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Introduction
e m m A  H u n t e r
A f r I C A ,  I t  I s  O f t e n  s A I d ,  I s  s u f f e r I n g  f r O m  A  C r I s I s  O f 
citizenship.1 Since the return of multiparty politics, new dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion have led to the denial of rights and privileges 
to those designated as “strangers.”2 in a continent where movement has 
always been the norm, designating particular groups as outsiders and 
seeking to exclude them from political rights on that basis has proved a 
tempting political tactic.3 At the same time, even those who enjoy the 
legal status of citizenship and the political rights that flow from it face 
difficulties in approaching the state as active citizens engaged in ruling 
themselves.4
 At the heart of contemporary debates over citizenship in Africa lie 
dynamic exchanges between the present and the past, between politi-
cal theory and political practice, and between legal categories and lived 
experience. yet studies of citizenship in Africa have often tended to 
foreshorten historical time and to privilege the present at the expense of 
the past. the very term citizen is often understood as relevant primarily 
to the postcolonial state, limiting comparative analysis of political status 
across space and time. As we shall see, this neglect of history poses 
problems, given that theories of contemporary African politics often 
rest heavily on readings of the past.
 more broadly, a tension has emerged between the approach taken 
by historians and that taken by social scientists. Among the latter, 
it has become axiomatic that colonial states were characterized by a 
dichotomy between subjecthood and citizenship, representing a clear 
difference between the majority of the population and a privileged 
minority accorded full legal rights. But this focus on legal status and 
terminology misses the ways in which there have always been different 
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sorts of subjects, with different sorts of rights, duties, and prerogatives 
negotiated on the ground as much as defined in colonial law, in ways 
not captured by the citizen/subject dichotomy. Still more important, 
the focus on legal status means that we risk losing sight of broader dis-
cursive spheres in which political membership is articulated and claims 
are made. We need to look beyond the normative texts of colonial and 
postcolonial lawmaking and more closely into the domains of history, 
narrative, and social practice.5
 this is an opportune moment to survey the field and propose new 
ways forward. it emerges from a visiting fellowship program that 
brought five historians, political scientists, and sociologists from African 
universities to Cambridge in 2011–12 to work on the theme of citizen-
ship, belonging, and political community in Africa. the ideas explored 
here were developed over a series of seminars with invited speakers, 
a workshop in Cambridge, and a conference in nairobi. this volume 
necessarily includes only a small selection of the work presented at the 
Cambridge seminars and at the two conferences, but the contributions 
of all participants helped shape the arguments developed here.
 the aim of the book is twofold. in the first place, it seeks to pro-
vide a critical reflection on citizenship in Africa by bringing together 
scholars working with very different case studies and with very differ-
ent understandings of what is meant by citizenship. Second, by bring-
ing historians and social scientists into dialogue in the same volume, 
it argues that a revised reading of the past can offer powerful new 
perspectives on the present.
dialogues between disciplines
this book brings together nine case studies that take very different 
approaches. But while the contributors approach the issue from the 
perspective of varying disciplines, the differences between them are not 
reducible to those disciplinary differences. rather, they approach the 
issue along three thematic axes.
Civil and Civic Citizenship in Africa
if we see a legal definition of citizenship, or “civil citizenship” not as 
the definition of citizenship but as one element of a shared field, we 
can cast our eye back to the ways in which the governed engaged with 
their governors prior to, and later outwith or alongside, the institu-
tions of the modern state.6 this is a theme explored in more detail in 
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John Lonsdale’s chapter, but in brief, in precolonial Africa, struggles 
for citizenship focused on incorporation. Jonathon glassman’s work 
on nineteenth-century eastern Africa has led us to appreciate the im-
portance of struggles for inclusion. relationships between slaves and 
their owners were unequal, but by employing a common language of 
paternalist authority, slaves could seek to defend or enhance their po-
sitions. As glassman makes clear, they could employ an “ideological 
language of clientelism to express personal agendas that were aggressive 
and innovative.”7
 this is not surprising, for across precolonial Africa, establishing ties 
of personal dependence and inserting oneself into networks of authority 
were often more important than seeking autonomy.8 But these rela-
tionships were fluid and unstable. Chiefs sought to build authority and 
attract followers, but they knew that followers could, if they wished, 
go elsewhere. As Cherry Leonardi writes with reference to southern 
Sudan, “Chiefship itself had originated in mobility and migration, in 
terms of both the individual acquisition of linguistic and other foreign 
knowledge and the subsequent attraction of adherents. But this also 
gave chiefs’ followers their own means of holding chiefs to account by 
the threat and practice of further migration to alternative patrons: ‘no 
chief wanted his people to leave him.’”9
 While some have argued that the advent of the colonial state saw the 
extinguishing of older modes of interaction between governors and gov-
erned, the cases explored in this volume show clearly that in nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century Africa this process was never complete. far more 
striking is the interaction between the new institutional forms of the 
state and older practices that continued to have traction.
 in the Cape Colony of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
explored in this volume by nicole ulrich, Khoesan were largely ex-
cluded from the colonial legal order. this meant that they were left 
either to negotiate relations of dependency with frontier farmers or to 
bond together with other subordinated classes to better their position. 
the patchwork of legal statuses that characterized the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Cape began to be extinguished from the late eigh-
teenth century on, as colonial rulers acted to redefine sovereignty and 
political subjecthood and discursively to construct a relationship be-
tween the imperial state and the individual. ulrich’s chapter traces the 
way that this happened in the Cape with the replacement of dutch rule 
with British rule. While there was institutional continuity, the British 
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brought with them a new governing ethos underpinned by the category 
of the “British subject.” the result was that “masters and servants were 
brought into the same legal framework and, in theory, came to be re-
garded more or less as equal before the law,” a dramatic change from 
the dutch east india Company (VoC) system, which was, as ulrich 
reminds us, “designed to protect social hierarchies.”
 Colonial rulers described this relationship as reflecting a new concep-
tion of sovereignty, though at times they did so using old language, as 
in Zanzibar, where the term used in colonial citizenship laws was the 
old word for subject, raia.10 new conceptions of sovereignty provided 
new discursive and practical resources to colonial subjects. the claim to 
imperial citizenship was one such discursive resource, as ulrich shows 
in her chapter. Khoesan laborers “could look to the colonial state to se-
cure limited rights and protections, especially within the realm of labor 
relations.” in a postcolonial context, Aidan russell’s exploration of early 
postcolonial Burundi evocatively captures the ways in which Burundians 
on the border selectively employed the state’s language and turned it 
back at state officials as a way of proving their loyalty to the state. in 
other contexts, legalistic forms of claim making became increasingly 
important. Similarly, Cherry Leonardi’s informants in southern Sudan 
recalled going to the colonial courts “to claim one’s right,” as older modes 
of political practice were overlaid with a new juridical tone.11
 But while colonial laws and didactic texts focused on a relationship 
to the imperial state, everyday political life often took place at other 
levels of political belonging, with rights and duties negotiated through 
membership of political communities smaller than the state. individu-
als had different criteria for belonging, which themselves changed over 
time, and engaging with power often meant playing different forms of 
political membership off against each other. As Cherry Leonardi and 
Chris Vaughan show in their chapter, in 1940s and 1950s Sudan, “‘local’ 
and ‘national’ citizenship were interactive fields, rather than discrete 
spheres.”
 if the contributions of ulrich, russell, and Leonardi and Vaughan in 
this volume point to the need for studies that explore changing modes 
of engagement between governed and governors over the longue durée, 
what analytical tools might we employ to understand these? to answer 
this question, Aidan russell puts forward a compelling case for desta-
bilizing the common dichotomy between “citizen” and “subject” as a 
productive way forward. modernization narratives offer an account of a 
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gradual transition from subjecthood to universal citizenship, a narrative 
partially arrested in colonial Africa by the dichotomy produced by colo-
nial states, whereby some were granted the status of citizens and others 
left subject to authoritarian chiefs.12 But for russell, “the distinction 
of subject and citizen is simultaneously an informative and a mislead-
ing principle of analysis.” exploring the “daily practices and expressions 
of people and state” in early postcolonial Burundi, russell finds that 
“as the terms and obsessions of state authority shifted, the people of 
Burundi certainly acted the subject, yet frequently too they made the 
claims of active citizens, blended obedience with negotiation and loy-
alty with invocation, and conformed to political realities while seeking 
to shift them toward their interest.” the focus on practice and agency, 
in dialogue with state discourse and legal status, comes out clearly too 
in Samantha Balaton-Chrimes’s case study of the nubians of Kenya, 
making the case, in her words, for “an account of citizenship as a multi-
dimensional legal status and political condition that is constructed and 
contested by agential political subjects.”
 All four of these chapters thus bring out the interplay of state 
discourses and shifting modes of practicing citizenship from below. At 
the same time, they also point us to the ways in which the limits of 
political community, as well as who is included and excluded from any 
given political community, are subject to negotiation.
Deep Histories of Inclusion and Exclusion
Several of the contributors to this volume define citizenship in terms of 
a legal status granted or withheld by the state, which gives those hold-
ing it access to a set of rights and demands of them certain duties. yet 
their contributions demonstrate that the apparent modularity of this 
conception of citizenship conceals historical battles over how the limits 
of inclusion and exclusion are defined and thus over the boundaries of 
political community. far from history demonstrating a gradual but ulti-
mately unidirectional path, there is an alternative history of institutional 
experiments and roads not taken. Citizenship has always been, in Luise 
White’s words, a “slippery category.”13 in this regard, the transition from 
one imperial system to another and the unraveling of imperial systems 
in the era of decolonization were particularly important.14
 As we have seen, the advent of British rule in the Cape gave Khoesan 
access to a new language of imperial citizenship. this language of 
imperial citizenship functioned as a weapon in argument more than 
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settled fact, yet, as Leonardi and Vaughan point out, its appearance in 
the rhetoric of petitions tells us something interesting about changing 
conceptions of political community in the colonial era.
 the same was true of the moment of decolonization, as frederick 
Cooper reminds us in his postscript to this volume. decolonizing states 
did not have to take an off-the-shelf model of territorial citizenship; 
they could experiment with alternative and more expansive models. 
the twists and turns taken by these experiments are brought to life 
in Henri-michel yéré’s chapter, which explores félix Houphouët-
Boigny’s attempt to introduce “double nationality” to early postcolonial 
ivory Coast. this was not a straightforward policy of dual citizenship; 
rather, Houphouët-Boigny had in mind a system whereby “nationals of 
different West African states could benefit from the same rights and 
duties as citizens of their host country without being citizens.” for 
Houphouët-Boigny, this was a political move, designed to shore up 
support and pursue African unity on his terms. yet it failed, rejected 
by a group of elite ivorians for whom it seemed to herald fewer jobs 
and opportunities. yéré analyzes this controversy as a struggle between 
two alternative conceptions of citizenship: Houphouët-Boigny’s recon-
stituted version of french imperial citizenship on the one hand and a 
conception of ivorian citizenship on the other. in doing so, he demon-
strates the centrality of struggles over citizenship to the decolonization 
process and the making of postcolonial states.
 Had it succeeded, Houphouët-Boigny’s model would have both 
destabilized and reinforced hierarchies of citizenship between ivori-
ans and other nationals of other West African states. the importance 
of hierarchies of citizenship is emphasized too in the case studies of 
mauritius and Kenya. in mauritius, as ramola ramtohul shows, where 
hierarchies of citizenship had been established historically and the pur-
pose for which groups had originally come to the island served to define 
their position in mauritius’s social hierarchy, a franco-mauritian elite 
sought to use their “claim of being the ‘authentic’ mauritian population 
that legitimately deserved to lead the country” to exclude others from 
political rights. Similarly, for the nubians of Kenya, Balaton-Chrimes 
argues, only by tracing the history of the community within Kenya can 
we understand the “way in which today’s nubians are marginalized by 
the nation’s contemporary citizenship.”
 more generally, the case of the nubians reminds us, in Balaton-
Chrimes’s words, that “political membership has historically been 
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negotiated in dialogue with, rather than purely determined by, colonial 
(and postcolonial) legal and political status,” and this is as true of the 
present as of the past.15 At the same time, all three of these case studies 
pay particular attention to the mid-twentieth century and reinforce the 
point, made most forcefully by yéré, that the struggles over inclusion 
and exclusion that have dominated contemporary politics in much of 
Africa and that are often traced to the effects of political liberalization 
after 1989 have a much longer history than we might think.16 that said, 
the political landscape has changed dramatically since 1989, and with 
this in mind it is to contemporary Africa that i now turn.
Multicultural Citizenship in Africa
the growing importance in contemporary Africa of struggles over au-
tochthony or indigeneity compels us to interrogate the category of civil 
citizenship and reflect on the ways in which Africa has, in recent years, 
become a testing ground for new conceptions of multicultural citizen-
ship. While the modernization theories of the mid-twentieth century 
assumed a trajectory toward the existence of homogenous nation-states, 
the unexpected persistence of subnational identities, particularly ethnic 
identities, in postcolonial Africa has led scholars and activists to con-
sider how models of citizenship that leave space for difference might be 
constructed.
 in this vein, some have stressed the potential for a new multicultural 
citizenship to open up new paths for “meaningful citizenship.”17 Peter 
ekeh argued many years ago that in Africa we see the working out 
of a duality created by colonial rule whereby there are effectively two 
bases of citizenship: one “official” and determined by the state; and the 
other “unofficial” or “primordial,” defined by local communities on the 
basis of birth.18 the two publics have different norms of behavior. the 
civic public is, ekeh argued, fundamentally amoral, a space in which 
material gains are pursued without the need to give anything back. this 
is a sphere of rights rather than duties. in contrast, the “primordial” 
public is a sphere of duties more than of rights; more important, it is a 
moral space to be contrasted with the amorality of the civic sphere. thus, 
whereas in the West, ekeh argues, citizenship is conceived in terms of 
a transactional relationship of rights and duties, in Africa rights and 
duties are partitioned between two separate and rival spheres of citi-
zenship.19 there is therefore an uncertain fit between the relationship 
of an individual in relation to the state and vernacular conceptions of 
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citizenship determined locally, and in more recent work ekeh has de-
veloped this idea further, arguing that whereas in the Hobbesian tradi-
tion individuals go to the state in search of protection, in Africa they 
go to ethnic kinsmen in pursuit of protection from the state. As a result, 
“[t]he bonds of mistrust between states and individuals in Africa are 
replaced with bonds of moral sentiments binding individuals who share 
a common ethnicity.”20
 But crucially, in ekeh’s work, as in more recent analyses that pursue a 
similar line of inquiry, there is potential for the rural domain of culture 
to be a space in which to develop practices of what Lahra Smith terms 
“meaningful citizenship.”21 this is a line of interpretation that we see in 
John Lonsdale’s work on Kenya. in the Kenyan examples that Lonsdale 
explores, ethnic citizenship was not simply a domain in which individu-
als gave of themselves in return for protection; rather, it was a domain of 
moral argument, in which the proper relationship between young and 
old, rich and poor was worked out and in which unequal social relations 
were made bearable. this was, in ekeh’s terms, a domain of both rights 
and duties. more than that, Lonsdale shows that the development of a 
moral ethnic public in the colonial period did not preclude the develop-
ment of other forms of citizenship, national or imperial, both in the 
colonial period and more recently.
 Building on this argument and seeking to extend it more widely, 
Lahra Smith argues that “[w]hat scholars of diversity and multicultur-
alism theory in the west offer is a dynamic and optimistic view of the 
role of identity politics in supporting democratization. Adopting and 
modifying this theoretical approach would radically change the pes-
simistic and defeatist tone of what is typically studied as ‘ethnic politics’ 
in the African context.”22 for Smith, the lens of “meaningful citizen-
ship” means that “certain kinds of claims, such as ethnic and gendered 
claims by citizens, can be read as liberatory and democratizing rather 
than atavistic or primordial, as both the western media and dominant 
political regimes would have us conclude.”23 Her findings lead her to 
be more optimistic about a process of “citizen expansion” at the local 
level, which she identifies in ethiopia in the early twenty-first century, 
than studies of formal political institutions and quantitative measures of 
democratization in ethnically plural states would suggest.
 these arguments are in part supported by ramtohul’s case study. 
in mauritius, recognizing difference at the moment of independence 
allowed for the creation of a stable and durable political system. A 
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relatively optimistic note is also struck by eghosa osaghae in his over-
view chapter. While he remains committed to a goal of equal citizen-
ship, he argues that in contrast to earlier eras of state building when 
the state simply denied ethnic difference, post-1989 the “increased in-
volvement of civil society in citizenship construction makes the process 
more discerning of diversity and the imperatives of equitable rights and 
accountability and therefore more likely to endure as a negotiated rather 
than a received paradigm.”
 But for Solomon gofie, we should be wary of the power of recog-
nizing ethnic identities by itself to make civic engagement more pos-
sible. exploring the ethiopian case, he argues that far from enhancing 
the ability of ethiopian citizens to engage with the state through its 
celebration of the right to recognition of ethiopia’s “peoples,” in fact 
“the propagation of the discourse of ‘the peoples’ accompanied by state 
control of land and the curtailment of freedom of expression and as-
sociation has acted to reinforce state control and restrict the ability of 
ethiopia’s citizens to engage with the state.” in his chapter he describes 
the ways in which the governing ePrdf regime in ethiopia has used 
a language of recognizing group rights as a means of imposing power.
 Adefemi isumonah too sounds a cautionary note, fearing that the 
reification of “indigene” identities risks ignoring the fact that social 
change, mobility, and urbanization mean that individual rights may 
be becoming more important than group identities for nigerians. in 
his chapter, isumonah explores the “contradictions of the pro-ethno-
territorial approaches to rights in nigeria,” arguing against the pref-
erence for group rights as the best guarantor of individual freedoms. 
Both isumonah and gofie question the idea implicit in recent thinking 
about multicultural citizenship that recognizing group rights is the best 
route to a more engaged citizenry. the discussion of colonial-era en-
gagements with new languages of individual rights and conceptions of 
imperial citizenship suggests that Africans have found these languages 
useful in confronting authoritarian states in the past and may well do so 
again in the future.
the Past in the Present
Why does this matter? in the first place, asking questions about citizen-
ship in Africa’s past as well as its present is important because it helps 
us better understand that past. We begin to see aspects of power and 
its operation that we might otherwise miss, hidden beneath powerful 
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narratives of “modernization” or “democratization.” this volume there-
fore serves as an invitation and encouragement to historians to go fur-
ther in exploring the ways in which citizenship is practiced in particular 
historical contexts, embracing citizenship as an analytical category not 
restricted to specific forms of engagement with the modern state.
 But this volume also seeks to make the argument that a better un-
derstanding of the past is relevant in trying to understand our present 
condition and the future prospects of democracy in Africa. to see why, 
we return now to consider briefly the reasons that scholars have recently 
become so interested in the issue of citizenship.
 in Africa, the return of multiparty elections in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s was greeted with initial enthusiasm followed by disappoint-
ment. While the model of authoritarian one-party rule that had existed 
since the mid-1960s rapidly became hard to defend on the international 
stage and new parties appeared across the continent, elections did not 
seem to provide an effective means of peacefully replacing incumbent 
parties. As scholars sought to understand the limits of elections, some 
turned to the political cultures that had been created in the colonial 
period and concluded that these political cultures militated against the 
creation of democratic citizenship in the postcolony. the colonial state, 
some scholars argued, should be understood as a regime of subjecthood 
and clientship, not citizenship.24 And the persistence of patron-client 
relations in the postcolonial state seemed to preclude the potential for 
citizenship as active participation in the civic humanist tradition.
 these debates were in some ways specific to Africa but were also 
part of a wider conversation about citizenship and democracy that had 
developed since the 1980s, when the forces of economic and political 
liberalization in an era of growing consciousness of globalization began 
to inspire a developing interest in the concept of citizenship. What did 
it mean to belong to a political community? What was the state willing 
to do for its citizens, and what could it do in an era when global forces 
seemed to be becoming more powerful than nation-states?25 As politi-
cal liberalization opened up the possibility of fundamentally reshaping 
the boundaries and limits of political communities, ethno-nationalist 
politics and the demand by minority groups for recognition of their 
differences returned to public political debate across the world, from 
Canada to ethiopia.
 in seeking to explain the apparent crisis of citizenship in contem-
porary Africa, many scholars have turned to the colonial past and the 
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political culture that colonial regimes helped to create. Bruce Berman, 
dickson eyoh, and Will Kymlicka describe the colonial state as one 
in which “people related as subjects and clients, rather than citizens, to 
an authoritarian state.”26 for mahmood mamdani, the system of gov-
ernment established in the colonial era that denied citizenship rights 
to African subjects in rural Africa helped create the basis of postcolo-
nial authoritarianism.27 this, it has been suggested, helps explain why, 
twenty-five years after the return to multiparty democracy in much of 
sub-Saharan Africa, voters seldom throw incumbent governments out 
of office.
 the colonial past has thus become crucial to understanding the 
present. But which colonial past? for social scientists, creating a useable 
past has meant ironing out many of the ambiguities and contradictions 
of that past and relying on a particular narrative of modernization that, 
in the case of Africa, is deemed to have failed. Attention has focused 
on the way in which colonial states simultaneously imposed a model 
of civil citizenship as a universal norm and at the same time denied 
access to the rights it offered to most of their African subjects. this is a 
narrative of the past in which opportunities for the governed to engage 
with their governors come only with the birth of the modern state and 
are incompatible both with precolonial modes of political authority and 
with colonial states that granted political rights to a few but denied 
them to the many.
 yet the historical case studies collected here demonstrate clearly that 
the governed have always sought to engage their governors, though they 
have done so in different ways at different times. this deeper history 
demands to be taken seriously, for it helped to shape the ways in which 
Africans engaged with their colonial and postcolonial rulers. At the 
same time, putting history into dialogue with contemporary social sci-
ence forcefully makes the point that those concerned with policy mak-
ing in the present need to be much more sensitive to local differences 
and to the ways in which conceptions of citizenship are worked out in 
different ways in different places.
Structure of the Volume
the volume begins with a chapter by John Lonsdale, making a strong 
argument for the importance of history in understanding citizenship 
in Africa. the remainder of the volume is divided into three parts, 
followed by a postscript. Part 1 takes the familiar distinction between 
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“citizens” and “subjects” but destabilizes it through three historical case 
studies from the Cape, Burundi, and Sudan. Part 2 takes seriously the 
“slipperiness” of citizenship and explores three case studies from across 
the continent—ivory Coast, mauritius, and Kenya, focusing on the era 
of decolonization. Part 3 moves to contemporary Africa, combining an 
overview chapter by eghosa osaghae with case studies from nigeria 
and ethiopia. finally, in his postscript frederick Cooper offers his re-
flections on the volume and the issues it raises.
 taken together, the contributors to this book demonstrate some of 
the ways in which a revised understanding of citizenship in the colonial 
and early postcolonial state can help set contemporary debates in a new 
light and offer new avenues for creative thinking about the building of 
democratic cultures in Africa. While the chapters range widely in geo-
graphical and chronological focus, as well as in the debates they explore, 
what unites them is a desire to bring Africa’s deep historical past into 
dialogue with the present, in ways that might also indicate new paths 
for the future.
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Unhelpful Pasts and a Provisional Present
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political conflict throughout history. Subjects and slaves have been 
ready to die in order to attain the more secure, free, and responsible 
status of citizen—whether two thousand years ago in roman italy,1 in 
the european revolutions that began with dutch revolt and english 
civil war, in the many American wars of independence, in Caribbean 
and West African slave revolts, in the white-settled parts of Africa half 
a century ago, or in the ukraine and Syria of today. these contemporary 
examples remind us that would-be citizens may oppose each other as 
well as their state. for citizenship is a protean and dynamic condition; 
its rights, liberties, and obligations relate people not only to their rulers 
but also to fellow citizens who differ both in social class and, increas-
ingly, in ethnic or religious culture. Competitive self-interest shapes 
these relations, whether vertical in terms of social class or horizontal, 
between cultural communities. But, as this book’s subtitle suggests, self-
interest commonly looks for moral support in those past precedents that 
come most usefully to mind. the question i ask here is whether either 
of two potential histories of precedent, Western and African, can help 
Africans to argue and resolve today’s policies, strategies, and practices 
of citizenship.
 Some questions about citizenship are in any case never settled; their 
contexts vary and mutate. one set of questions concerns the eligibility, 
costs, and benefits of citizenship. eligibility, who is or is not qualified 
to be a citizen, can alter with demographic and economic change—as 
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contemporary world history bears witness, with its rise in narrower 
ideas of who has local rights of “belonging” and who, by contrast, is now 
a “stranger.”2 the costs of citizenship in duty and loyalty also fluctuate, 
most obviously between times of war and peace. the depth and range 
of benefits in personal freedoms and public services, too, are notoriously 
affected by economic cycles, regional inequalities, class differentiation, 
and administrative (in)competence. other questions arise from the cul-
tural diversity typical of a global modernity. How far can or should 
varied loyalties, religious beliefs, and cultural practices, or a plurality of 
land rights, mother tongues, and family laws be tolerated, even celebrated, 
within one citizenry? the answer will vary with ruling ideology and 
partisan pressure, and both can clearly change. fear of mutual threat can 
give way to trust in a shared strength, so deepening the solidarity that 
best enables citizens to keep an effective watch on state power. recent 
history in every continent suggests that the reverse is the more likely, 
but the point remains: group stereotypes and prejudices, and with them 
the limits placed on active citizenship, are not immutable.3
 How citizenship is imagined, secured, and performed, therefore, can 
only be the local and provisional outcome of continuing societal struggle 
from top and bottom. from above, prudent rulers aim to secure loyalty 
and service; but their promises of prosperity and protection can well be 
turned against them as tests by which their citizens may call them to ac-
count.4 from below, subjects or the lower classes, second-class citizens, 
have to fight to claim and retain rights of representation, justice, and 
welfare. All negotiations of citizenship are, as suggested, likely to call 
on precedent—to encourage or to warn. Students of Africa can think 
of two seemingly opposed ways of interrogating possibly relevant pasts. 
first, print preserves what at first glance seems to be “the West’s” long 
accumulation of universal wisdom. Secondly, while past African speech 
may be more mutable in memory and in its oral transmission, it does at 
least seem to teach local lessons. But, to answer my opening question, 
each history may be less helpful than it seems.
An instructive “Western” Past?
Are “Western” print arguments about states and citizens, centuries 
in the making, so different from the oratory of yesterday’s unlettered 
African elders? Both stores of political thought, canonized in print 
or unreliably remembered, have taken their several origins in partisan 
argument designed to win support in disputed times. even when we 
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accept the polemical nature common to both print and oral pasts, it 
is all too tempting to refer to supposedly superior, Western, bookish 
criteria when analyzing or, too often, judging African political practice. 
We have to remind ourselves that Western political theory is not uni-
versal, a standing rebuke to others; it is as contextually contingent and 
combative in local origin and purpose as the ideas orally enunciated 
elsewhere in the world.5
 intellectual historians have long abandoned the notions either that 
classical texts express timeless wisdom or that there has been an advance 
in enlightenment, with generations of political philosophers standing 
on their predecessors’ shoulders to see more clearly. But an unwary ob-
server may still wonder at what looks like an evolutionary teleology, 
from Plato to the united nations charter, that foretells our currently 
hegemonic principle: which is that legitimate power rests in a liberal 
democracy obedient to a universal franchise exercised by citizens who 
know their human rights. this appearance of political progress can even 
be imagined as an unsleeping, critical consultation with the inexorable 
rise in the coercive power, bureaucratic reach, and moral ambition of the 
world’s polities. But all that imagined history is now in question; nation-
states are today said to be threatened by the blind forces of globalization, 
abetted by a neoliberal philosophy of individual rights that pays no heed 
to social obligation. As things stand (at present), therefore, the Western 
experience of relations between state and citizen is divided. Some states, 
france perhaps most obstinately, still aspire to honor an ageing social 
democracy, in a contract to protect citizens from the inequities of global 
markets.6 more states repudiate such expensive undertakings, profess-
ing instead a neoliberal faith in the productive energies and redistribu-
tive potential that are in theory released when autonomous individuals 
are liberated from their former social solidarities, their citizenship. thus 
divided in the lessons they draw from their particular past, Western ob-
servers are well advised to keep an open mind on how Africans work out 
their still-unsettled meanings of citizenship, informed and misinformed 
by pasts of their own.
 it is in any case difficult to see any coherence in european thought 
and practice in the two broad fields of citizenship most discussed today, 
not only in Africa. these concern personal eligibility for civic status 
and how, if at all, cultural diversity should be publicly recognized, if all 




 even the first criterion for citizenship, one’s very existence, can be 
debated. Civic rights may be based either on one’s place of birth, jus 
solis, or one’s cultural genealogy, jus sanguinis, or on both, in changeable 
proportions. other criteria change too. in the not-distant past, a West-
ern citizen had to meet variable criteria of supposed civic responsibility: 
to be a man rather than a woman, to be freeborn rather than slave, to 
own property, to have a certain income or a specified profession, and so 
on. Cultural diversity, next, is a matter of concern if people are agreed 
to be social rather than autonomous beings. if that is so, then our public 
personality is privately constituted by those closest to us in language, re-
ligion, and daily custom. this intimate social formation—subjectivation, 
as our french cousins call it—is everywhere becoming more “multicul-
tural” as historically constructed cultural majorities receive immigrant 
minorities. How should this and other social differences affect the 
mutual obligations of citizenship? Some argue that equal rights require 
formal respect for difference, even a promise of future cultural protec-
tion. But group and individual rights conflict: such a protected future 
would surely have to permit freedom of dissent, to allow members of 
both majority and minority groups to choose to adopt a different cul-
tural identity.7
 in conducting what can only be an absurdly brief inquiry into the 
history of Western political thought,8 to see whether it offers guidance 
in such dilemmas, one is struck by both the recurrence, not evolution, 
of a limited repertoire of constitutional relations between states and 
citizens and also the dreadful ends that can result from attempts to con-
struct culturally unified citizenries, intolerant of difference.
 if one thinks, first, of the qualifications required for citizenship, our 
classical starting points, Athens and rome, seem remarkably similar and 
equally contradictory. these slave-based polities—to which the Ameri-
cas and many African kingdoms bore a marked resemblance as recently 
as the nineteenth century—initially restricted citizenship to freeborn, 
able-bodied, male family heads, men who carried private responsibility 
and who, being liable to military service, also had an eye to the possible 
cost of public decisions. in due course, both the city of Athens and 
the roman empire created a graduated citizenship by extending some, 
not all, rights to the free poor. But, and here was the contradiction, 
each polity also upheld the absolute right of wealthy family heads to 
rule their dependants, both slave and free. While poor citizens sought 
protection as clients to such powerful patrons, such submission also 
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abridged their few civic rights. the tension between free citizenship 
and subservient clientage is certainly not peculiar to modern Africa, and 
its personal frictions can on occasion inspire what it appears designed to 
deter, political activism from below.9
 the exclusion of dependent persons, including women, from full 
political rights has, then, been as much Western as African. not until 
after the first or (in the cases of france, greece, and italy) the Second 
World War did european women gain the vote. this represented not 
so much constitutional evolution as a reversion to the classical connec-
tion between a citizen’s liability to military risk and his or her political 
entitlement. Was it because they lived in a neutral country with their 
home front unthreatened by war that Swiss women were denied the 
vote until 1971, a decade after most African women? europe cannot 
claim much evolutionary superiority when it comes to promoting sub-
jects to citizenship. today, moreover, fewer europeans than Africans 
go out to vote. this idle contentment with the thinnest of citizenships, 
this failure in republican duty, ought to add to our reluctance to criti-
cize others.
 nor is the european story of granting equal civic dignity to cultural 
diversity any better. it would be hard to think of a more dreadful history. 
it started well enough. two thousand years ago, in rome, Cicero argued 
that to respect a conquered people’s hyphenated identity, both local and 
roman, would best ensure their loyalty. the fourteenth-century italian 
jurist Bartolus of Sassoferrato agreed, for the practical lawyer’s reason 
that local customary law was more likely to be respected than distant 
imperial edicts. these wisdoms then seem to have been forgotten. in 
the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques rousseau persuaded revolution-
ary france that subordinate allegiances were conspiracies against the 
public interest—in terms echoed by most of Africa’s postcolonial nation 
builders.
 Learning from the french revolution, europe’s nineteenth-century 
rulers set out to build unified nations out of diverse peoples, only a 
century before Africa’s tried to do the same. in so doing, both created 
suspect strangers out of people whose difference was previously held, at 
worst, to be potentially rebellious rather than existentially treacherous.10 
Compulsory schooling and military conscription so eroded this former 
diversity that continued difference did indeed appear to be conspira-
torial. Jews are only the best known because the most grievously op-
pressed of such supposed traitors to the new nations. it was in europe 
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that the logic of national unity was followed to the bestial lengths of the 
holocaust, or shoa, a genocidal destruction carried out in the context of 
two world wars, even bloodier rituals of nationhood.11 “the West” has 
no cause to feel superior to Africa even when remembering rwanda, 
darfur, or Zanzibar.12 the universal declaration of Human rights, 
adopted by the united nations in 1948 and an inspiration to many Af-
rican activists,13 was a reproof, not a tribute, to recent european history. 
europe’s pasts are no moral tutor to Africa’s present—but are Africa’s 
pasts any better equipped?
relevant “African” Pasts?
it is even more foolish to generalize about African than european 
history; the continent once held more numerous polities and peoples, 
more varied in their means of living and governance, than early mod-
ern europe. one generalization does, however, seem safer than others. 
it has two stages, demographic and political. first, before 1900 the 
population of sub-Saharan Africa was relatively sparse in relation to 
natural resources; in most regions there were limited supplies of labor 
and unlimited supplies of land. Second, given that land was more or 
less freely available, wealth and power came most economically from 
investment in the allegiance of scarce people, whose rational answer 
to any oppression would be migration rather than resistance. Africa’s 
many internal frontiers offered asylum, opportunities to negotiate a 
greater self-reliance.14 it was difficult, therefore, for Africans to build 
states strong enough to control the allocation of scarce resources, 
land especially.15
 three consequences of this difficulty are thought to have followed; 
they all question the present relevance of Africa’s pasts. these are, first, 
the quasi-Athenian distinction between slave and free that was found in 
many former kingdoms; next, the vulnerability of kinless, autonomous 
individuals in contrast to the relative security from bondage or starva-
tion one gained by belonging to a recognized community; and finally, 
the managerial authority accorded to male household heads—again like 
Athens or rome.
 Africa’s states tended to cluster in those rare environments where 
peasants could practice settled rather than shifting agriculture, even at 
the cost of submitting themselves to the demands of power. Well-
watered highland ethiopia was one such region, the great Lakes area 
of eastern Africa another, the coastal forests of West Africa a third. 
23
Unhelpful  Pasts  and a  Provis ional  Present
even in these favored areas, relatively ungoverned frontiers offered a 
refugee answer to misrule. Kings therefore had to rule with discrimi-
nation if they were to retain Africa’s obstinately mobile people; to 
maintain a distinction between slave and free was central to statecraft. 
many kingdoms sought to bind the loyalty of free householders by 
offloading drudgery and danger onto slaves—although slaves could 
also rise to high office, especially in royal armies. in some areas of 
West Africa, slaves might constitute one-third of the population, 
conscripted from among the already kinless: whether prisoners of 
war, convicted criminals, or famished debtors. for one to have a good 
chance of remaining free, it paid to surrender one’s autonomy to some 
hierarchy of tributary belonging.16
 the constitutional history of Africa’s kingdoms—unfashionable 
in european studies—shows that householders had alternative ways 
to invest in this social capital of belonging and so win a status that 
could, without too much exaggeration, be called citizenship. one, a 
paradox found in the coastal kingdom of dahomey, was to claim to be 
the property of the king, worthy of his protection. the second, more 
common, was to enter into client membership of—if one were not al-
ready born into—some tribute-paying group. Asante and Buganda, on 
opposite sides of the continent, provide well-known examples. their 
kings, as elsewhere, exercised power by sharing it out among powerful 
subjects with useful followings—tributary “clans” that performed the 
ritual, administrative, and military tasks that built royal power and 
in so doing might also check despotism. Clan notables boosted their 
authority with personal clients; these could in turn try to improve 
their prospects by submitting to another patron whose star was rising 
at court: client mobility gave monarchical constitutions political his-
tories. the benefits of something like citizenship could be acquired, 
then, by energetic belonging to a recognized community, by personal 
clientelage to a notable, or, in dahomey, by a seemingly abject but 
nonetheless alert submission.17 Several questions arise: Are these con-
stitutional histories still useful? Are similar strategies of enlisting or 
taming state power still available, now reinforced by the gravitational 
pull of the franchise rather than the centrifugal threat of migration? 
or do the social reciprocities of Africa’s frontier peoples, more or less 
stateless as they were, offer a more relevant past?
 Before 1900 most Africans probably lived stateless lives, without 
kings. Statelessness was not indiscipline; “republican” liberties are 
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famously demanding. obedience to reciprocal obligation, not easy for 
the poor, was the fee for social insurance—an expectation of support 
from one’s close kin and wider community at times of domestic or natu-
ral disaster. these communities of local belonging are properly called 
“ethnic,” culturally informed and externally defined by their expert 
knowledge of how to live well in a specific environment. Best seen as 
a mosaic of inter-active discursive arenas, they were neither the closed 
descent groups of the colonial imagination nor the egalitarian utopias of 
nationalist myth. Pastoralists were the most unequal; their poor simply 
ceased to be members.18 Household management (and its productive 
expertise) was the peak of civic virtue, never an equal attainment. it also 
carried responsibility because success was never single-handed. Wealth 
depended on the energy of people, kin and clients who, in return, ex-
pected from their patron assets that they could then invest in married 
households of their own.19 is Africa’s stateless history therefore any 
more helpfully instructive for today than that of its states?
 An answer to that question has to reflect the memory of the dark 
underside of African history, that nightmare of the poor, those who 
failed to earn the social capital of belonging. in their marginalized expe-
rience, all power, even the power of stateless social hierarchy, was a zero-
sum game; it grew by repudiating reciprocal relations of trust, not by 
cultivating loyalty. Africa’s slave masters in particular, kings and nobles, 
had on this view sucked their well-fed life from out of wider society. 
their european partners in the human traffic were likewise believed to 
prosper by employing slaves under the sea, making the goods imported 
in exchange for people. this terrifying vampirism betrayed the moral 
economy of underpopulation in which, to repeat, one earned civic virtue 
by supporting industrious kin and clients with the assets that offered 
them personal self-mastery within their community of belonging. Lin-
guistic historians can trace such a moral premise in “long-term regional 
histories of durable bundles of meaning and practice.”20 But it was a 
fragile premise, dependent on the scarcity of labor.
 the old moral economy of wealth in people, of enabling patronage, 
was never universal, and today labor is all too abundant; productive land 
has now become the scarcer factor of production. Africa’s demography 
was revolutionized in the past century, a greater change than colonial 
rule and decolonization. from the 1920s to the 1950s, the population in-
creased from around 142 million to 200 million;21 by 2000 it had reached 
700 million and today stands at one billion. Almost unlimited supplies 
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of labor now compete for limited resources. this reversal in value be-
tween land and people means that migrant strangers are less welcome 
as clients or workers; that title to land and rights in its usage are more 
narrowly defined and fiercely disputed; and that clients can expect both 
a less generous endowment, if any, from a patron’s domain and less free-
dom to choose an alternative protector.22 in all, the poor have fewer 
hopes for social mobility while rulers enjoy more unrestrained power.
 for many, therefore, past meaning and practice have become menac-
ing rather than inspirational. memory can conjure up sinister “phantoms 
from different layers of time [that] flow into each other”, revived by im-
ages of gluttonous elites who “eat” public assets. one common phantom 
is the invisible power with which undue personal ambition consumes 
the spirit of those whom it outstrips, whose envy can in turn destroy 
success. these witchcraft beliefs, “the dark side of kinship,” flourish on 
the resentment spawned by the previously unimaginable inequalities 
of wealth and power that are the fruit of political freedoms enjoyed 
within a global capitalism. this “spiritual insecurity” poses obvious 
problems for democracy. Politicians can appear to enjoy an invulnerable 
occult power; conversely, popular fear of neighbors can provoke vigi-
lante demands for rough justice that no modern government can satisfy. 
Citizens may in consequence succumb the more readily to “the ordinary 
apathy of normal political life.”23
 in a world of competing beliefs, Africans struggle as much as anybody 
else with their rational and existential doubts that witchcraft accusations 
can ever locate moral responsibility. the anxieties that lie behind per-
sonal quests for an honorable belonging perhaps help to explain two of 
today’s complementary developments. first, many local communities are 
ever more insistent on their exclusive rights as putative firstcomers, sons 
of the soil, hostile to the immigrant strangers in their midst, even those 
of several generations’ standing who once added to a locality’s wealth in 
scarce people. Second, many urban elites, as keen to redeem their debt 
to a locality that funded their education as to appease the envy of less-
fortunate kin, pay generous attention to their rural districts of origin.24 
these communal phenomena, one of boundary making, the other of 
investment in local reputation, point to what many believe to be the 
chief obstacle for the sentiment and practice of full and equal African 
citizenship—namely, ethnic diversity, what used to be called tribalism.
 the history of ethnicity, its mutation through time—as one of a 
possible set of identities, moral communities, linguistic arenas, political 
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constituencies, or frameworks of social action—is a contested topic in 
African historiography.25 Before colonial rule, as we have seen, there 
were two ethnic conditions: statish and stateless. Both welcomed and 
assimilated strangers, often allowing mobility upward from servitude. 
Within kingdoms, numbers and varied skills added to a clan’s political 
power. elsewhere, beyond the reach of states, ethnicity, as suggested, was 
discursively related to the technical and managerial skills best suited to 
a particular ecological niche.26 fresh hands, often those of neighboring 
famine victims, could be assimilated; family strategies of insurance and 
accumulation often favored wives from elsewhere.
 given this dual state and nonstate history, scholars have disputed 
how far the need of european colonial rulers to name, map, and “read” 
their subjects obliged Africans to think and act within more closely 
defined “tribes” than before. Historians have thus far paid less attention 
to the likely consequences of demographic change. All that can be said 
with any certainty is that the internal arguments and external boundaries 
of community have, throughout history and all over the world, been 
subject to continual change, responsive to the contingencies of demo-
graphic, political, and economic context.27
 But how does that truism clarify the question of ethnic difference 
and national citizenship, on which the european past has so little to 
boast? Colonial rule, a stronger form of state than Africans had previ-
ously known, certainly changed the competitive context and therefore 
tended to harden the boundaries of belonging. ethnic membership, like 
past clanship, became the most accessible collective voice with which 
to seek both social solidarity and economic protection, and to make 
political claims. Local arguments about how old moral economy should 
accommodate social change summoned up comparative dialogues with 
wider pasts, thanks to a spreading knowledge of the global precedents 
suggested in the Qur’an or Bible, the latter in its varied vernaculars. 
What changed most was the character of those who led the discussion, 
as well as their means of communication. Wealthy elders, household 
heads, used to set social norms by their legal decisions, prescriptive in 
small localities. they began to be challenged by teachers, preachers, and 
clerks, whose authority came not from managing domestic production 
but from literacy, the magical new technology for taming the occult 
forces and abstruse paper of an alien state. Literacy also had a wider 
convening power than elders’ speech, reaching along the routes taken by 
migrant workers and into their workplaces; it enabled one to conceive 
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of wider boundaries of belonging. Simplified, unified, morally uplift-
ing print histories proved that these imagined ethnic communities had 
exercised civilized self-rule in the past and so were worthy of imperial 
recognition.28 Africans were claiming citizenship in the modern world 
long before independence.29
 How far colonized Africans were able to think and act in this way 
as creative citizens rather than as deferential clients under the “tribal” 
practices of european rule is another contested issue; it divides the 
contributors to this volume.30 But the point, surely, is that past Afri-
can history had demonstrated that protective potential could lie within 
different concepts of social and political belonging. the colonial era 
was similarly tolerant of diverse degrees of subjecthood, as the present 
volume also shows. the ideological ambiguities of the colonial rulers 
themselves, both french and British, encouraged different African ap-
proaches to the possibility of political agency, of citizenship.31
 the french found it difficult to deny their African subjects, espe-
cially salaried workers, the revolutionary promise of citizenship under 
the metropolitan banner of liberty, equality, and fraternity. to evade the 
costly welfare commitments to African workers implied in this promise 
was one motive of french decolonization.32 Britain found it as hard to 
live up to the promises of imperial citizenship that Africans perceived in 
two British claims: that the empire had abolished slavery under good 
Queen Victoria;33 and that all imperial subjects, white and black, could 
expect equal treatment—in tribute to the empire’s military aid, both 
indian and African, in the first World War. Africans could in conse-
quence employ two equally effective strategies in demanding sovereign 
nationhood when imperial recognition was denied—both workers’ 
strikes for proletarian rights and ethnic coalitions that demanded to 
assemble common citizen nationalities from out of different subject 
tribespeople.
 the postcolonial nationhood that followed was a greater break 
with history than colonial rule had been—however much nationalist 
leaders claimed to renew their links with the glories of the African 
past. much of that past (not least the civic virtue of building wealth 
by the generous and demanding patronage of strangers) was in danger 
of becoming irrelevant, thanks to two developments: the demographic 
growth already met and the new political logic of nation building. 





independent states, unlike the colonial powers that evaded their duty 
to subjects by leaving, cannot escape the expectations of citizens.34 to 
eradicate poverty, ignorance, and disease, as promised, were and are 
heavy responsibilities. Who had how much right to which scarce public 
goods became a pressing issue, sharpening boundaries of entitlement 
still further. Citizenship is not always open to all today; even second- 
or third-generation immigrants can be at risk. in some cases, only 
specified ethnicities, such as the matriclans of Asante, have secured full 
citizenship as firstcomers, indigenous to their new nation (autochthones 
in french). more African countries honor the rights of jus sanguinis 
than of jus solis, of blood rather than residence. Colonial boundaries, 
by contrast, had been porous; the three corners of sub-Saharan Africa 
(east, west, and south) had each constituted a vast migrant labor zone. 
in this comparatively recent past, immigrant laborers were often able 
to negotiate the more secure status of tenant farmer or sharecropper; 
today their descendants have become latecomers, unwanted foreigners 
(notoriously so in the ivory Coast). other West African countries have 
expelled immigrants en masse. in Africa as in nineteenth-century 
europe, making new nations has created new strangers.35
 Civic status and human rights can also come in degrees. Property 
ownership is nowhere in Africa a formal requirement for citizenship; 
nonetheless, the landless—especially new migrants to towns—and 
in western Africa the descendants of slaves, people said to lack self-
mastery, or possession de soi, find it difficult to exercise rights that are 
legally theirs.36 Such informal civic exclusion, consistent with past social 
hierarchies, is inconsistent with an impersonal rule of law, that essen-
tial condition for the full enjoyment of citizenship. the lack of secure 
titles to land, accordingly, is a powerful argument for tribal autochthony 
and its fear of strangers.37 in the absence of such universal protection, 
people also seek refuge, as in the past, in clientelage. But clients today, 
with their ever-larger numbers, are less able to choose and check their 
protectors. they are more or less bound in allegiance to ethnic patrons, 
in the hope that these will invest their ethnic vote banks in winning a 
local, not private, share of state largesse.38
 the tendency for citizens to seek safety in ethnic clientelage also 
raises in acute form the question of the politics of difference. european 
political thought has the least to offer here. Western states still possess 
29
Unhelpful  Pasts  and a  Provis ional  Present
majority cultures; their minorities can to some argued degree be publicly 
recognized, accommodated into a nation’s past by an enlargement rather 
than a revision of a national story—although legacies of empire can still 
embarrass france and Britain. few African states, by contrast, possess 
a majority culture; Somalia—not an encouraging example—Botswana, 
and Lesotho are among the exceptions. others are a mosaic of anxious 
minorities, varied in language, social hierarchy, family authority, bodily 
inscription, property law, and so on. official recognition of difference 
may well promote still-more-minute ethnic demarcations of dubious 
historical provenance, diminishing rather than enlarging freedoms. in 
any case, where is cultural difference produced? is Wolof culture, for in-
stance, created in rural Senegal, in dakar, in Paris, or in marseilles?39 to 
add to these complexities of difference, ethnic membership still tends 
to demand stern “republican” standards of self-conduct and civic virtue. 
these, especially when interpreted by “traditional courts,” do not fit 
well with liberal criteria of citizenship and human rights.40
 for the West’s majority cultures to practice a fraternal “multicul-
tural” politics that respects differences in the subjectivation, the moral 
self-constitution, of minority citizens is hard enough. Africa, facing a 
more jealous politics of difference, has witnessed four approaches to 
its management: single-party despotism, “big man” manipulation of 
identity after the return of multiparty democracy, an educated disdain 
for democratic vulgarity, and the start, just possibly, of something else—
elite responsibility for the diversity of nationhood.
 independent Africa’s initial single-party regimes, first, appeared 
to tackle difference by suppressing it under synthetic cultures of na-
tional “development.” As for rousseau, so too for them difference was 
a conspiracy against the public interest—and, moreover, plotted by 
what were despised as the colonial tribalisms of yesterday. But nation-
building rhetoric often masked an ethnic partiality in government; 
this, abetted by oppression, ensured that ethnicity did not disappear 
but, rather, stiffened in self-defense.41 “tribe” then returned as the most 
readily assembled interest group when the “second liberation” of the 
1990s installed the forms of competitive democracy.42 the upheaval 
owed much to popular outrage against life-denying dictatorships, which 
were so contrary to past traditions of “republican” or “moral” ethnicity, 
in which leadership was earned by stern but hospitable self-mastery. But 
democratic competition since then has too easily bent this critical moral 
ethnicity into a deformed, obedient clientelage as “big man” patrons 
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have demanded a reliable vote bank with which to negotiate their entry 
into national politics. this political tribalism has been Africa’s second, 
manipulative, approach to the politics of difference; it subverts the stan-
dards of public accountability that moral ethnicity demanded, and does 
little for the poor; it may indeed knowingly smother any discourse of 
class. ethnic clientelism cannot afford to ask the critical questions that 
might undermine its patrons. But that is a price many are prepared to 
pay for inclusion in a majority parliamentary coalition of ethnic mi-
norities, their best bet for winning for themselves what ought to be the 
universal entitlements of citizenship.43
 to exercise even these conditional political rights, however, citizens 
need first to enjoy the social and economic rights that enable them to 
imagine and pay for public activity. the difficulties of the landless and 
those of slave descent have been mentioned. But there is now another, 
more subtly divisive, side to the African politics of citizenship. this is 
the attempt by young professionals to devise safe rules of discourse and 
behavior in a public sphere that was unreliably liberated in the 1990s. for 
lack of any local national language save in Swahili-speaking tanzania, 
the consequence has been the emergence of aspirant national cultures of 
anglophone or francophone “politeness.”44 these admirable initiatives 
in active citizenship come at a cost: they are inevitably biased toward the 
well educated and risk disabling the citizenship of others, particularly 
the less educated and the poor. one can illustrate this possibility in two 
dimensions: one in civic society and the other in public debate.
 first, many educated young people find employment in nongov-
ernmental organizations (ngos), often funded by overseas donors to 
champion the poor. But, as observed in Kenya and malawi, they tend 
to act with an institutionalized paternalism that denies active debate 
and self-mastery to those they claim to represent.45 one is reminded 
of Plato’s republic, “a tale of virtuous shepherds who manipulate the 
wishes and beliefs of their flock, not the operation of institutions that 
allow self-government by free and public-spirited, but otherwise ordi-
nary, citizens.”46
 Second, public speech has become more free in many countries, if 
not yet safe from arbitrary sanctions. radio talk shows and street par-
liaments attract large audiences. their organizers and speakers show 
a debonair familiarity with modern technologies of communication 
and parliamentary procedure, a clubbable civility and fluency of literary 
reference. But one must doubt whether theirs is an independent public 
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sphere, shaping the political initiatives of an independent middle class. 
talk-show hosts are often trying to influence opinion in the interest 
of their “big man” patrons; like ngo officials, they are also impatient 
with, and perhaps nervous of, the clumsy, ill-spoken, excitable, and ig-
norant public comportment of the poor, especially women, should they 
dare to take the floor, prendre la parole.47 this is a public sphere not yet 
confident in handling difference; it is designed, indeed, to silence differ-
ence as an embarrassment, at least in public discourse between politely 
educated elites.
 that unease does not end the story of African citizenship. Some 
members of this new generation, self-confident and with a new sense of 
Africa’s potential in a globalizing world, have a clear view of themselves 
as the citizens of the future. they can show signs of that social responsi-
bility to which Western middle classes have long pretended, moralizing 
market advantage by acting as public-spirited citizens. Kenyan elites, 
golf-playing club members, not long ago got together to deliver fam-
ine relief to the least-regarded, least-educated ethnic group in the dry 
north of their country, quite independent of any state aid.48 Again, this 
charitable act, this act of good citizenship, scarcely gives power to the 
poor—but the powerlessness, the second-class citizenship, of poverty is 
scarcely peculiar to Africa.
 ordinary citizens nonetheless feel corrupted by this powerlessness, 
by their dependence on ethnic patrons to win favors from the state. 
in what must have been one of Africa’s most thoroughgoing inqui-
ries into public opinion, Kenya’s Constitutional review Commission 
toured the country in 2002, to hear the views of wananchi, “the people 
of the country.” Almost all expressed disillusion with politics. Some 
blamed unchecked presidential power, others venal parliamentarians. 
two aspects of the proceedings strike one most. the first is that despite 
the politically correct exhortations of the itinerant commissioners, the 
men in their audiences tried to silence women. the second is the per-
vasive sense among speakers that while political corruption tainted 
all it was nonetheless unavoidable. it turned citizens into clients, not 
that these terms were used, and even beneficent ethnic patrons into 
public thieves. How far the suggested solutions—a greater religious 
foundation for political morality, more inclusion of marginalized eth-
nic groups—might change matters is open, as always, to question. But 
one cannot doubt the popular longing for what analysts, if not the 
wananchi, would call citizenship.49
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 for greater citizen responsibility and entitlement to be achieved, 
therefore, Africa awaits the constitutional history of its future. in these 
future debates, it would be unwise to ignore Western political thought, 
even while rejecting its universality. Half a century and more ago po-
litical activists in a Buganda kingdom still under British rule found it 
helpful to consult such Western—but diverse—prophets as rousseau, 
John Locke, Harold Laski, and richard Crossman as well as the Bible’s 
prophets, to draw out comparisons with their own constitutional his-
tory. their eclecticism avoided all teleological obedience to Western tu-
tors. Having consulted others, these ganda politicians could then think 
for themselves, in their own turbulent context, about how to revive a 
just monarchy or, more boldly, how to abolish ganda social hierarchy.50 
they can stand for political thinkers all over Africa. their own his-
tory, like the history of Western political thought, may not settle the 
controversies of contemporary citizenship. But cross-fertilization and 
comparative cautions are surely needed to stimulate fresh thought today. 
this book is a good example.
notes
1. Jane Burbank and frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and 
the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 2010), 29–30.
2. Peter geschiere, The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and 
Exclusion in Africa and Europe (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 2009).
3. Harri englund, “introduction,” and francis B. nyamnjoh, “reconciling 
‘the rhetoric of rights’ with Competing notions of Personhood and Agency 
in Botswana,” in Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa, ed. Harri en-
glund and francis nyamnjoh (London: Zed Books, 2004), 1–29 and 33–63, 
respectively.
4. John Lonsdale, “Political Accountability in African History,” in Politi-
cal Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power, ed. Patrick Chabal 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1986), 126–57.
5. Quentin Skinner, “meaning and understanding in the History of ideas,” 
History and Theory 8 (1969): 3–53; Skinner, “Some Problems in the Analysis of 
Political thought and Action,” Political Theory 2 (1974): 277–303.
6. editorial, “osons les valeurs,” Le Monde, January 7, 2014.
7. As discussed in Charles taylor, Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recog-
nition,” ed. Amy gutmann (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1992).
8. drawn from Alan ryan, On Politics: A History of Political Thought from 
Herodotus to the Present (London: Allen Lane, 2012); and Burbank and Cooper, 
Empires in World History.
9. See Patrick Chabal, Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London: 
Zed Books, 2004).
33
Unhelpful  Pasts  and a  Provis ional  Present
10. Sara rich dorman, daniel Hammett, and Paul nugent, Making Na-
tions, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
11. david nirenberg, Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition (new york: W. W. 
norton, 2013).
12. nor has Asia, after the mass murders under mao Zedong or Pol Pot.
13. emma Hunter, Political Thought and the Public Sphere in Tanzania: 
Freedom, Democracy and Citizenship in the Era of Decolonization (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2015), 143–45, 153–54.
14. Jane guyer and Samuel Belinga, “Wealth in People as Wealth in Knowl-
edge: Accumulation and Composition in equatorial Africa,” Journal of African 
History 36, no. 1 (1995): 91–120.
15. See, among others, A. g. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa 
(London: Longman, 1973), 11–27; John iliffe, Africans: The History of a Conti-
nent (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2007), 133; and Shane doyle, 
“Bunyoro and the demography of Slavery debate,” in Slavery in the Great 
Lakes Region of East Africa, ed. Henri médard and Shane doyle (Athens: ohio 
university Press, 2007), 236–37.
16. Hunter, Political Thought, 13, drawing on igor Kopytoff and Suzanne 
miers, “African ‘Slavery’ as an institution of marginality,” in Slavery in Africa: 
Historical and Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Suzanne miers and igor Kopy-
toff (madison: university of Wisconsin Press, 1977), 17; see also John iliffe, 
The African Poor: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1987), 7, 
11–12, 31, 50, 59, 68–70, 84.
17. t. C. mcCaskie, Asante Identities: History and Modernity in an African 
Village (edinburgh: edinburgh university Press, 2000); Holly Hanson, Landed 
Obligation: The Practice of Power in Buganda (Portsmouth, nH: Heinemann, 
2003); mikael Karlström, “Civil Society and its Presuppositions: Lessons from 
uganda,” in Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa, ed. John L. 
Comaroff and Jean Comaroff (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1999), 
104–23; r. C. Law, “‘my Head Belongs to the King’: on the Political and rit-
ual Significance of decapitation in Pre-colonial dahomey,” Journal of African 
History 30, no. 3 (1989): 399–415.
18. iliffe, African Poor, chap. 5; david m. Anderson and Vigdis Broch-due, 
The Poor Are Not Us: Poverty and Pastoralism in Eastern Africa (Athens: ohio 
university Press, 1999).
19. fred Hobson, “freedom as moral Agency: Wiathi and mau mau in 
Colonial Kenya,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, no. 3 (2008): 456–70; John 
iliffe, Honour in African History (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 
2005), chap. 7.
20. david L. Schoenbrun, “Conjuring the modern in Africa: durability 
and rupture in Histories of Public Healing between the great Lakes of east 
Africa,” American Historical Review 111, no. 5 (2006): 1403–39.
21. iliffe, Africans, 250.
22. in Perils of Belonging (109–10, 216), geschiere makes surprisingly little 
reference to this reversal in value between land and labor.
34
John LonsdaLe
23. “Phantoms” quotation, rosalind Shaw, Memories of the Slave Trade: Ritual 
and the Historical Imagination in Sierra Leone (Chicago: university of Chicago 
Press, 2002), 264; for kinship’s dark side, see Peter geschiere, The Modernity 
of Witchcraft: Politics and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa (Charlottesville: uni-
versity of Virginia Press, 1997); “apathy” quotation, Adam Ashforth, Witchcraft, 
Violence, and Democracy in South Africa (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 
2005), 104. Luise White doubts the narrative power of past slavery; see White, 
Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa (Berkeley: uni-
versity of California Press, 2000), 15–16. for more-durable fears, see elizabeth 
isichei, Voices of the Poor in Africa (rochester, ny: university of rochester 
Press, 2002); and Harri englund, “Witchcraft, modernity and the Person: 
the morality of Accumulation in Central malawi,” Critique of Anthropology 
16 (1996): 257–79. for the eating of assets, see Jean-françois Bayart, L’État en 
Afrique: La politique du ventre (Paris: fayard, 1989). for spiritual insecurity, see 
Ashforth, Witchcraft.
24. B. e. Kipkorir, “the educated elite and Local Society,” in Hadith 4: 
Politics and Nationalism in Colonial Kenya, ed. Bethwell A. ogot (nairobi: east 
African Publishing House, 1972), 252–69.
25. r. d. Waller, “ethnicity and identity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Modern 
African History, ed. John Parker and richard reid (oxford: oxford university 
Press, 2013), 94–113.
26. Steven feierman, The Shambaa Kingdom: A History (madison: univer-
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 17–22.
27. John Lonsdale, “the moral economy of mau mau,” in Unhappy Valley: 
Conflict in Kenya and Africa, by Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale (Athens: 
ohio university Press, 1992), 266–68, 461–68; Adrian Hastings, The Construc-
tion of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 1997).
28. derek Peterson, Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping and the Work 
of Imagination in Colonial Kenya (Portsmouth, nH: Heinemann, 2004); Bruce 
Berman and John Lonsdale, “Custom, modernity, and the Search for Kihooto: 
Kenyatta, malinowski, and the making of Facing Mount Kenya,” in Ordering 
Africa: Anthropology, European Imperialism, and the Politics of Knowledge, ed. 
Helen tilley with robert gordon (manchester: manchester university Press, 
2007), 173–98.
29. James ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order 
(durham, nC: duke university Press, 2006), chapter 6, “of mimicry and 
membership.”
30. According to how far they accept the differentiation between urban 
“citizens” and rural “subjects” that is asserted (too starkly in my view) in mah-
mood mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1996).
31. As discussed in emma Hunter’s introduction to the present volume.
32. frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question 
in French and British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1996).
35
Unhelpful  Pasts  and a  Provis ional  Present
33. John Lonsdale, “ornamental Constitutionalism in Africa: Kenyatta 
and the two Queens,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 34, no. 1 
(2006): 87–103; derek r. Peterson, ed., Abolitionism and Imperialism in Britain, 
Africa, and the Atlantic (Athens: ohio university Press, 2010).
34. frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2002).
35. Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Author-
ity and Control (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 2000); Bruce Berman, 
dickson eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, eds., Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa 
(Athens: ohio university Press, 2004), chaps. 1–4; richard Kuba and Carola 
Lentz, eds., Land and the Politics of Belonging in West Africa (Leiden: Brill, 
2006); dorman et al., Making Nations; geschiere, Perils of Belonging.
36. emma Hunter, “dutiful Subjects, Patriotic Citizens and the Concept of 
good Citizenship in twentieth-Century tanzania,” Historical Journal 56, no. 
1 (2013): 257–77; Christian Lund, “Proprieté et citoyenneté: dynamiques de re-
connaissance dans l’Afrique des villes,” Politique africaine 132 (2013): 5–25; eric 
Hahonou, “Proprieté, citoyennetés et héritage de l’esclavage au nord Bénin,” 
Politique africaine 132 (2013): 73–94.
37. morten Bøås and Kevin dunn, Politics of Origin in Africa: Autochthony, 
Citizenship and Conflict (London: Zed Books, 2013).
38. Bruce J. Berman, “ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: the 
Politics of uncivil nationalism,” African Affairs 97, no. 388 (1998): 305–41; iliffe, 
Honour in African History, chap. 18.
39. Jean-françois Bayart, The Illusion of Cultural Identity (London: Hurst, 2005).
40. Stephen n. ndegwa, “Citizenship and ethnicity: An examination of 
two transition moments in Kenyan Politics,” American Political Science Re-
view 91, no. 3 (1997): 599–616.
41. Will Kymlicka, “nation-Building and minority rights: Comparing Af-
rica and the West,” in Berman et al., Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa, 54–71.
42. A key argument in geschiere, Perils of Belonging.
43. richard Werbner, in his epilogue to englund and nyamnjoh, Rights 
and the Politics, 261–74, rightly called the dichotomy between moral ethnic-
ity and political tribalism “stultifying”—as sketched in John Lonsdale, “moral 
ethnicity and Political tribalism,” in Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and 
Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, ed. Preben 
Kaarsholm and Jan Hultin, 131–50 (roskilde, denmark: roskilde university, 
1994)—but the stultification was observed in Kenya’s politics, not derived from 
political theory.
44. for the metropolitan model, see Lawrence e. Klein, Salisbury and the 
Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth 
Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1994).
45. Stephen n. ndegwa, The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in 
Africa (West Hartford, Ct: Kumarian Press, 1996); Harri englund, Prisoners of 




46. ryan, On Politics, 498.
47. florence Brisset-foucault, “Prendre la parole en ouganda: Critique 
et citoyenneté sous l’hégémonie du mouvement de résistance nationale 
(nrm)” (Phd diss., université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2011); richard 
Banégas, florence Brisset-foucault, and Armando Cutelo, “espaces publics 
de la parole et pratiques de la citoyenneté en Afrique,” Politique africaine 127 
(2012): 5–20.
48. dominique Connan, “La décolonisation des clubs kényans: Sociabilité 
exclusive et constitution morales des élites africaines dans le Kénya contempo-
rain” (Phd diss., université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2014), 488–538.
49. Stephanie diepeveen, “‘the Kenyas We don’t Want’: Popular thought 
over Constitutional review in Kenya, 2002,” Journal of Modern African Studies 
48, no. 2 (2010): 231–58.
50. Jonathan earle, “Political theologies in Late Colonial Buganda” (Phd 
diss., university of Cambridge, 2012).
references
Anderson, david m., and Vigdis Broch-due. The Poor Are Not Us: Poverty and 
Pastoralism in Eastern Africa. Athens: ohio university Press, 1999.
Ashforth, Adam. Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy in South Africa. Chicago: 
university of Chicago Press, 2005.
Banégas, richard, florence Brisset-foucault, and Armando Cutelo. “espaces 
publics de la parole et pratiques de la citoyenneté en Afrique.” Politique 
africaine 127 (2012): 5–20.
Bayart, Jean-françois. L’État en Afrique: La politique du ventre. Paris: fayard, 
1989.
———. The Illusion of Cultural Identity. London: Hurst, 2005.
Berman, Bruce J. “ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: the Politics of 
uncivil nationalism.” African Affairs 97, no. 388 (1998): 305–41.
Berman, Bruce J., dickson eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, eds. Ethnicity and 
Democracy in Africa. Athens: ohio university Press, 2004.
Berman, Bruce J., and John Lonsdale. “Custom, modernity, and the Search 
for Kihooto: Kenyatta, malinowski, and the making of Facing Mount 
Kenya.” in Ordering Africa: Anthropology, European Imperialism, and the 
Politics of Knowledge, edited by Helen tilley, with robert gordon, 173–98. 
manchester: manchester university Press, 2007.
Bøås, morten, and Kevin dunn. Politics of Origin in Africa: Autochthony, 
Citizenship and Conflict. London: Zed Books, 2013.
Brisset-foucault, florence. “Prendre la parole en ouganda: Critique et 
citoyenneté sous l’hégémonie du mouvement de résistance nationale 
(nrm).” Phd diss., université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2011.
Burbank, Jane, and frederick Cooper. Empires in World History: Power and the 
Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton university Press, 2010.
Chabal, Patrick. Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling. London: Zed 
Books, 2004.
37
Unhelpful  Pasts  and a  Provis ional  Present
Connan, dominique. “La décolonisation des clubs kényans: Sociabilité 
exclusive et constitution morales des élites africaines dans le Kénya 
contemporain.” Phd diss., université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2014.
Cooper, frederick. Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present. Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2002.
———. Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and 
British Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1996.
diepeveen, Stephanie. “‘the Kenyas We don’t Want’: Popular thought over 
Constitutional review in Kenya, 2002.” Journal of Modern African Studies 
48, no. 2 (2010): 231–58.
dorman, Sara rich, daniel Hammett, and Paul nugent. Making Nations, 
Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
doyle, Shane. “Bunyoro and the demography of Slavery debate.” in Slavery in 
the Great Lakes Region of East Africa, edited by Henri médard and Shane 
doyle, 231–51. Athens: ohio university Press, 2007.
earle, Jonathan. “Political theologies in Late Colonial Buganda.” Phd diss., 
university of Cambridge, 2012.
englund, Harri. “introduction.” in Rights and the Politics of Recognition in 
Africa, edited by Harri englund and francis B. nyamnjoh, 1–29. London: 
Zed Books, 2004.
———. Prisoners of Freedom: Human Rights and the African Poor. Berkeley: 
university of California Press, 2006.
———. “Witchcraft, modernity and the Person: the morality of Accumulation 
in Central malawi.” Critique of Anthropology 16 (1996): 257–79.
feierman, Steven. The Shambaa Kingdom: A History. madison: university of 
Wisconsin Press, 1974.
ferguson, James. Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order. durham, 
nC: duke university Press, 2006.
geschiere, Peter. The Modernity of Witchcraft: Politics and the Occult in 
Postcolonial Africa. Charlottesville: university of Virginia Press, 1997.
———. The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa 
and Europe. Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 2009.
guyer, Jane, and Samuel Belinga. “Wealth in People as Wealth in Knowledge: 
Accumulation and Composition in equatorial Africa.” Journal of African 
History 36, no. 1 (1995): 91–120.
Hahonou, eric. “Proprieté, citoyennetés et héritage de l’esclavage au nord 
Bénin.” Politique africaine 132 (2013): 73–94.
Hanson, Holly. Landed Obligation: The Practice of Power in Buganda. 
Portsmouth, nH: Heinemann, 2003.
Hastings, Adrian. The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and 
Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1997.
Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and 
Control. Princeton: Princeton university Press, 2000.
Hobson, fred. “freedom as moral Agency: Wiathi and mau mau in Colonial 
Kenya.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, no. 3 (2008): 456–70.
38
John LonsdaLe
Hopkins, A. g. An Economic History of West Africa. London: Longman, 
1973.
Hunter, emma. “dutiful Subjects, Patriotic Citizens and the Concept of good 
Citizenship in twentieth-Century tanzania.” Historical Journal 56, no. 1 
(2013): 257–77.
———. Political Thought and the Public Sphere in Tanzania: Freedom, Democracy 
and Citizenship in the Era of Decolonization. Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 2015.
iliffe, John. The African Poor: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 1987.
———. Africans: The History of a Continent. Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 2007.
———. Honour in African History. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 
2005.
isichei, elizabeth. Voices of the Poor in Africa. rochester, ny: university of 
rochester Press, 2002.
Karlström, mikael. “Civil Society and its Presuppositions: Lessons from 
uganda.” in Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa, edited 
by John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, 104–23. Chicago: university of 
Chicago Press, 1999.
Kipkorir, B. e. “the educated elite and Local Society.” in Hadith 4: Politics 
and Nationalism in Colonial Kenya, edited by Bethwell A. ogot, 252–69. 
nairobi: east African Publishing House, 1972.
Klein, Lawrence e. Salisbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse 
and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth Century England. Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 1994.
Kopytoff, igor, and Suzanne miers. “African ‘Slavery’ as an institution of 
marginality.” in Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives, 
edited by Suzanne miers and igor Kopytoff, 3–85. madison: university of 
Wisconsin Press, 1977.
Kuba, richard, and Carola Lentz. Land and the Politics of Belonging in West 
Africa. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
Kymlicka, Will. “nation-Building and minority rights: Comparing Africa and 
the West.” in Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa, edited by Bruce J. Berman, 
dickson eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, 54–71. Athens: ohio university Press, 
2004.
Law, r. C. “‘my Head Belongs to the King’: on the Political and ritual 
Significance of decapitation in Pre-colonial dahomey.” Journal of African 
History 30, no. 3 (1989): 399–415.
Lonsdale, John. “the moral economy of mau mau.” in Unhappy Valley: 
Conflict in Kenya and Africa, by Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, 265–504. 
Athens: ohio university Press, 1992.
———. “moral ethnicity and Political tribalism.” in Inventions and 
Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of 
Ethnicity and Nationalism, edited by Preben Kaarsholm and Jan Hultin, 
39
Unhelpful  Pasts  and a  Provis ional  Present
131–50. international development Studies occasional Paper 11. roskilde, 
denmark: roskilde university, 1994.
———. “ornamental Constitutionalism in Africa: Kenyatta and the two 
Queens.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 34, no. 1 (2006): 
87–103.
———. “Political Accountability in African History.” in Political Domination 
in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power, edited by Patrick Chabal, 
126–57. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1986.
Lund, Christian. “Proprieté et citoyenneté: dynamiques de reconnaissance 
dans l’Afrique des villes.” Politique africaine 132 (2013): 5–25.
mamdani, mahmood. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy 
of Late Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1996.
mcCaskie, t. C. Asante Identities: History and Modernity in an African Village. 
edinburgh: edinburgh university Press, 2000.
ndegwa, Stephen n. “Citizenship and ethnicity: An examination of two 
transition moments in Kenyan Politics.” American Political Science Review 
91, no. 3 (1997): 599–616.
———. The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa. West 
Hartford, Ct: Kumarian Press, 1996.
nirenberg, david. Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition. new york: W. W. 
norton, 2013.
nyamnjoh, francis B. “reconciling ‘the rhetoric of rights’ with Competing 
notions of Personhood and Agency in Botswana.” in Rights and the 
Politics of Recognition in Africa, edited by Harri englund and francis B. 
nyamnjoh, 33–63. London: Zed Books, 2004.
Peterson, derek r., ed. Abolitionism and Imperialism in Britain, Africa, and the 
Atlantic. Athens: ohio university Press, 2010.
———. Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping and the Work of Imagination 
in Colonial Kenya. Portsmouth, nH: Heinemann, 2004.
ryan, Alan. On Politics: A History of Political Thought from Herodotus to the 
Present. London: Allen Lane, 2012.
Schoenbrun, david L. “Conjuring the modern in Africa: durability and 
rupture in Histories of Public Healing between the great Lakes of east 
Africa.” American Historical Review 111, no. 5 (2006): 1403–39.
Shaw, rosalind. Memories of the Slave Trade: Ritual and the Historical Imagina-
tion in Sierra Leone. Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 2002.
Skinner, Quentin. “meaning and understanding in the History of ideas.” 
History and Theory 8 (1969): 3–53.
———. “Some Problems in the Analysis of Political thought and Action.” 
Political Theory 2 (1974): 277–303.
taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition.” edited by 
Amy gutmann. Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1992.
Waller, r. d. “ethnicity and identity.” in The Oxford Handbook of Modern 
African History, edited by John Parker and richard reid, 94–113. oxford: 
oxford university Press, 2013.
40
John LonsdaLe
Werbner, richard. “epilogue: the new dialogue with Post-liberalism.” in 
Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa, edited by Harri englund 
and francis B. nyamnjoh, 261–74. London: Zed Books, 2004.
White, Luise. Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa. 
Berkeley: university of California Press, 2000.
PArt One




Rethinking Citizenship and  
Subjecthood in Southern Africa
Khoesan, Labor Relations, and the Colonial State  
in the Cape of Good Hope (c. 1652–1815)
n i C o L e  u L r i C H
t H e  C O n C e P t  O f  C I t I z e n s H I P  I n  t H e  C A P e  O f  g O O d  H O P e  u n d e r 
empire first became evident under the merchant colonialism of the 
dutch east india Company (Verenigde oost-indishe Compagnie, or 
VoC) in 1652, and started to change with British rule beginning in 
1795, marking the introduction of modern imperialism. the colonial 
state’s approach to and the responses of indigenous Khoesan communi-
ties—who were inexorably incorporated into the colony as part of the 
labor force—at the Cape Colony are particularly revealing of important 
elements of this discussion.
 Approaches to citizenship and popular claims to rights are his-
torically and geographically constituted and dynamic, which means 
that citizenship varies across regions and changes over time.1 glob-
ally, the ideological and social contestations surrounding notions 
of legitimate political authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, especially during the “Age of revolutions,” laid the foun-
dations for modern notions of citizenship and democracy.2 An ex-
amination of citizenship and forms of belonging at the Cape at this 
time not only challenges the notion that the people of Africa were 
somehow absent from the making of the modern world and of its 
key universalistic political ideas but also seeks to contribute to a 
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deeper political history of the continent that enriches our view of 
rule, rights, and political identities.
 What can we learn from examining citizenship and political belong-
ing at the Cape of good Hope? there was not always a direct rela-
tionship between social class, racial designation, and political access. 
nevertheless, issues related to labor control played a key part in shaping 
governance. thus, while the Company awarded some inhabitants citi-
zenship, the laboring classes (including slaves from Asia and Africa and 
low-ranking Company servants recruited from europe) were denied 
political rights and representation and were governed through a harsh 
regime of labor regulation designed to terrorize and control.
 the political identities and strategies of indigenous Khoesan, who 
were ultimately absorbed into the colony as part of the rightless labor-
ing classes of slaves and low-ranking Company servants, were shaped 
by colonial conquest as well as by the experience of class exploitation. 
thus, Khoesan did not reduce their identity to that of a nation or eth-
nicity but also participated in broader class-based modes of popular 
protests that drew in others.
 However, notions of citizenship at the colony were by no means 
static, and they were fundamentally redefined under the modern im-
perialism introduced by the British toward the end of the eighteenth 
century. the “Age of revolutions,” which changed the way in which 
legitimate political authority was viewed worldwide, gave rise to radical 
demands for political rights, representation, and republicanism, after 
which imperial states could no longer simply rule through force and 
violence.3 in this context, labor regulation was reformed and British 
subjecthood could be used to make broader political claims based on 
an imperial “citizenship” allowing Khoesan laborers to claim a level of 
rights and protections.
Citizenship and empire
for scholars interested in African politics, mahmood mamdani’s notion 
of the bifurcated power of the colonial state4—with urban constituencies 
ruled as citizens (by civil law, struggling over rights and representation) 
and rural constituencies ruled as subjects (by “traditional” authorities 
and customs)—provides a point of departure for scholars of Africa to 
make sense of the complex interplay between ethnic identities and ac-
cess to state resources, rights, and citizenship. this situation, accord-
ing to mamdani a legacy of colonialism, continues to bedevil African 
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politics, as it lays the basis for widespread ethnic politics and the ongo-
ing power of “traditional” authorities.
 the applicability of this framework to modern South Africa can 
be debated both because the development of the capitalist economy 
broke down any neat urban/rural divide and because of the distinctive 
trajectory of the national liberation struggle in South Africa. national-
ist parties, with the African national Congress (AnC) being the most 
notable, along with communist and socialist organizations and a large 
trade union movement continually downplayed and opposed ethnic 
divisions and mobilization in favor of broader-based forms of unity, by 
nation or by class. race proved a more potent force than ethnicity or 
a rural/urban divide, yet even then, traditions of civic nationalism and 
nonracial mobilization were widely promoted.5
 Within this context, questions related to “the nation,” or “the na-
tions,” within South Africa have occupied pride of place in polemics, 
and there is still much debate over the national question and the rela-
tionship between racial and class inequality.
 in the postapartheid period, issues related to citizenship have re-
mained topical. At one level, there have been ongoing struggles around 
social citizenship, with the focus falling on issues like HiV treatment, 
access to health care, and gender inequality; at another level, the pres-
ence of African and Asian foreign nationals living in South Africa, 
coupled with widespread anti-immigrant sentiment, has raised ques-
tions about the boundary of the “nation.”
 this does not mean that ethnicity does not or has not shaped po-
litical action in South Africa. ethnic mobilization preexisted and was 
reinforced by apartheid, which placed great emphasis on African “tradi-
tional” authorities. Postapartheid the Zulu king was widely accused of 
inciting the wave of violence against foreign nationals that took place in 
2015, combining exclusive forms of ethnicity and nationhood.
 even so, political mobilization done specifically along ethnic lines has 
been generally regarded as chauvinist, and therefore taboo, and political 
discussion over the contours of the “nation” has remained preoccupied 
with the constitution and contours of a South African nation, as opposed 
to ethnic factionalism and regionalist separatism.
 gary Wilder’s recent book, Freedom Time (2015), also reminds us that 
responses to colonial rule were varied and complex and did not follow 
a single pattern. even nationalism, now seen as a natural and inevitable 
response, was only one of many strands. As Wilder shows, some now 
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seen as anticolonial heroes—such as Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sédar 
Senghor, theorists of Negritude—did not necessarily equate liberation 
and rights with national sovereignty and independence. Both men ad-
vocated, instead, reforming the french empire into a federation, rather 
than its breakup into nation-states.
 the same complexities can be seen in “black loyalism” found in 
South Africa. Part of a larger tradition of thought also found in British-
ruled Canada and india, black loyalism—found notably among the 
amakholwa (Christian-educated) Africans and elite Coloureds and 
indians—is argued to have promoted loyalty to the British Crown, 
which was viewed as a source of protection and a bearer of rights and 
entitlement.6 expressions of loyalty were linked to claims informed by 
a wider conception of imperial citizenship and, according to Hilary Sa-
pire, involved appeals “against actions deemed inimical to the spirit of 
liberal empire and its ‘civilising mission.’”7
 in this regard, citizenship claims and subject status in the imperial 
framework were not necessarily as mutually exclusive as mamdani sug-
gests: it was precisely through accepting and asserting membership of 
empire, even as subject races and territories, and through paying hom-
age to the British monarchy that rights, entitlements, and protections 
were often claimed.
 far less, however, is known of the place of citizenship claims and 
associated mobilizations in earlier colonial periods, including the early 
colonial period of VoC rule, followed by British rule.
 At the same time, the very rich social history of the Cape of good 
Hope, as well as the existing literature on the political identities and 
actions of the small elite of free-burghers, has been shaped by the pa-
rochialism of much work on the Cape.8 A recent trend has challenged 
the tendency to view the Cape in isolation or simply as an early stage 
of “South Africa,” locating the early colonial Cape within a broader 
global context and relating this history to international developments 
and themes. However, this trend is marked by a focus on cultural 
themes, such as consumption, and the bodily practices of elites.9 A 
notable exception, which relates the early history of the Cape to citi-
zenship and the nation, is david Johnson’s study Imagining the Cape 
Colony: History, Literature, and the South African Nation (2012), which 
focuses on the Khoesan and the troubled relationship between politi-
cal rights and recognition, on the one hand, and economic insecurity 
on the other hand.
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 thus, while most of the other chapters in this volume are interested 
in the nation-state in postcolonial modern Africa, this chapter investi-
gates the way in which indigenous and marginalized people conceptual-
ized rights and political belonging (in relationship to the state) in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries.
 this chapter is divided into three main parts—the first focuses on 
the structure of Company power at the Cape of good Hope and the 
limited political integration of Khoesan, who were primarily absorbed 
into the colony as laborers and seen as part of the servile, rightless, labor-
ing classes. the second section focuses on the political identities forged 
by Khoesan and their free-burgher masters on the colonial frontier. 
the third part examines the way in which British rule fundamentally 
changed the political terrain by reforming labor controls and recogniz-
ing Khoesan as subjects.
Citizenship and merchant Colonialism
merchant colonialism is a form of colonialism that needs to be under-
stood on its own terms. How did citizenship operate under Company 
rule at the Cape, and in what way did the colonial state relate to in-
digenous Khoesan populations? the answers to these questions lie in 
the structure of political power and government strategies of inclusion 
and exclusion.
Patrimonial Power and Labor Control
in 1652 the VoC gained a foothold on the African continent when it 
colonized the Cape of good Hope. to fully comprehend the structure 
of VoC power at the Cape, we must consider both dutch and VoC 
modes of rule.
 the dutch republic was politically fractured and decentered. the 
central government, or States-general, did not have sovereign powers, 
and there were no central funds or central bureaucracy of any impor-
tance. the dutch republic was a confederation of seven sovereign 
provinces and was fractured further along the lines of autonomous 
states and cities. this decentered organization of power is confirmed 
by Julia Adams, who categorizes the dutch republic as an “estatist” 
(as opposed to absolutist) patrimonial state.10 this means that the early 
modern dutch state was based on the “segmentation or parcelization 
of sovereign power among the ruler (or rulers) and corporate elites,”11 
giving rise to complex interdependencies, underpinned by permanent 
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tensions and competition between rulers and corporate bodies and be-
tween the corporations themselves.
 the VoC—which reflected the character of the dutch state—was 
established in 1602 by the States-general and held the monopoly of 
trade from the dutch republic from east of the Cape of good Hope to 
west of the Straits of magellan. the Company was never purely com-
mercial in nature and was invested with political power—the Company 
was mandated to enter into diplomatic relations, to establish some form 
of civil administration in its factories and colonies, and to billet troops.12
 As noted by Adams, internally, the control of the Lords XVii, the 
directors of the VoC, was curbed by the Company’s fragmented or-
ganizational structure and also by distance, which delayed the relay of 
information between the netherlands and the east indies.13 the inter-
mediary position of the headquarters established in Batavia complicated 
arrangements, and no one actor was able to establish centrality. thus, 
Adams notes, the “mutual and symmetrical dependency inscribed in the 
heart of the VoC’s hierarchy undercut the potential power advantage of 
the metropole.”14
 the Company built a vast empire in the indian ocean. despite the 
VoC’s military prowess, its trade and colonial relations were shaped 
by intricate and shifting regional balances of power.15 As a rule, the 
Company was dependent on local alliances and allies to gain economic 
and political advantage, and its reach was limited.
 to carry out its function as a cross-continental trader, the Company 
relied on a large body of labor; a key aspect of Company administration, 
and indeed governance, included the control and regulation of labor. 
much like those of other merchant companies, the VoC’s labor prac-
tices were predicated on a system of physical violence and coercion and 
what appears to be sheer disregard of human life.
 most Company “servants” were men of low rank and worked as sail-
ors and soldiers or general laborers.16 recruited from northern europe, 
they were bound by four- to seven-year contracts and were subject to a 
regimented system of coercive control based on a hierarchy of officers, 
strict routine, and a set of regulations (Artikelsbrief ) supported by a net-
work of land-based and maritime courts.
 Sailors and soldiers could be beaten by their officers for minor of-
fenses.17 those suspected of more serious offenses, such as assault, 
would be arrested and tried by a court, which further institutionalized 
and entrenched violence. in addition to forced labor and imprisonment, 
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punishments, usually carried out in public, included whipping, brand-
ings, face mutilation, strangulation, drowning, running the gauntlet, and 
hanging. dissidents could even be punished after death. their corpses 
could be quartered, hung out in public, and left in the open to rot.
 other labor regimes that operated in the Company included the use 
of convict labor and slavery.18 the institutional frameworks for these 
systems were developed by the Company in Batavia. Batavia was par-
ticularly reliant on the labor of Chinese debtors, who built much of the 
Company’s infrastructure, but in addition, African exiled convicts were 
used to assist the police and executioners with corporal punishments.
 regulations governing slaves—an institution that remained illegal 
in the netherlands but was used by the VoC abroad—were codified 
by Batavian administrators in the Statutes of india of 1642 and 1766. 
As in the case of sailors and soldiers, slave codes were backed up by the 
criminal justice system, and more-serious offences and disorderly acts 
were tried by the criminal court.
 under the VoC, there was no pretence of equality under the law: 
the legal system was consciously and explicitly based on entrenching 
and maintaining hierarchies and inequalities of class and status.19 the 
most gruesome and violent punishments were reserved for slaves. for 
instance, they could be broken on the wheel, be burnt alive, or have their 
heels and noses cut off.
 in addition to suffering violent regimes of control and discipline, the 
slaves and servants of charter companies, including the VoC, had to 
contend with the omnipresence of death. Jan Lucassen estimates that of 
the roughly one million men who travelled to the east indies with the 
VoC during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, only one-third 
(33.1 percent) returned.20 High mortality can be attributed to the lack 
of medical knowledge, the prevalence of disease in the tropics, and the 
poor health of the men recruited by the VoC, but ill-treatment, abuse, 
malnutrition, war, and capital punishment also played key roles.
 Labor had to be constantly replenished and new recruits or slaves 
disciplined into their new roles. As Peter Linebaugh and marcus re-
diker indicate, such human wastage was simply part of business.21 the 
constant presence of death was an important element of the emerging 
global system of labor, with its regimes of control that perpetuated vio-
lence and terror.
 the VoC reflected the character of dutch institutions more gener-
ally and was based on a fragmented arrangement of power and alliances. 
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However, the VoC’s fragmented and partial rule should not be inter-
preted as benign. VoC-run factories and settlements were based on the 
premises of colonial conquest as well as a harsh regime of labor control.
Servant, Slave, and Citizen
Starting out as a refreshment port for VoC fleets travelling between 
the netherlands and the east indies, the Cape Colony gave rise to 
a relatively extensive colonial settlement that required government 
administration. in line with norms of the time, the Company devel-
oped a distinctive strategy of political inclusion, based on a limited 
form of citizenship, and exclusion, which denied large sections of the 
population, specifically the laboring class, access to political rights 
and protections.
 the VoC had no plans to establish a settlement, and the colony 
initially consisted of a fort and garden with a basic administration. the 
commander, later the governor, ruled together with the Council of 
Policy, which met weekly to carry out “all functions of government” on 
land, and a Court of Justice, modelled on Batavian law supplemented 
with local ordinances, was created in 1656.22
 However, the Company had some difficulty in acquiring the cattle 
from indigenous Khoesan communities needed to feed men and stock 
ships and was dependent on importing farming produce from the neth-
erlands and Batavia. to reduce this dependence on outside food sources, 
the Company established a scheme whereby Company servants could 
be released from their contracts to farm.23 in return, they were awarded 
the status of free-burghers (or free citizens).
 With european society still largely bound by feudal structures and 
relations, citizenship was neither widespread nor nearly as central to 
political processes and ideologies as it is today. nevertheless, as Prak 
documents, early forms of citizenship could be found in certain cities, 
including some in the dutch republic.24 Citizenship varied a great deal 
from city to city. Prak notes, for instance, that in Bois-le-duc, the category 
of citizens included all those born or baptized within the town, while in 
deventer only children born of citizens were assured citizenship. yet, in 
general, citizenship offered membership to guilds (which monopolized 
the trade and production of goods) and a trial by local courts. Although 
citizens could be elected to office in some cities, Prak argues that the 
administration of municipalities was still controlled by the aristocracy 
and political representation was limited. in return for these privileges, 
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citizens were expected to pay taxes and to participate in the protection 
and policing of the city.
 regardless of the various legal parameters, Prak notes, it was pri-
marily the urban middle classes who honed citizenship into a distinct 
identity—separating them from the poor, foreigners, and Jews—and 
mobilized as citizens to make political claims. for instance, the obliga-
tions of burghers were construed as tasks that only those who earned a 
decent living and were autonomous from a lord or master could carry 
out. this could be seen in the case of citizen militias, a highly contested 
institution, which became central to the notion of citizenship in the 
netherlands as the power of guilds declined.
 in the colonial context of the early Cape, burgher status was conferred 
on more-modest men and their wives, who would not be regarded as 
proper citizens by the urban middle classes in the dutch republic. the 
autonomy of the Cape burghers was quite limited.25 Although released 
from their Company contracts, they could be reinstated as servants at the 
Company’s behest. Burghers were also obliged to sell their produce to the 
Company at fixed prices and were not permitted to trade privately with 
Khoesan. in addition, they were expected to provide military service.
 nevertheless, Cape burghers did gain privileged access to state and 
social resources. many started as low-ranking Company servants, and 
the change in legal status allowed many to elevate their class position. 
they were provided access to land and to other people’s labor, as well as 
an opportunity for advancement and autonomy.
 Political and social rights were intricately linked, and burghers were 
allowed to marry, thus giving them further access to family labor, as well 
as access to material and social “capital” in the forms of inheritances 
and credit. from as early as 1658, Cape burghers were also given some 
political representation. two (later three) burgher representatives were 
incorporated onto the Council of Policy when cases involving burghers 
were heard.26
 Although dominated by the Company, the Cape economy diversi-
fied. through the establishment of retail and small-scale manufacture, 
burghers added to the urban port-centered economy based on Company 
shipping dependent on the labor of low-ranking men, mainly sailors 
and soldiers under contract. As in the case of the VoC more generally, 
servants stationed at the Cape—estimated to be approximately three 
thousand men by the late 1700s—were governed through labor codes 
and the criminal justice system, not as citizens.27
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 the Company retained a few farms and outposts, but farming was 
soon taken over by burghers. those involved in retail, manufacture, 
and farming usually depended on others to provide labor. At first the 
commander of the Cape, Jan van riebeeck, advocated the importa-
tion of convict Chinese labor, but starting in 1658 slaves were brought 
into the colony.28 Some of these slaves were retained by the Company, 
and together with a small number of convicts, they provided domestic 
labor and worked on Company farms and public works. However, the 
overwhelming majority became “private” slaves, who were sold to and 
worked for burghers.
 from the 1670s on, intensive agriculture was replaced with extensive 
agriculture, leading to the establishment of new farming districts (Stel-
lenbosch, Paarl, franschhoek, tijgerberg, Wagenmakers Valley, the 
Land of Waveren, and Paardeberg).29 farmers mostly grew grapes for 
wine production and grain, and there were also a few farmers engaged 
in mixed farming, which included cultivation and stock farming.
 government administration was extended to the new, rural dis-
tricts. the Collegie van Heemraden served as the chief administrative 
body, which was headed by the landdrost, a VoC official.30 the heem-
raden was able to deal with minor civil cases, involving disputes in 
which claims did not exceed fifty rix-dollars, and the landdrost was 
expected to prosecute those crimes committed in his district before 
the Court of Justice.
 As farming grew, the number of slaves in the colony steadily in-
creased. Slaveholdings remained relatively small, especially when 
compared to the plantation economies of the Americas, and few farm-
ers in the Cape owned more than fifty slaves at a time.31 nevertheless, 
“private” slaves soon outnumbered Company slaves and became the 
most prominent form of labor in the colony. By 1770, there were ap-
proximately 8,200 slaves in the colony, outnumbering the 7,736 free-
burgher inhabitants.32
 individual slave owners exercised direct authority over their slaves, 
but they were still bound by Company rules and regulations (established 
by the Statutes of india of 1642 and 1766, supplemented with local or-
dinances). owners could punish their slaves in most instances, but the 
court recognized slaves as human and presided over their lives and limbs. 
only the court could order restraints such as leg-irons, or the torture 
and death of dissidents, and slave owners who overstepped the bounds 
of acceptable forms of punishment for slaves could face censure.33
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 However, as noted by Wayne dooling, the implementation of slave 
regulations was in practice determined by local power relations.34 Lead-
ing slave owners, the landed gentry, resented Company restrictions. 
through capturing key positions in local government, forging alliances 
with VoC officials, and exploiting legal ambiguities, they were able “to 
give specific content and particular meaning to the rule of law.”35 this 
meant that slave owners were not necessarily penalized by the court for 
violent excesses against slaves.
 By the late seventeenth century, the burgher population was augmented 
by a small number of “free blacks,” who had been emancipated from slav-
ery or had completed their sentences as convicts.36 Some free blacks were 
involved in occupations similar to those of burghers (rented rooms, ran 
eating houses, grew and sold vegetables, or practiced a craft), but most 
were involved in fishing.37 Although “free,” this section of the population 
was denied the same status and political rights as burghers, unless they 
married into burgher families. (According to nigel Worden, Company 
men intent on applying for citizenship, or burgher status, often married 
free black women.38 together, both parties could be viewed as more re-
spectable and improve their social and political standing in Cape society.)
 it is important to note that there were free inhabitants, including 
citizens, who were unable to make an independent living. they formed 
part of the free poor who worked for others or as indigents relied on 
state aid to survive.39
 By the early 1700s, social and political hierarchies had already taken 
form. A significant part of the population was free, but not all free in-
habitants were granted citizenship. Although not as independent as the 
city-based citizens found in the netherlands, citizens did have limited 
political representation and access to resources.
 However, the majority of the Cape’s inhabitants—low-ranking 
Company servants, who were contracted/indentured, and slaves—were 
laborers and primarily governed through harsh regimes of controls and 
the criminal justice system. these elements of the Cape’s population 
had very few, if any, rights, and the courts were predicated on main-
taining social hierarchies, which meant that punishments were often 
determined by an offender’s social class rather than his or her crime.
The Company, Stock Farming, and Indigenous Khoesan
in addition to the free population and bonded laborers, indigenous 
Khoesan constituted a significant part of the colony. the Company’s 
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approach to indigenous communities gives much insight into the na-
ture of colonial conquest at the Cape and the linkages between political 
power, the economy, and labor.
 When the first commander of the VoC-Cape, Jan van riebeeck, 
arrived at the Cape, he was instructed to develop trade relations with 
local pastoral Khoesan communities.40 However, when Khoesan failed 
to trade their cattle in the numbers required by the Company, van 
riebeeck petitioned the Lords XVii (the directors of the Company) 
for permission to enslave Khoesan.41 He claimed that Khoesan were 
idle, godless savages and “a brutal gang living without any conscience.”42 
much like the native people of America, dispossessed commoners, po-
litical dissidents, and renegades, as well as rebellious women, or “Ama-
zons,” in the north Atlantic,43 men like van riebeeck construed the 
Khoesan as monstrosities worthy of destruction.
 However, the Lords XVii refused van riebeeck’s request. According 
to Kerry Ward, who examines the banishment of convicts to the Cape, 
the Company instructed local officials to treat the Khoesan respectfully 
as a trading nation.44 However, when placed in a context of colonial 
occupation, this rhetoric of benign trade quickly gave way to a reality of 
systematic territorial enclosure and political domination.
 the VoC’s station occupied territory on which goringhaicona, 
or strandlopers (beachcombers), relied for their marine-based hunter- 
gathering and that also formed part of the grazing routes of pastoralists 
such as the goringhaiqua and the Cochoqua.45 Khoesan were increas-
ingly prevented from accessing this land. At first, the Company grew 
hedges to keep Khoesan and their cattle out. At one stage, the Lords 
XVii even wondered whether it would be possible to dig a channel be-
tween the Salt and Liesbeek rivers with a view of separating the Cape 
from the African continent.46
 Concerned about the permanence and growth of the VoC outpost—
from which they were excluded—peninsular Khoesan united and took 
up arms against the Company in 1659. After this war (referred to as the 
first dutch-Khoesan War), the justification for occupation appears to 
have shifted, and Company officials argued that they had won the ter-
ritory through war.
 After the Second Khoesan-dutch War (1673–77), territorial and 
political inclusion became possible for Khoesan polities but strictly 
on Company terms and on an indirect basis. the defeated gonnema, 
leader of the Cochoqua, was expected to pay a tribute of thirty cattle a 
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year. At about the same time, the Company asserted its right to adjudi-
cate disputes between different clans in its territory.47
 governor Simon van der Stel (1679–99) also developed a practice 
whereby he would officially recognize loyal Khoesan chiefs or captains, 
bestowing on them a ceremonial staff and a classical name (such as 
Hercules and Hannibal).48 Such officially sanctioned leaders were able 
to retain access to land and grazing in the colony. Legal pluralism ac-
companied institutional pluralism, and Khoesan who broke the law in 
the colony were handed to their communities for punishment.
 At first, the Company had sought to exclude the Khoesan entirely 
from the small station. However, as the station expanded and became 
more secure, the Company established systems to deal with Khoesan 
indirectly through officially appointed patriarchs.
 mamdani argues that indirect rule was introduced by the British; 
he describes the VoC-Cape as a “a multiracial society marked by a 
single legal order” and claims that “the colonized were the indigenous 
Khoikhoi and the imported malay slaves, forming a small minority of 
the Cape population.”49 However, the situation is considerably more 
complex than mamdani describes. the core of Company rule based on 
labor and criminal codes was coercive for the majority of people, which 
included the “colonized” consisting of slaves and Khoesan. there was 
a form of indirect rule, but this took a much weaker form as seen in 
parts of twentieth-century colonial Africa. VoC-sanctioned patriarchal 
loyalists had little real power and did not form a key part of the ad-
ministrative apparatus, and there was no effort to shore up “traditional” 
authorities or codify “custom.” Company-appointed Khoesan patriarchs 
were, for example, rewarded by special concessions yet generally lacked 
coercive power, as well as the respect and loyalty of the communities 
that they supposedly governed.
 moreover, the Company failed to develop systematic laws and in-
stitutions for those Khoesan who were increasingly drawn into the 
colony, mainly as workers. Khoesan labor was particularly important 
for the stock-farming sector that emerged at the beginning of the 
1700s when free grazing permits, or “loan farms,” were made available 
for a small annual rent, giving potential farmers access to a minimum 
of 2,420 hectares.50 Stock farming required substantially less capital 
and labor than arable farming. there was subsequently a rapid in-
crease in the number of stock farmers. in 1746, there were approxi-
mately 225 stock farmers. By 1770, this number had grown to 600.51 
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more and more loan farms were taken out at ever-increasing distances 
from Cape town.
 Although government was extended with the establishment of new 
districts, the colonial borderlands, or frontier, proved much more diffi-
cult to govern. it is here that free-burghers interfaced with surrounding 
Khoesan and other African communities, as well as new multiracial com-
munities constituted by fugitives and runaways from the colony and sur-
rounding societies. no one particular group was able to establish outright 
political or cultural dominance.52 economic competition was fierce, and 
inhabitants resorted to violent strategies of accumulation based on illicit 
cattle raiding or turned to hunting to gain an advantage. there were a 
few rich stock farmers, but most free-burgher stock farmers were fairly 
modest cattle herders.53 Some stock farmers owned one or two slaves. 
However, free-burghers in the borderlands were mostly dependent on the 
labor of Khoesan, who were skilled in handling animals.
 traditionally, Khoesan entered into relations of dependency or be-
came clients within their own societies to acquire dogs, cattle, or weap-
ons, but such relationships remained fluid.54 dependents could leave to 
become autonomous or to enter into another dependency relationship. 
even when forced to find work in VoC-controlled territory, Khoesan 
attempted to retain some independence by refusing to enter into long-
term contracts.55 Because such workers often returned to their kin and 
communities after their contracts expired, they became migrant laborers 
of a sort. Communities often moved to secure the best pasturage for 
their animals, making Khoesan migrants doubly mobile.
 Although an increasingly important source of labor for the colony, 
these Khoesan workers did not conform to official categories—be they 
Company servant, burgher, slave, or subjugated Khoesan under a loyal 
Company-appointed patriarch—and had no clear legal status. in the 
absence of any official codes for Khoesan workers, it was left to masters 
and servants to negotiate instruments of control. on the more-open 
frontier, some Khoesan workers were able to assert more-traditional 
Khoesan practices of dependency in relation to their burgher masters. 
those who had lost their cattle and access to pasturage would attach 
themselves to a farmer, often adopting Christianity and the dutch lan-
guage. Such dependents, known as oorlams, would be rewarded with a 
cow or two and even a horse or a gun.56
 Stock farmers could also rely on the labor of “Bastaards,” or peo-
ple of mixed european-Khoesan descent, or the distinct category of 
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“Bastaard-Hottentots,” specifically referring to people with slave fa-
thers and Khoesan mothers. reflecting complex racial and class hierar-
chies, Khoesan with european heritage tended to have a higher status 
and gravitated toward less menial jobs, often working as craftspeople 
or transport riders.57 in many instances, frontier burghers sent trusted 
Khoesan dependents on commando (militia) duty as their substitutes.58
 However, there was also room for a great deal of abuse and violence—
Khoesan “orphans” (in reality children kidnapped in raids) were forced 
into labor, and in opposition to the flexible work arrangements preferred 
by Khoesan servants, masters were also known to withhold remunera-
tion to recover debts, seize livestock, and chase runaways, as well as to 
hold children hostage to force their parent(s) to return to work.59
 the first VoC attempts to regulate Khoesan workers directly, as op-
posed to through Khoesan patriarchs, started in the 1730s and 1740s 
when dissidents were tried and punished by the colony’s criminal court. 
As noted above, the criminal justice system had long been used as a 
mechanism to discipline slaves and low-ranking Company servants ac-
cused of more-serious offences, and it was easily extended to include 
Khoesan workers.
 it is important to underscore that Khoesan workers were only par-
tially integrated into the Company’s administration and primarily in-
terfaced with its legal system as criminals. for instance, at this time, 
the Company did not even keep a basic census of Khoesan workers, or 
indeed of any Khoesan living in the colony.60 its loyal patriarchs had 
limited power and were subject to little in the way of supervision. the 
partial integration as criminals institutionalized Khoesan workers’ ser-
vile status. Along with slaves and Company servants, Khoesan workers 
were constructed by the state as part of a naturally violent and deviant, 
indeed monstrous, laboring class.
 territorial expansion, mainly through the illicit hunter-trader-raider 
economy, took its toll. Khoesan lost their independent way of life; they 
were proletarianized and forced into labor. only in 1775—two decades 
before the complete eclipse of VoC rule—were the first codes specifi-
cally for Khoesan workers introduced, when the Company approved a 
regulation in Stellenbosch that allowed children of Khoesan mothers 
and slave fathers to be “apprenticed” (indentured) up until the age of 
twenty-five.61
 the Company did not respect Khoesan communities as nations in 
their own right, nor did it treat them as equal trading partners or as 
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“free” people. rather, the land that Khoesan relied on for subsistence 
was occupied, their leaders were defeated and subjugated, and Khoesan 
were integrated into the colony as laborers. yet unlike the governance of 
Company servants and slaves, there were no ready-made codes through 
which to govern Khoesan laborers, and they occupied a relatively am-
bivalent legal position.
 underpinned by the conflicting imperatives of keeping Khoesan 
apart from the colony politically but absorbing them economically as 
laborers, the Company’s approach moved from excluding Khoesan 
from the colony to a fatuous system of indirect rule, partial institu-
tional integration to provide some form of labor control, and inden-
ture. much like low-ranking Company servants and slaves, Khoesan 
were primarily deemed to be part of the servile laboring class and were 
denied political rights.
Political Belongings and imaginations of freedom
for the majority of Khoesan in the colony, colonial enclosure, class 
exploitation, and violence were intimately linked and most acutely ex-
perienced on the frontier. it is there that the political identities and 
aspirations of Khoesan laborers and their burgher masters were forged 
and most keenly expressed.
 the colonial borderlands were difficult for the Company to control 
and were characterized by violence emanating from cattle raids. Such 
raids did not only reflect the accumulation strategies of those who par-
ticipated in the hunter-raider-trader economy but were also a central 
part of Khoesan resistance to colonial rule.62
 Burghers in this part of the colony developed a distinct identity dif-
ferent from that of their more elite and urban counterparts.63 Aggrieved 
that the Company did not provide them with enough support against 
raids by independent Khoesan and fugitive bands, they questioned the 
legitimacy of Company rule. for instance, the 1738 rebellion reflected 
the more humble backgrounds of frontier free-burghers and was led by 
a deserted Company soldier, etienne Barbier.64 rebels maintained that 
they were easily ruined by raids and not only objected to the high cost of 
loan farms but also questioned the Company’s control over the supply 
of ammunition needed to initiate cattle raids and protect themselves 
from retaliation.
 the VoC’s decline signaled that significant political and institu-
tional changes were taking place at the Cape. elite burghers, who were 
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inspired by the American revolution and by the Patriots in the nether-
lands, gained in political confidence. they challenged the Company’s 
monopolistic trade policies and demanded more representation in 
government.65
 By the 1790s, political turmoil had also spread to the borderlands, 
by which time the anti-Company sentiments of frontier burghers had 
given root to republicanism.66 embroiled in the Anglo-dutch War 
(1780–84), the VoC attempted to exact the burghers’ military obli-
gations. However, those residing in the recently established graaff-
reinet district were reluctant to leave their farms and families, as raids 
by Khoesan and fugitive groups had intensified in response to expand-
ing colonial settlement. Left to their own defenses, that is, without 
Company protection, they believed that they no longer owed the 
Company their allegiance. British spies reported that these burghers 
were informed by the “ridiculous notion, that like America, they could 
exist as an independent state.”67
 However, the republicanism of these burghers remained exclusive 
and narrow. they did not generalize their calls for freedom, equality, 
and fraternity to other sections of the population, least of all their slaves 
or Khoesan laborers.
 for many Khoesan, participation in cattle raids was not simply moti-
vated by cattle accumulation but was often informed by a clear political 
motive. According to Shula marks, regular raids on the colony marked 
a shift away from the wars initially waged by Cape Peninsular Khoesan 
against the Company and represented a form of protest in objection 
to colonialism.68 in 1739, for instance, an interpreter explained that the 
purpose of a particularly large raid along the Berg river was to “chase 
the dutch out of their land as long as they lived on their land, and 
that this was but a beginning but would do the same to all the people 
around there.”69
 At the same time, the crimes for which Khoesan were prosecuted 
show that these workers did not necessarily operate only within neat 
national or ethnic categories and were also involved in other forms of 
protest action. Khoesan bands overlapped with or incorporated other 
fugitive groupings, or runaway slaves, sailors, and soldiers.70 these com-
munities served as living examples of a modest, yet autonomous, way of 
life for those living under their masters in the colony.
 not adequately recognized in the literature on the early colonial 
Cape is that Khoesan laborers also established connections with other 
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working poor and participated in proletarian solidarities, contributing 
to proletarian traditions of direct action.71
 thus, Khoesan laborers, together with slaves and low-ranking Com-
pany servants, devised ways in which to strike back at their exploiters 
and oppressors or to improve their living and working conditions for the 
better. through withholding labor, desertion, arson, verbal and physical 
assault on masters, mutiny, striking, and other forms of rebellion, the 
working poor took the moral codes of their masters and colonial au-
thorities to task. in so doing, they rejected their condition of servitude, 
pursued a life of freedom, created their own independent class commu-
nities, questioned poor living conditions, refused to work on Sundays, 
developed their own understanding of fair punishment, protected their 
relationships with others, challenged the authority of their masters and 
overseers in the workplace, refused to accept high rates of mortality, and 
exposed corruption.
 these often modest struggles need to be seen in context. in a society 
based on colonial conquest and on the widespread use of bonded and 
slave labor, military might and physical violence served as the main pil-
lars of the power of the state and master class. Any overt challenges 
were met with violent repression. more often than not, the ringleaders 
of rebellions or mutinies were put to death, their corpses desecrated and 
denied proper burial.
 Like the burgher elites, the Cape’s popular classes were not quiescent 
during the “Age of revolutions” and also challenged their masters and 
the Company. marks notes that from the 1770s onward, Khoesan labor-
ers deserted in large numbers to join armed bands that raided frontier 
farms.72 By the 1780s, marks notes, some bands were several hundred 
strong, and in the 1790s there was one report of a band that had grown 
to almost a thousand. in line with the growing republicanism as well as 
the nationalist sentiment of the age, they wanted to govern themselves 
and buck the yoke of colonial rule. By that time, their anticolonial aspi-
rations had begun to increasingly converge with their labor grievances.
 By the 1780s, the anticolonial action of the Khoesan, often with the 
support of others, started to take on new forms. most notable was the 
movement in the overburg led by the prophet Jan Parel, who combined 
millenarianism with a vision of revolution.73 Parel predicted that the 
world would end on october 25, 1788 (a year before the french revolu-
tion), ushering in an era of utopian bliss and the end of colonial rule. to 
prepare, his followers (consisting of four hundred Khoesan servants, free 
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blacks, and slaves) were urged to burn their european clothing and to 
erect new straw huts with two doors. once these rituals were complete, 
they were to attack the Swellendam drosty and kill all “Christians.” 
However, predictably, this spiritual-political protest did not translate 
into widespread protest, nor did it deliver the colony from colonial or 
class rule.
 toward the end of the 1700s, republicanism, which grew out of the 
violence that characterized life on the frontier, had become a key politi-
cal idea. While free-burghers developed an exclusive form of republi-
canism, seeking more self-rule in a society in which most people were 
to remain servile, rebellious Khoesan laborers attempted to make sense 
of both their political dispossession and class exploitation. Anticolonial 
resistance in the form of raids was most fierce on the colonial frontier, 
where the threat to their political and economic independence was most 
immediate. ethnic and national identities were complicated by the ex-
periences of the Khoesan as laborers. they often identified with others 
who were marginalized, exploited, and oppressed and also participated 
in modes of class-based resistance.
imperial Citizenship
When the British took control of the Cape in 1795, the colony was 
gripped by social and political conflict. the British (and Batavian 
republic, the new revolutionary dutch government) reorganized the 
structure of power, introducing new strategies of inclusion and exclu-
sion. Partly in a response to the radical political ideologies associated 
with the “Age of revolutions,” the British state’s approach to Khoesan 
laborers provided new opportunities for different kinds of political en-
gagements and identities.
 drawing on the practice adopted for other new colonies taken during 
the napoleonic Wars, the British War office decided to keep most of 
the institutions inherited from the Company in place,74 which is prob-
ably why scholars have tended to stress the continuity between dutch 
and British rule at the Cape.75 However, the British administration was 
underpinned by a different, and increasingly modern, ethos. the Brit-
ish state introduced two hugely significant changes that redefined the 
national question at the Cape as well as the terrain of popular political 
engagement.
 first, the British War and Colonial office used the category of “British 
subject” as a key organizing principle as well as a tool of state legitimation. 
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frontier farmers (who then came to be referred to as “Boers”) lost their 
privileged status as citizens. together with their Khoesan laborers, they 
were incorporated into the category of British subject. in so doing, 
masters and servants were brought into the same legal framework and, 
in theory, were regarded more or less as equal before the law. the legal 
system, then, differed from that of the VoC, which included explicit 
measures designed to protect social hierarchies often further reinforced 
through the public display of physical punishment.
 in the second instance, the British colonial state was sensitive to the 
changes in elite and official conceptions of acceptable forms of labor 
across the British empire and much of the globe. Largely because of an 
international campaign against slavery in the late eighteenth century, 
as well as slave revolts across the Atlantic, some forms of unfree labor 
had become morally repugnant to “enlightened” men and women, and 
existing forms of labor were reformed.
 the Cape’s new imperial rulers promoted a paternalistic rather than 
a liberal attitude toward labor. un-freedom would be retained, but the 
brutality of the system would be limited by the state, which was rep-
resented as a neutral arbitrator and intruded more forcefully into the 
regulation of masters and servants.
 most notably, the criminal justice system, a key tool of labor control 
under the VoC, was reformed. the British War and Colonial office and 
local officials expressed particular concern over the court’s blatant impar-
tiality and the use of torture to exact confessions and to punish.76 the use 
of terror was tempered, while the introduction of an appeals court and 
circuit courts extended mechanisms for legal redress.77 these did not sim-
ply address broader political concerns regarding the provision of rights 
and protections; such measures also altered the operation of the criminal 
justice system and, in so doing, reformed a central aspect of labor control.
 nevertheless, the slave question proved difficult to resolve—although 
reforms were introduced to ameliorate the conditions in which slaves 
lived and worked. When the British first arrived at the Cape, some 
of the elites believed that slaves would be encouraged to rise up and 
revolt.78 However, the slave owners were quickly placated by promises 
of free trade, the protection of private property (including slaves), and 
limited taxes. Perhaps keen to consolidate state–upper-class relations 
and cognizant of the continued reliance on slave labor for agricultural 
production, the new administration focused attention instead on the 
unruly eastern frontier and on the Khoesan labor question.79
63
Rethinking Citizenship and Subjecthood in Southern Africa
 in addition to securing the territorial boundary of the colony and 
keeping the Xhosa out, authorities sought to discipline both masters 
and their Khoesan servants into what was viewed as their correct class 
and legal roles. British officials depicted their Boer subjects as indolent, 
unsophisticated, and cruel masters in need of state regulation, while 
their Khoesan subjects were viewed as an “innocent and oppressed race 
of men” that required “countenance and protection” from government.80
 no sooner had rebellious republican Boers been defeated by the 
military and brought under British rule in April 1799 than Khoesan, 
including those regarded as the most loyal workers, deserted en masse 
to join large bands on the frontier, giving rise to the “Servant rebellion” 
(1799–1803).
 once again, Khoesan drew attention to the link between their co-
lonial and class oppression, and their rebellion was against the colonial 
state as much as against the master class. in the words of the rebel 
Captain Stuurman, the best remedy to the violent abuse Khoesan had 
suffered at the hands of their masters was to reclaim “the country of 
which [their] fathers were despoiled by the dutch” and to fight for their 
independence from their Boer masters.81
 the rebellion has been documented by Susan newton-King and 
V. C. malherbe.82 After briefly courting the Cape’s new British rulers, 
rebel Khoesan instead chose to ally with members of fugitive Xhosa 
communities who also sought refuge on the frontier. the growing rebel 
forces raided outlying farms, plundering arms, ammunition, and horses. 
farmers fled the area, and by the end of July 1799, Khoesan bands were 
in control of the whole southeastern portion of the graaff-reinet dis-
trict. they not only had succeeded in halting the latest colonial en-
croachments but also had managed to push the colonial border back.
 doubtful that a military campaign against the rebel Khoesan Confed-
eracy would be successful, British authorities adopted two strategies to 
quell the rebellion. first, as noted by Susan newton-King, any claim to 
territory east of the Sundays river to the Zuurveld was relinquished, and 
so the alliance between Xhosa fugitives and the confederacy became de-
stabilized.83 this was part of a broader strategy of extending state author-
ity over complex border relations, by drawing a clear boundary between 
the Xhosa lands and the colony. this was to be done by establishing a 
direct relationship with Xhosa communities, instead of relying on frontier 
Boers as intermediaries, by prohibiting Boers from using Xhosa as labor-
ers, and by preventing Xhosa from entering the colony without a pass.84
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 Secondly, authorities focused on regulating master-servant relations 
and by extending basic protections to Khoesan.85 in 1801, the fiscal 
urged that formal contracts be made with Khoesan workers and be 
registered with the court. this system was designed to bind Khoesan 
workers to their masters by preventing them from deserting, but it was 
also meant to stop farmers beating their servants “ad libitum.”86
 in 1801, governor young reported that “the Boers [were] becom-
ing less Savage masters, under the eye of government, and the poor 
Hottentots [were] returning to their masters under the Protection of 
the government, and by a Strict administration of Justice, more useful 
servants, & more peaceable.”87
 the Servant rebellion dissipated by 1803 under the brief period of 
Batavian rule. Soon after the British regained the Cape, the slave trade 
within the British empire was abolished. the stabilization and regu-
lation of Khoesan labor became even more urgent. the rudimentary 
existing measures to regulate Khoesan workers were extended by the 
1809 Caledon Code (the “Hottentot regulation”) and by apprenticeship 
legislation in 1812.88 in addition, from 1812 onward, Khoesan had access 
to the so-called “black” circuit courts, which investigated abuses and 
ill-treatment.
 these protections were minimal. nevertheless, as subjects with 
limited protections, Khoesan were able to negotiate rights and obli-
gations with the state. for the first time, a reformist political strategy 
became viable, and with the help of missionaries, Khoesan lobbied the 
government and used the courts to win further legal reforms.89
 under the British, limited labor reform together with the incorpora-
tion of Khoesan—and their free-burgher masters—into the category 
of “British subject” fundamentally redefined the limits of political pos-
sibility. With the basis of a form of imperial citizenship laid, Khoesan 
laborers could look to the colonial state to secure limited rights and 
protections, especially within the realm of labor relations. it is at this 
point that the earliest manifestation of “black loyalism” in what would 
become South Africa may be found. the new imperial power, in codify-
ing rights and protections as part of its larger project of administrative 
reform at the Cape—and in line with the new global necessity of ruling, 
not simply by brute force but as a “legitimate” protector of its subject 
races and classes—opened space for a new type of politics. under the 
VoC, popular dissent was met with terror and repression; un-freedom 
was affirmed at every turn; spectacular and brutal reprisals were the 
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norm. the new British order, by contrast, enabled claims to be made 
for the protection of the British Crown, even by its most subject groups, 
and, to the extent that this really did expand the rights and protections 
of the most downtrodden classes, made the possibility of a reformist 
and a loyalist politics real for the first time.
generally, VoC rule was fragmented yet still brutal in that it was 
predicated on colonial conquest and a harsh regime of labor control. 
At the Cape, the Company introduced a unique form of citizenship, 
but a large proportion of inhabitants were servants or slaves governed 
through harsh labor codes and subject to a criminal justice system based 
on upholding social and political inequalities.
 A significant part of colonial governance dealt with the indigenous 
Khoesan population. the Company’s approach to Khoesan was shaped 
by the conflicting imperatives of political exclusion and separation of 
Khoesan polities from the colony, giving rise to a very weak form of 
indirect rule, and the absorption of Khoesan as laborers, which led to 
their partial institutional integration, mainly into the criminal justice 
system, and eventually to the development of labor codes that legal-
ized their indenture. Like Company servants and slaves, they were part 
of the servile laboring class and denied the same political rights and 
protections awarded to their free burgher masters.
 the political identities and aspirations of Khoesan laborers and 
frontier free-burgher masters were formed in relation to one another. 
for Khoesan, colonial conquest and class exploitation were intimately 
linked. this could be seen in both their anticolonial action and their 
participation in broader forms of class-based resistance.
 Both state and popular articulations of citizenship changed signifi-
cantly beginning in 1795 under British rule. reflecting broader global 
shifts associated with the “Age of revolutions,” labor conditions were 
ameliorated, and Khoesan were incorporated as British subjects. this 
allowed Khoesan to claim rights and protections from the colonial 
state, laying the basis for different kinds of engagements and political 
belonging.
 A direct line cannot be drawn between the governmental categories 
or political relations that emerged in the early colonial Cape and the 
practices and meanings attached to national citizenship in postapart-
heid South Africa. nevertheless, this deeper political history can still 
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shed light on how we may understand the state, as well as the construc-
tion of political identities and aspirations.
 first, by focusing on the early modern period, this chapter shows 
that there is not just one standard or continuous narrative of colonial 
rule in Africa.
 Second, the “native question,”90 or the way in which a foreign minor-
ity rules an indigenous majority, was not simply determined by the or-
ganization of power, as mamdani claims. rather, government strategies 
of inclusion and exclusion as well as political identities and strategies 
were also closely tied to issues of labor exploitation, as well as class-
based connections, solidarities, and aspirations.
 finally, neat distinctions cannot be drawn between notions of the 
citizen and the subject. under British rule, Khoesan were able to draw 
on a broader notion of imperial citizenship to make demands on the 
colonial state, suggesting that early manifestations of “black loyalism” 
had a significant popular component.
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t H r e e
“We Are Oppressed and Our Only  
Way Is to Write to Higher Authority”
The Politics of Claim and Complaint in the  
Peripheries of Condominium Sudan
C H e r r y  L e o n A r d i  A n d  C H r i S  VA u g H A n
I n  l At e  1 9 5 4 ,  A s  s u d A n  m O v e d  r A P I d ly  t O wA r d  s e l f - g O v e r n m e n t, 
a letter was sent to one of the members of the new national legislative 
assembly, Benjamin Lwoki, by one or some of his constituents. Signed 
“yei citizens” and immediately beneath this “Chief modi Baraba,” the 
letter complained about the behavior of northern Sudanese merchants 
and officials “bullying us here,” about the quality of the yei hospital 
and doctor, and about the transfer of a southern Sudanese official away 
from yei. the letter exhorted Lwoki to “stand firm”: “our Parliament 
representative and others please note that we the yei citizens are now 
grieved badly and are very anxious to put our complaints forward 
to you in order that you have to raise them up before the house of 
representatives.” the letter was headed with the political constituency 
number (62), and was copied to “Juba citizens” as well as to the equatoria 
Province governor.1
 Precisely who actually wrote the letter is not clear, but the two-line 
appellation “yei citizens Chief modi Baraba” is intriguing. Was Chief 
modi, the most senior chief in yei district (or his scribe), claiming 
to be writing on behalf of the people of his chiefdom? or were other 
people using the name of the chief to define their political community 
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or to add authority to their complaints? did “yei citizens” refer to the 
townspeople of yei or to the wider citizenry of yei district or of the 
political constituency? Who was included in this category?
 the letter is revealing of the new political language of the late co-
lonial period, when the Condominium government was promoting 
ideas and discourses of representative government and national citizen-
ship. these ideas were to be realized first through mechanisms of local 
government, which may help to explain why “yei”—as district head-
quarters—had become a salient political unit. in this chapter, however, 
we explore the deeper context behind the “local citizenship” that was 
being promoted by the Condominium government in the 1940s and 
1950s, and we examine the ways in which it was asserted or debated by a 
range of people in southern and western Sudan. We argue that the local 
state was indeed the primary arena in which discourses and practices 
of citizenship emerged but that these ideas and practices also helped 
to produce a translocal idea of the state, to which people increasingly 
appealed in the course of local struggles and politics. the letter from the 
yei citizens demonstrates that “local” and “national” citizenship were 
interactive fields rather than discrete spheres.
 We also suggest in this chapter that the salience of such ideas of 
citizenship in the late colonial period did not appear out of a vacuum 
and was not solely the product of a new state-led agenda. if citizen-
ship was a language and imaginary taken up with vigor from below 
in the final years of colonial rule, this was because a central aspect of 
this imaginary had been well established in the preceding decades: the 
notion of an abstracted, translocal state law that governed rulers as well 
as subjects. So, even when the state was trying to repress any ideas of 
national citizenship in the earlier years of “indirect rule,” the workings 
of local politics produced demands from below that a universal state law 
should guarantee individual and collective rights. However, such claims 
were sometimes highly instrumentalized and coexisted with various 
other very different kinds of political claims. the extent to which the 
contentious politics of indirect rule was productive of citizenship is 
therefore a difficult question to answer.
 for James tully, such assertion of political rights would be a recogniz-
able variety of “diverse citizenship”—in which groups formally denied 
rights by distant, unaccountable structures of power nonetheless find 
avenues to claim rights as members of various kinds of political commu-
nity (perhaps at a very local level), often in the face of opposition from 
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those larger structures.2 nonetheless, as frederick Cooper reminds us in 
the postscript to this book, such a flexible approach to defining citizen-
ship risks obscuring the particular analytical value of the term. for Coo-
per, citizenship posits “a collective body of equivalent citizens who have 
a common relationship to the state”—and the broad-based horizontal 
claim of equivalence is precisely what gives citizenship its particular 
potential and significance as a means of limiting the impositions of the 
state. this is quite a different form of political community and concep-
tion of rights—based on horizontal relationships of equivalence—from 
that created by patrimonial systems defined by vertical relationships of 
inequality.3 in the case studies under examination here, the imaginary of 
a broad-based community of equivalent citizens definitely had traction 
for those making claims on the state in the period of later colonial rule 
(examined in the final part of this chapter), as evidenced in the explicit 
communication mentioned above between “yei citizens” and “Juba citi-
zens” in 1954. during the preceding years of indirect rule in the 1920s 
and 1930s, such an imaginary is harder to detect. nonetheless, even in 
these earlier years, complaints that drew attention to breaches of the law 
by individuals in authority and claims made to individual or collective 
rights that were guaranteed by law did implicitly draw on an idea of 
equivalency—that all were subject to the rule of the law, both elites and 
ordinary people, and that the law guaranteed rights even as it subjected 
people to power. to this extent, the law did mediate an embryonic sense 
of citizenship, even if this was not yet as fully articulated, imagined, or 
indeed effective in limiting state power as would sometimes be the case 
in the years leading up to independence.
 our emphasis on an active local politics of citizenship in the colonial 
era is at odds with the prevailing scholarly emphasis on the political 
exclusion and denied rights of colonial subjects in such peripheral re-
gions as southern and western Sudan. the dominant scholarly model of 
Sudan’s political geography suggests a long-established divide in terms 
of political and social rights between the hyperdominant riverine core 
of the state and multiple peripheries that have been neglected in devel-
opmental terms and excluded from political influence. the argument 
has been made that this dysfunctional core-periphery relationship was 
not necessarily created by colonial rule but was certainly reinforced by it, 
and that it lay at the roots of Sudan’s postcolonial civil wars.4 these wars 
might themselves be understood in part as a series of struggles for full 
citizenship, rights, and entitlements by various peripheral populations.
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 the core-periphery model also fits rather well with mahmood 
mamdani’s claims about the “bifurcated” character of the colonial state.5 
Condominium Sudan would appear to epitomize his depiction of a 
colonially constructed customary order of rural communities subjected 
to their chiefs and insulated from urban concepts of civil rights: from 
the 1920s, government policy famously sought to create rural “compart-
ments,” bounded ethnic units of population, protected from the “septic 
germs” of urban political activism.6 But the quarantine was never ef-
fective: in many areas the colonial government continually struggled to 
keep people out of the towns and to handle the volume of complaints, 
appeals, and petitions with which district officials were presented. in-
deed, the very category “yei citizens” reveals the political salience of 
colonial towns and administrative units (rather than necessarily tribal 
units) as the focus of struggles over rights and relations with the state. 
the connection of this category to a chief demonstrates the blurring 
of mamdani’s dichotomies of urban and rural, rights and custom, civil 
society and community, citizenship and subjecthood. despite colonial 
imaginaries of rural chiefship, chiefs in areas like yei had always been 
closely connected to the small towns, their authority traversing any 
urban-rural divide.7
 Peripheral regions may have indeed been neglected and subordi-
nated; but our evidence that local populations in the peripheries of 
Sudan persistently engaged with state power and tried to turn it to their 
advantage, or to limit its excesses, reminds us that people from even 
the most marginalized regions were making claims on the state and 
seeking the recognition of their rights in a way that adds complexity 
to the core-periphery model. And the languages that people used in 
these endeavors also demonstrate the unbounded character of politi-
cal imagination in the apparently remote peripheries of Condominium 
Sudan. mamdani describes two entirely distinct languages of author-
ity: “urban power spoke the language of civil society and civil rights, 
rural power of community and culture.”8 But in late colonial southern 
and western Sudan, multiple registers of political language were being 
spoken simultaneously or alternately, as people sought to assert both 
collective and individual rights, to make claims on an often personalized 
imaginary of the state, and to regulate the behavior of state agents and 
intermediaries through the law. the practice of “complaining,” or put-
ting “complaints forward” as this letter did in 1954, had become a well-
established means of communicating with the state. However limited 
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the efficacy of such complaint, the practice demonstrates an expectation 
that the state should listen to its subjects and address their grievances—
and of course sometimes it did. Claims on the state could be asserted 
on the basis of patrimonial relationships or rights of citizenship—often 
simultaneously, in ways that produced tensions for colonial officials and 
exposed some of the contradictions of colonial rule.
 the first part of this chapter looks at the interwar heyday of indirect 
rule in Sudan, to trace how these multiple languages emerged and were 
deployed to demand political recognition and/or legal rights. We then 
focus on the shift in Condominium policy to a modernizing vision of 
local government and the largely conservative way it was implemented 
in the south and west from the late 1930s onwards. finally, we look 
at how this limited change nevertheless generated new political and 
legal languages, and we explore examples of claim making, petitioning, 
complaint, and appeal, which increasingly took a written form in this 
later period. the rhetoric of rights and citizenship was intertwined with 
older discourses of genealogy, personalized and paternalist rule, and 
patrimonial obligation, demonstrating that these political languages 
were never mutually exclusive or confined to discrete spheres but rather 
inhabited what tully terms a broader “field of citizenship.”9
Becoming Mazalim: Contesting oppression under indirect rule
in the 1920s, the Condominium government moved to consolidate its 
alliances with local leaders in the southern and western provinces, fol-
lowing the conquest of the darfur sultanate and the military defeat 
of local uprisings or resistance elsewhere. Pax Britannica was to be 
enforced through the “native administration,” and the judicial and 
coercive power of chiefs was deliberately constructed or strengthened. 
Local elites became adept at deploying the language of genealogy, his-
tory, and ethnicity to gain recognition from and make claims upon the 
state. But the colonial government’s receptiveness to such discourse also 
opened up space for complaints and disputes over chiefship itself, as 
well as for the articulation of the rights and duties of rulers and subjects 
within the native administration units. At the same time, though, many 
of the chiefs’ subjects seized every opportunity to appeal beyond the 
confines of these units to state law and justice and to assert individual as 
well as communal rights.
 in both darfur and the southern provinces, colonial officials en-
countered multiple forms of authority that they could not easily order 
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into the neat “tribal” units envisaged in native administration policy. 
in darfur, various kinds of chiefship had already been institutional-
ized under the fur Sultanate and/or turco-egyptian and mahdist 
governments in the nineteenth century, sometimes with administrative 
responsibilities and jurisdictions defined quite clearly by the state. But 
particularly in the pastoralist peripheries of the sultanate, British co-
lonial rule brought an unprecedented concentration and centralization 
of authority in the hands of chiefs.10 in the southern provinces, among 
mainly stateless societies, chiefship was a new form of authority and 
a new unit of jurisdiction: the native administration geography often 
mapped awkwardly onto existing smaller political communities and 
the wider influence of precolonial spiritual authorities like rain chiefs, 
spear-masters, and prophets.11 “tribes” were not political or territorial 
entities, as colonial officials quickly realized, and chiefs were appointed 
not as heads of tribes but as heads of smaller (sometimes multiethnic) 
territorial units. many of the early colonial chiefs in southern Sudan 
were junior sons or dependents of more powerful families or were inter-
preters or soldiers in the colonial army; there is evidence that the posi-
tion was initially seen as dangerous or demeaning. But as chiefs became 
more powerful and their position more lucrative, disputes over chiefly 
positions and complaints about chiefly abuses increasingly reached the 
attention of government.12 And while the history of chiefship was quite 
different between darfur and the south, it is strikingly clear that com-
plaints against chiefs in both regions employed a similar combination 
of genealogical argument and criticism of chiefly misrule, responding 
to an equally similar opportunity structure created by a common (and 
contradictory) colonial ideology.
 it is important, if obvious, to note that in this period people did 
not use the language of national citizenship to make their claims on 
government. they did not directly assert membership in a broad-based 
horizontal collective of equivalent citizens—rather, they mobilized on 
the basis of their membership in local political communities. these 
were communities explicitly and inherently defined by inequality, even 
if that inequality was itself the subject of debate and mechanisms of ac-
countability. often those who directed protest to government were able 
to do so because of their elite standing in these communities and did 
not necessarily make their claims explicitly on the grounds of solidarity 
with a wider ethnic citizenry, let alone any broader definition of political 
community. nonetheless, they addressed their complaints to a state that 
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was understood to govern these various communities and was imagined 
to have the obligation to hear and respond to the complaints of the 
people. Claims made to the state on this basis were not always suc-
cessful—but they did consistently, implicitly or explicitly, assert rights: 
especially the rights of peoples to be governed by chiefs who behaved in 
accordance with local moralities of rule and who came from and there-
fore represented the local community. definitions of such communities 
were therefore also at the heart of these struggles, which often rhetori-
cally centered on dissatisfaction with a chief imposed by the govern-
ment on a people not his own. this claim making was precisely the 
stuff of active citizenship politics—defining political communities and 
holding leaders to account—and while many claims remained directed 
to local state officials, a willingness to engage officials at higher levels 
in the hierarchy demonstrated that a political relationship with rulers 
beyond the local was also being imaginatively constructed. in making 
these claims, people also drew the attention of officials to ways in which 
chiefs contravened the law of the state, implicitly asserting that the law 
should apply to those who ruled as well as those who were governed.13 
Colonial and local discourses of probity and proper rule thus interacted 
in the course of contentious chieftaincy politics, and subjects claimed 
the right to be heard by their rulers as members of rights-bearing com-
munities governed by the state.
 mamdani suggests that the power of chiefs was “unrestrained” by 
any law, since chiefs themselves determined the customary law that 
prevailed in rural areas.14 Certainly in the 1920s, highly authoritarian 
versions of “customary law” were being recorded by some southern dis-
trict commissioners (dCs) seeking to enforce the obedience of subjects 
to their chiefs.15 the judicial and police power of chiefs that the colo-
nial government sanctioned was unprecedented in both darfur and the 
south. indeed, by the 1930s, greater administrative introspection and 
ethnographic enquiry were generating concern among officials in the 
southern provinces that colonial policy had invented and entrenched 
chiefly despotism. Administrators became more open in their recogni-
tion that many chiefs had been appointed by government without any 
of the traditional authority or genealogical claim on which the native 
administration was supposedly based.16 in fact, “custom” did not trump 
administrative expediency; administrators tended to stick to their choice 
of chiefs and policies of amalgamating smaller units into larger chief-
doms, even when this clearly had no basis in history or tradition. Chiefs 
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were more likely to be removed from their position for contravening 
colonial laws (particularly hunting regulations and the remittance of 
taxes and court income) or for failing to meet administrative require-
ments for taxation and labor.
 But the fact that chiefs were on occasion removed and replaced nev-
ertheless demonstrated to their subjects the potential efficacy of com-
plaining against chiefs or reporting their misdemeanors to government. 
Complaints and disputes over chiefship often came to the attention 
of colonial officials because they were orchestrated by rival claimants 
among local elites, who knew enough of the government to articulate 
their grievances most effectively. Such disputes were often factional, 
lineage based, or even fraternal, and complainants thus exploited the 
colonial concern with heredity and descent. in southern darfur, com-
plainants in the 1920s suggested that a ta’aisha nazir (paramount chief ), 
Zubayr Sam, “was not a ta’aishi but half a Salami, a mule they called 
him in their fury.”17 A mixed family heritage here left the chief vulner-
able to claims of ethnic inauthenticity, claims that also served to reassert 
the importance of local political community and the expectation that 
those in authority belonged to that community. files on chiefs from 
both the south and darfur contain detailed family trees to illustrate and 
explain conflicts among rival claimants and families, and the quest for 
the “rightful” chief was a perennial problem for officials. But in prac-
tice, administrators were often prepared to live with the knowledge that 
many of their most useful and cooperative chiefs were by no means 
“rightful” in hereditary terms. genealogical arguments were therefore 
most effective when combined with complaints about chiefly misrule or 
illegal behavior, and this ensured that elite struggles over chiefship also 
opened up the potential for broader negotiations of subject rights and 
state law.
 Chiefs of course sought to prevent complaints against them from 
reaching government ears. one dC in southern darfur, dudley Lam-
pen, was particularly keen to get around chiefly gatekeepers to com-
municate with the nas, or ordinary people, a desire exploited by the 
subjects of Zubayr Sam: “Zubayr took care to lodge me in his house 
where i should not hear much of his extortions and bullyings, but the 
taaisha were not to be denied and lay in wait for me on my strolls 
out. . . . He (Zubayr) was smooth-tongued and talked much to impress 
me, but his administration was really too corrupt to stand.”18 Some 
time after Lampen had heard these initial complaints, Zubayr came to 
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Kubbe, the subdistrict headquarters, where Lampen found him “shak-
ing in fright”; Lampen noted, “[W]hen i told him to precede me back 
to his dar (land/territory) he said he would be killed if he went back, so 
i took him with me.” upon return to dar ta’aisha, Lampen’s attention 
was occupied by a very successfully organized public protest against the 
nazir’s rule: “A large crowd had gathered in the nazir’s village to listen 
with obvious sympathy to the complaints of a few more vocal ta’aishi. 
the complaints proceeded on two lines: definite complaints of criminal 
action, he had robbed persons taken into quarantine against relapsing 
fever, he had underlisted his tribe but collected a surplus on a private 
listing, his administration of justice was determined by bribery. Apart 
from these open complaints came a number of prominent men to see 
me secretly and protest against his selfish leadership of the tribe.”19
 it is striking that in the public arena, complaints were articulated 
largely in the language of the law and state regulation. Such lan-
guage was perhaps rather instrumentalized: the allegations of bribery 
that speakers made in Lampen’s presence would likely have had little 
resonance among the local community. in neighboring Kordofan, ian 
Cunnison noted of the Baqqara Humr that bribery incurred no shame 
within Humr society but allegations of bribery were frequently made 
against leaders to get government attention.20 this could be a highly 
effective strategy: when officials had their attention drawn to particular 
wrongdoings that obviously contravened colonial legal norms, it was 
difficult for them to simply do nothing. Such pressure was height-
ened in the example here by the public nature of the hearing: Lampen 
sat for a week listening to complaints in Zubayr Sam’s village, where 
“rows upon rows of interested spectators watched the meglis [council] 
from neighbouring trees, drawing near and having to be expelled.”21 
instrumentalized or not, the use of this language implied that people 
had the right to expect government to regulate the illegal misbehaviors 
of their chiefs and in doing so simultaneously address grievances that 
were perhaps more deeply felt by local people but also more difficult or 
dangerous to communicate to officials. this was an implicit assertion 
of rights shared by all those governed by the state and its laws (even 
as the apparatus of native courts created a landscape of great variation 
in local legal cultures). yet while the public discussion focused on law 
and corruption, certain elite men obviously had the confidence to ap-
proach Lampen privately to express their grievances in what seems to 
have been a rather different idiom of good government (frustratingly 
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underreported here), to which Lampen was also receptive in his quest 
to access popular opinion. Zubayr was subsequently dismissed.
 A similar example of a successful complaint, voiced in multiple 
idioms, comes from Juba district in southern Sudan. the long-serving 
dC of Juba, Captain Cooke, had intervened in several chiefdoms in 
the 1930s to appoint his favored candidates as chiefs, regardless of their 
hereditary claim. in 1937, however, he proved unusually receptive to 
complaints against the chief of gondokoro, tongun modi, for taking 
livestock and beating people, on the grounds that “his father modi 
Shoka had no claim to the chiefship.”
i think tongun modi tried to carry out the wishes of government 
but his people refused to obey him on many occasions because of 
his oppressiveness. . . . A complaint was made to me and i decided 
that a meeting should be held at ilibari, and that it should be at-
tended by all the headmen, elders and any who had complaints. . . . 
it was very orderly and all who spoke did so with restraint and 
fairness. there were complaints as to tongun modi’s taking chick-
ens and one or two cows—Beating two others without a proper 
trial, making another man sit in the sun with a heavy chain around 
his neck. even allowing for certain exaggerations i am sure these 
complaints were based on a certain amount of fact and all, both 
elders and young men, appeared definitely to wish for the removal 
of tongun modi. . . .
 tongun having made himself unpopular—his people com-
plained and stated quite correctly that he should not really be chief, 
but that Lako Bureng is the rightful heir according to Bari custom.
 Cooke was candid in spelling out the particular combination of fac-
tors that led him to remove tongun. Had tongun proved as good a 
chief as his father, his lack of hereditary claim might have been ignored; 
conversely, a chief with a hereditary right to the chiefship might be 
tolerated even if tyrannical: “[t]hough the people may accept certain 
things from the man who is their rightful chief, they would not neces-
sarily do so from one who has no claim.” Cooke went on to make clear 
the clinching factor: “even so one might have been prepared to keep 
him as Chief after taking disciplinary action if he had proved satisfac-
tory on government grounds, but he has not done so.”22
 in many other cases, of course, complainants failed to dislodge 
chiefs who were liked by the dC and gained a good reputation with 
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government. the nazir of the Habbania in southern darfur, el ghaali 
taj el din, was described by one British official as “a most outrageous 
zalim [oppressor],” yet he remained in his role for fifteen years, despite 
persistent and forceful protest.23 A large part of el ghaali’s success lay 
in forming good relations with (male) officials: immediately before he 
gained office; reports noted that he was “honest, loyal, hospitable and 
above all a man.”24 By the 1940s el ghaali was under increasing pres-
sure from accusations of illegal dues collection and bribe taking, but the 
district and provincial staff remained supportive of him as nazir. the 
dC of southern darfur put it most clearly: “As long as we support him 
we are making native Administration a synonym for maladministra-
tion. But there is no denying the fact that his age and personality have 
given him much prestige within his tribe and he has taken care that no 
one else will have any at all.”25
 Custom and genealogy was thus only one of the languages in which 
complaints against chiefs were articulated to government, and it was not 
necessarily the clinching factor in administrative decisions; chiefs’ abil-
ity to meet government demands and build a positive reputation among 
colonial officials was more crucial. While this shows that chiefs were, of 
course, much more vulnerable to the whims of the state than they were 
to their own subjects, the pragmatic emphasis on the effectiveness of 
chiefly authority also created an opportunity for local populations. By 
refusing to obey chiefs’ orders and demands, their people could precipi-
tate the kind of inquiries detailed above, which in turn opened an arena 
for the expression of wider grievance.
 the discourse of “oppression” by chiefs was particularly prominent 
in such arenas, as the accounts of Chief tongun and nazir el ghaali 
show. the Arabic term zulm/mazlum (oppression/oppressed) was widely 
used, particularly in darfur, to complain against chiefly tyranny. it 
evoked deeper historical ideas about the rights and duties of rulers and 
their subjects.26 in the case of darfur, there was considerable precedent 
for using this discourse: under the sultanate, subjects had at times suc-
cessfully appealed to the authority of the sultan against their chiefs. in a 
dramatic example of this, Sultan umar Lel in the 1730s “received com-
plaints of zulm [oppression against thirty leading chiefs; he had fifteen 
executed by the men’s gate and fifteen by the women’s gate of the fashir 
[royal residence].”27 Zulm was endemic in sultanic governance—royal 
charters addressed chiefs and officials as “all those oppressive [officials] 
who are overbearing with the rights of the muslims.”28 But equally 
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people expected their rulers to act against the excesses of their local 
representatives.
 British colonial officials in the twentieth century—and some 
english-speaking Sudanese—frequently used these Arabic terms in 
otherwise english-language texts, as well as using the english term op-
pression. Justin Willis argues that the use of other such Arabic terms 
by Condominium officials hints at the untranslatability of the novel 
governance by colonial chiefs into either the vernacular or the Brit-
ish languages of authority and morality.29 yet this very uncertainty 
gave room for the negotiation of what zulm (or its english transla-
tion) meant in the colonial context. And the invocation of the Arabic 
term by colonial officials implied a degree of receptivity to the culture 
and practice of complaint from below. Zulm might thus be defined as a 
criticism of governance that was recognized by the government (even 
if not necessarily acted upon). most importantly, we might argue that 
the act of complaining and petitioning transformed people from nas 
(“those without authority of any sort—the ‘subjects,’ in the full sense in 
which mahmood mamdani uses the word”30) into al-Mazlumiin (the 
oppressed) in the colonial record and that the category of Mazlumiin 
therefore did not connote the passive status of subjection to oppression 
so much as the active contestation of this oppression and, indeed, the 
assertion of a form of political community based on a shared experience 
of chiefly wrongdoing. Paradoxically, then, those who asserted that they 
were mazlum were in fact the most active participants in the negotiation 
of political authority: in both precolonial darfur and colonial Sudan 
they claimed the right as oppressed subjects to have their complaints 
heard by their rulers.
 the Mazlumiin appropriated the colonial language of law and bu-
reaucratic regulation to define and highlight “oppressive” behavior by 
chiefs. it is striking that the complaints against Chief tongun recorded 
by Cooke stressed his “illegal actions” and his infliction of beatings and 
fines without proper trial, just as the complaints against nazir Zubayr 
had highlighted his “criminal actions.” the law was beginning to be 
used to regulate the behavior of chiefs rather than simply to enforce 
their power. And such appeals implied membership in a political com-
munity defined by that law, both subject to its control and bearing rights 
guaranteed by it. in 1938 a man appealed to a higher chiefs’ “B court,” 
because his own chief had sentenced him to more lashes than the “A 
court” warrant allowed. many chiefs and policemen were prosecuted 
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in the B courts for unfair or illegal activities.31 People used the appeal 
hierarchy to access the state itself, as an elder in rumbek recalled in 2006: 
“the village chiefs were working with the whites. if the chief did not give 
you your right, you went to the white man in charge of the court until you 
got your right, even though the village chief had denied it.”32
 from the earliest years of colonial rule, the language of law and in-
dividual rights had been deployed to petition colonial officials, often 
by individual subjects coming in person to the towns and government 
offices or directly approaching officials on trek. even before the 1920s, 
officials in rumbek in southern Sudan reported two to three thousand 
complaints a year being brought directly to the district headquarters to 
be heard by the British inspector or a mamur (junior official).33 in dar-
fur, dC Lampen described how numerous petitioners would come to 
see him in the afternoons, to discuss matters that “could not be reached 
over the hustle and bustle of the office, but only after an introduction of 
several cups of syrupy tea.” indeed so many of these complainants came 
outside the hours of business that Lampen had to “build a rest-house to 
lodge them at the side of [his] compound and even hire an ex-slave girl 
to cook for them.”34 officials on trek in the south were also constantly 
pestered by litigants, “each bent on the direct approach to the dC as 
the quickest means of getting what he thought was justice.”35 one dC 
complained of having court papers waved in his face throughout the day 
and even at night: “i have even had them brought to me when in bed 
in a rest house on the road.”36 People clearly imagined that by virtue of 
being ruled they possessed rights as individuals as well as communities: 
this was the implicit and unwritten bargain struck with government, 
an unwritten bargain that some also imagined to be guaranteed by the 
written law.
 one paramount chief in southern darfur similarly complained of 
the incessant demands of litigants and complainants,37 and the chiefs’ 
courts too became important arenas for the assertion of individual or 
collective rights. Chiefs also clearly sought to deter appeals and to con-
trol the recording and reporting of court cases. But people nevertheless 
found ways to appeal to higher authorities, whether in writing or in 
person or in collective protest. in doing so, they sought to establish 
and prevail upon personal relations with colonial officials. But they also 
expressed their claims and grievances in languages that were clearly 
known to be most efficacious in communicating with “government,” the 
hakuma, more broadly, and were in part appropriated from the public 
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discourse of colonial officials. in making their complaints, individual 
subjects were both recognizing the authority of the state and seeking 
its recognition of their rights. one official noted this quest for recog-
nition among protesters in dar Habbania: “[t]he individual Habbani 
pushing himself forward simply to be known to government.”38 in the 
late colonial period, the government would promote ideas of individual 
rights and relations with government through new political languages 
of citizenship and institutions of political representation. But appeals to 
the law to assert such rights and relations had already been occurring 
within the native administration units of the interwar years and would 
continue to find expression in the practices of complaint against oppres-
sion and making claims on the state.
Local government, Local Citizenship
By the late 1930s, the Condominium government was shifting away 
from the emphasis of native administration policies on tradition toward 
the modernizing, developmental rhetoric of local government reforms, 
with new emphasis on ideas of representation and citizenship. the in-
stitutions and practices of late colonial government in Sudan created 
new opportunities, particularly for the literate. But there was also con-
siderable continuity in the composition and role of local elites, many of 
whom swiftly learned to speak the new language of local government 
and claimed to represent “their” people in order to maintain their mo-
nopoly on relations and communication with government. the Condo-
minium government claimed to be promoting new kinds of transethnic 
and translocal political community, but in fact local government was 
intended as a means of containing politics in local arenas and limiting 
the potency of nationalism.39
 the localized citizenship envisaged by the government was articu-
lated at a “study camp” for northern Sudanese officials and intelligentsia 
in 1952: “effective Local government can in fact assert the rights of 
the Citizen in some ways better than he can assert them himself.” the 
theme of the study camp was “the state versus the citizen: the problem 
of freedom in the modern state”; and the report also suggested that 
local government could “soften the impact on any individual of an all-
powerful, yet remote and perhaps unsympathetic Central Authority.”40 
Perhaps reflecting the perennial tension between provincial officials and 
the central government or recognizing the narrow composition of the 
Sudanese elites assuming control of the state by this time, the political 
88
Cherry Leonardi and Chris Vaughan
elites of the late Condominium thus advocated local government as an 
arena in which the rights and freedoms of citizens could be protected 
from state tyranny.
 the new local councils established in the 1940s were therefore 
treated as arenas in which to educate Sudanese in proper civic behav-
ior and representative government. Local citizenship was in effect the 
latest disciplinary project of the state, even as it was intended to main-
tain (or create) the liberties of local peoples, and once again chiefs 
were at the forefront of this project, just as they had been the targets 
of educational and cash-cropping initiatives. the idea seemed to be 
that if chiefs could be made to perform as good citizens then “their” 
people would naturally enough follow their example. in the southern 
provinces, district officials simply turned the existing “B court” panels 
of chiefs into “councils,” having long treated the B courts as arenas 
of (limited) consultation and discussion.41 in darfur, new “combined 
courts” were established for the Baggara and Zaghawa chiefs, respec-
tively, to encourage more horizontal connections between chiefs. dis-
putes over chiefships were increasingly handed over to other chiefs 
to settle, and chiefs were prosecuted for misconduct by their peers.42 
government officials thus sought to inculcate a sense of shared civic 
responsibility and statesmanship among chiefs.
 in the late 1940s and early 1950s, formal rural and town councils were 
established, often largely composed of and elected by chiefs. At the same 
time, new province councils and a national legislative assembly were 
constituted; in the south, members were elected by the B court chiefs, 
and these councils and the legislative assembly included many (literate) 
chiefs again.43 Chiefs were thus being turned into political represen-
tatives not just of their own chiefdoms but of district constituencies. 
given that government education in darfur had been targeted exclu-
sively at the sons of chiefs, it is no surprise that chiefs and their families 
utterly dominated councils in darfur. in the south, chiefs sometimes 
faced new competition from teachers and government employees: in an 
election for a new district education council in Juba, an ex-soldier, the 
only literate candidate, was elected rather than one of the three chiefs 
standing: “Literacy won, clan heads murmuring as they cast their votes 
‘because he reads,’ for fear of reprisals from their chiefs.”44
 But chiefs succeeded in retaining a favored position in “representing” 
their people to the government. this was the context in which Chief 
modi Baraba or his supporters wrote such a commanding letter to their 
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representative in the national legislative assembly, the teacher Benja-
min Lwoki. modi was the most prominent yei chief and had already 
exhorted Lwoki to “speak firmly” for his constituency in the legislative 
assembly when he was elected in 1948.45 Chiefs could, it seemed, speak 
for those who had recently become defined as citizens, just as they had 
spoken for subjects in the preceding decades. one might argue, there-
fore, that the introduction of a discourse of citizenship had done little 
to displace existing political relationships and status. But the letter is 
also revealing of the broader ideas and expectations of the state that had 
emerged by the 1950s. it complained that the northern administrators 
in yei were transferring the new southern mamur, or junior official, to 
yambio: “[W]e should like him to work in yei here for at least 2 years 
officially in order . . . to study his behaviour towards the people and 
watch how he carries his duty forward.” this reflects both the desire 
to personalize government by getting to know individual officials, as 
chiefs always had, and the notion of administrators as public servants 
with a “duty” to citizens. Similarly the letter complained of bad condi-
tions at yei Hospital and the transfer away of a good doctor, complaints 
that had already been made to the ministry of Health and the province 
medical inspector, indicating that the letter’s author had a good knowl-
edge of government institutions (the letter also made reference to the 
public service committee responsible for selecting district officials).46 
the strong sense of entitlement in the letter reflects a growing expecta-
tion that the state should provide services in return for taxes, an idea 
that a British missionary also reported was prevalent in nearby moru 
district: “fees for outpatients (2 ½ d. a year) and inpatients (2 ½ d a 
day) were introduced in June, and emptied the hospital, which is looked 
on as a government one, which should therefore give free treatment. . . . 
they look on it as their right, since they pay taxes.”47
 the administrative and political reforms of the late colonial period 
contributed to heightening expectations of the state and provided a 
new language in which to make claims upon it in the name of “citi-
zens,” adding to existing repertoires of claim making and protest. But 
there was also considerable continuity in the way that people sought 
to contract with chiefs and government officials and to appeal to 
state justice as a resource in disputes and conflicts. in darfur, some 
of the councils were reportedly seen by ordinary people as the latest 
addition to the native courts system, in which chiefs of a district sat 
together to decide on cases, not as fundamentally new administrative 
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decision-making bodies. this was not an unreasonable view: the 
northern darfur district (ndd) Council was indeed the supreme 
court of appeal in the district, hearing cases from all the native courts 
and any petitions brought by the inhabitants of northern darfur.48 
the dC in 1949 expressed concern at this: “[P]etitioners imagine the 
ndd council takes place in order that their cases may be heard and 
they cannot understand that the Council’s primary task is to sit as a 
council to discuss affairs of the district.” the council building at Kut-
tum was “often surrounded by a mob of vociferous mazalim [oppressed 
subjects],” and the dC foresaw that any future attempt to remove the 
judicial aspect of the council’s role would cause problems.49
 As this suggests, the longstanding discourse of oppression continued 
to be channeled into the assertion of rights in the courts and councils. 
But “vociferous” complainants were also finding new languages and 
methods for expressing grievances and claiming rights in the later colo-
nial period.
“Petitions Are this Country’s Chosen music of Liberty”: 
Appealing to the State
While the Condominium government promoted local government as 
a mechanism for safeguarding the rights of citizens from the dangers 
of an “all-powerful” central government, many citizens reversed this 
equation, appealing to central government in protest of local misrule or 
injustice. British officials and the northern Sudanese elite might argue 
that local government was the solution to “the problem of freedom in 
the modern state,” but colonial subjects in southern and western Sudan 
also found their own means of addressing this problem, as the penul-
timate British governor of darfur declared: “Petitions are this coun-
try’s chosen music of liberty.”50 A range of colonial subjects spoke or 
wrote petitions and appeals to the state authorities, using the language 
of the law and the government’s own regulatory orders to protest the 
behavior of chiefs or the decisions of courts and to make claims on the 
state. Petitions to central government were not a novel development of 
the late colonial period, nor was their language necessarily innovative. 
they continued to employ the multiple languages of colonial gover-
nance, speaking alternately or simultaneously of patrimonial obligation, 
personalized and paternalistic relations, genealogical and historical 
structure, and the force of state law. However, their authors did increas-
ingly and explicitly also appeal to government on the grounds of their 
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rights as citizens. moreover, the chances of such petitions being acted 
upon by agents of central government were considerably greater in the 
politically uncertain years leading up to independence. As nationalist 
politics became more assertive, so government felt less able to deny the 
rights of those who demanded its intervention in local politics: con-
ceding rights at a local level might be a means to preempt efforts by 
nationalists to link local political issues to broader conceptions of rights 
and freedoms. in a sense—and as with the local government reforms 
discussed above—granting local citizenship might stave off the advance 
of nationalist citizenship. the net result, however, was that the state and 
its agents were increasingly limited by the conceptions of political rights 
they themselves were promoting.
 the most striking aspect of the practice of petitioning and appealing 
is the obvious awareness among colonial subjects of government hier-
archies and central state authorities. individuals and groups appealed to 
the highest authorities in Khartoum to complain against the decisions 
of provincial and district government officials or the local courts: this 
was true in the 1920s as well as the 1940s and ’50s. most of these peti-
tions took a written form, though determining exactly who wrote them 
is difficult: prisoners, for example, must have had access to a prison clerk 
to produce their appeals, which helps to explain why they tended to fol-
low standard stylistic tropes. Some darfuri elites who felt poorly treated 
by the provincial administration traveled all the way to the capital: some 
of these stayed with Sayyed Abd el-rahman al-mahdi, the mahdist 
leader and politician, in omdurman while they wrote out formal pe-
titions to the Sudan government protesting against their treatment. 
Petitions were made out to the director of intelligence or “the secretary 
for native Affairs” (this ended up in the civil secretary’s hands).51 in 
northern darfur, during the 1940s, the Awlad deggain lineage of the 
Zaghawa people simultaneously petitioned the northern darfur dis-
trict Council, the governor of darfur, the civil secretary, and Sayyed 
Abd al-rahman al-mahdi in protest against the behavior of their chief, 
Melik mohammedein.52
 most of these petitions did not achieve their aims: subjects often 
asserted rights that government refused to recognize, reminding us of 
the limits to the politics of citizenship being discussed here. Sending 
petitioners “around the block” to different levels of government was a 
useful way of exhausting their demands, as officials explicitly stated in 
correspondence.53 the state could thus absorb such protest in a manner 
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that did no harm to its capacity for rule. However, petitioners were 
sometimes remarkably persistent in their efforts, perhaps because of 
the “uncertainty which prevail[ed] as to the government’s reception” 
of these petitions.54 especially after 1945, claims to rights expressed in 
petitions became more likely to be acknowledged by the state because 
central government was increasingly wary of the potential for local 
chieftaincy politics to become entwined with the wider ambitions of 
nationalist politicians. in the instance of the Awlad deggain protest, by 
appealing to the authority of Sayyed Abd al-rahman (SAr), alongside 
the authority of government, the deggain had raised the possibility that 
their local demands might become entwined with the national political 
agenda of SAr, exactly the outcome feared by colonial government. 
the civil secretary in Khartoum therefore pressured the provincial 
administration to make concessions to their demands.55 more gener-
ally, colonial officials believed that growing chieftaincy protests in 1950s 
darfur were indeed encouraged by wider moves toward self-government 
and independence in Sudanese national politics. in this context, peti-
tions that appealed to the law as a means of protecting collective or 
individual rights were more difficult to dismiss. increasingly, practices 
among chiefs that would previously have been tolerated as part of the 
routine culture of local governance were viewed—by government of-
ficials as well as petitioners—as contravening an idea of the law that set 
limits to the power of those in authority. in the case of Melik moham-
medein, the chief ’s involvement in what the state perceived as camel 
theft—and his failure to deal adequately with camel theft as a crime in 
court—eventually precipitated his dismissal.56 Appeals to the law—and 
drawing attention to the illegal misdeeds of chiefs—was an increasingly 
rewarding way of demanding redress.
 Chiefs or ex-chiefs might in turn petition in protest at their deposition, 
as in the case of Lako Bureng, the chief who was appointed in gondokoro 
when dC Cooke removed tongun modi in 1937. Lako Bureng was in turn 
removed two years later for “misappropriating tribute money and favor-
ing his own relations when ordering work parties for Juba etc,” and the 
gondokoro chiefdom was amalgamated under the neighboring Belinian 
chiefdom.57 Lako wrote to the civil secretary in Khartoum: “Why should 
an independent tribe be made compelled [sic] to go under another tribe 
against their wish—i write this to you seeking justice. the Local govern-
ment refused my appeal and we feel that we are oppressed and our own 
[sic] way is to write to higher authority and request that you ask for the 
93
The Politics of Claim and Complaint in Condominium Sudan
case to see. . . . your excellency is the agent of the good god and if i am 
not justified by you i feel the gates of justice are finally closed.”58
 Lako was clearly drawing here on his roman Catholic mission 
schooling as well as on the rhetoric of justice and oppression that was 
so often prominent in petitions to government. But strikingly, other 
individual petitioners began to attempt to exercise imagined rights of 
membership in much wider imperial communities in protests against 
the judgments of their chief. “As the country is subject to union Jack 
i expect my right to be given in this case if found,” wrote a medical 
assistant in Akot, complaining at the failure of a chiefs’ court to enforce 
the return of cattle awarded to him.59 “therefore i suffered to come and 
fall under your feet being a representative of the King of england,” de-
clared a man in torit to the governor of equatoria, protesting the heavy 
punishments for adultery inflicted on his relatives by a chiefs’ court.60 
the concept of imperial citizenship was here, as emma Hunter puts 
it, a “weapon in argument [rather] than settled fact”—but the appear-
ance of such rhetoric in written petitions nonetheless hints at a growing 
sense of political community that stretched far beyond the local, at least 
among those who wielded the tools to commit their claims to paper.61
 the use of the specific term mazlum (oppressed) had clearly also 
spread to the southern provinces, despite the more limited use of Arabic 
there than in darfur. Like British officials, some literate southerners 
deployed the Arabic term in the midst of english texts: a man impris-
oned in Juba for allegedly harming another man with an herbal remedy 
complained, “i am mazalum because i have been punished heavily by 
imprisonment and a fine of one cow.” this appellant also requested 
mitigation because he was the sole provider for his elderly stepmother 
and young brother.62 Such personal circumstances were often heeded 
by courts and colonial officials, reflecting the more paternalistic char-
acteristics of colonial government, to which petitioners also appealed: 
“you are my father, all people [direct] their eyes to you,” wrote another 
deposed chief to the governor-general of Sudan.63
 Petitioners thus continued to approach and imagine the government 
as a hierarchy of individuals who had personal obligations to their sub-
jects, especially to those with whom they had built relationships of alli-
ance and patronage. But increasingly in the late colonial period, people 
also imagined government as the source of an abstracted and universal 
law, which guaranteed the rights of citizens as well as subordinating 
people to the control of the state. Petitions and appeals were frequently 
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written in a more legalistic language of rights and injustices: “i was 
dealt with on my rights falsely and not accordingly. . . . i wish you to 
investigate . . . in order that i might have my rights.”64 Appellants often 
referred to “government law” in their letters: “We want to know if there 
is any government law forcing any body to be punished with out any 
mistake,” complained a group of laborers claiming to have been wrongly 
arrested during a sectional fight in eastern equatoria.65
 As well as appeals for state recognition of individual rights, peti-
tions and complaints also continued to focus on sectional political rights 
within chiefdoms. indeed, the definition of local political communities 
and their rights became an issue of even sharper significance in the 
late colonial period as the rewards for recognition as a community by 
government became more obvious in the form of developmental goods 
of various kinds.
 one of the commonest articulations of grievance against chiefs was 
the accusation that they were favoring their own clan or lineage group; 
such grievances were often traced back to the amalgamation of differ-
ent chiefdoms under one chief. often “oppressed” people simply voted 
with their feet and moved to other chiefs, as the governor of equatoria 
noted with concern in 1948: “my file on the appointments and dismiss-
als of chiefs in Juba district presents a sorry picture of incompetence 
and maladministration among many of the holders of such posts, and 
of continuous chopping and changing over by small groups from one 
chiefship to another.”66 But the more that the government tried to keep 
people under their chiefs, the more that internal tensions were chan-
neled into protests and petitions.
 Strikingly, such complaints were increasingly employing the lan-
guage of representative government, as this petition by the subchiefs of 
Loggo West in Juba district in 1948 indicates:
We the 659 (six hundred and fifty-nine) . . . protest that the ap-
pointment of Lako Kirba was not known to us and therefore 
against our will. We were never asked our views nor our votes were 
taken. A chief is not to be chosen by some other chiefs but by his 
subjects, we the 659 people voted for Philipo Legge whom we elect 
and found fit for the rank. But Lako Kirba has only 207 voters, and 
how is it that 207 votes win the 659 votes?
 We are greater in number than that of Lako Kirba. Why are 
we not given our right?
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 the subchiefs were here claiming to speak for their people, numbered 
very specifically in terms of taxpayers. in fact, the payment of taxes was 
quite central in perceptions of citizenship. the colonial government 
had always treated the payment of tax or tribute as a sign of obedience 
and encouraged the idea that it contracted state protection and services. 
from the late 1940s onward, in an era of increasing enumeration of 
the population and emphasis on political representation, the payment 
of taxes was beginning to be linked to an electoral franchise and the 
provision of services too. in the late 1950s, after Sudan’s independence, 
amalgamations of chiefdoms continued to be promoted by Sudanese 
administrators on the grounds that larger populations would receive 
more social services: “Chief like Lolik Lado with 2715 tax payers weighs 
more that [sic] Aznaba with 277 tax payers. if the people of Aznaba join 
their neighbouring chief Phulai they will be able by their joint efforts 
to carry more efficiently their duties and will have the right to ask for 
services in return.”67
 in 1951, other petitioners argued against this primacy of numbers, but 
nevertheless emphasized the significance of paying taxes, in calling for the 
reinstatement of the formerly independent chiefdom of Sindiru, which 
had been amalgamated under another chief. the petition articulated a 
very clear set of contractual relations between government and chiefdom. 
the fulfillment of certain obligations to government was supposed to 
earn state recognition of political rights as an independent chiefdom: 
“Although we are few in number we are not exempted to pay tribute, but 
we are paying the same rate which is approved for the whole Province, 
we clear our roads as other chief, we collect same rate of fees from our ‘A’ 
court cases as other ‘A’ courts. We do anything which is ordered by the 
government in the same way the large chiefship is doing.”68
 in these debates over whether the rights and entitlements of com-
munities should correspond to numbers of taxpayers or to their compa-
rable rendering of services and dues to government, we begin to discern 
more-explicit evidence of an imagined equivalency in relations with the 
state that Cooper sees as central to definitions of citizenship. these 
might be communal rights that were being asserted, but they were ar-
gued on the logical basis of a wider horizontal equivalency of individual 
subjects whose rendering of taxes and labor established a common rela-
tionship to the state, regardless of whether the relative “weight” of their 
chiefdom was measured numerically or proportionally. the petition 
from Sindiru also made clear the fundamental assumption behind the 
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practice of petitioning: “[A]s you are our governor we humbly trust 
that you will listen to what we are asking.”69 Such petitions were not 
always or often successful, but the very process of petitioning invoked 
an implicit obligation: rulers must at least hear the complaints of their 
subjects. And the practice of petitioning assumed—and taught—that 
rulers could be prevailed on by invoking the logic and laws of their own 
rule to demand rights and recognition.
Citizenship in Sudan’s southern and western “peripheries” was primar-
ily negotiated within local political communities of chiefdom or district. 
But this local citizenship was increasingly defined in the late colonial 
period in terms of broader ideas about subjects’ (and sometimes explic-
itly citizens’) rights and the protection of state law, as well as through 
more well-established principles of patrimonial obligation and moral 
community. indeed, the legalism of the colonial state had served as 
a resource in contentious local politics even in the earlier decades of 
colonial rule: differing discourses of rights and obligations had been 
in interaction throughout the colonial period in these local contexts. 
Struggles over political power and rights in local arenas were also strug-
gles over access to the state and in turn helped to produce a translocal, 
hierarchical idea of the state to which people appealed in the course of 
their disputes. indeed, as other recent literature has suggested, we might 
understand these local processes, including the politics of citizenship, as 
central to the very processes of state formation.70
 the practice of complaining or claiming rights, whether in the courts 
or by letter or direct approach to officials, entailed the recognition of 
state authority, the acceptance by subjects of being governed. it might 
be argued further that the active promotion of citizenship by the late co-
lonial state was also a disciplinary project that had the strengthening of 
state hegemony at its heart. But the politics we describe here entailed an 
active process of negotiating the relationship with government through 
protest, dispute, and complaint. As we show above, the chiefdom was 
not the bounded unit of government that either the colonial administra-
tion might have envisioned or mamdani has described; chiefly subjects 
were continually going around or beyond their immediate chief to claim 
their rights and to protest oppression. But, equally, the chiefdom could 
also become a platform for asserting collective rights and for seeking 
state recognition, and citizenship might itself be imagined as both an 
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individual and a collective identity. in the contentious politics of chief-
ship discussed in this chapter, the boundary between subjecthood and 
citizenship was continually blurred and contested, as experiences of op-
pression became the grounds for the active negotiation of citizenship.
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Burundi, 1960–67
Loyal Subjects and Obedient Citizens
A i d A n  r u S S e L L
B e t w e e n  1 9 6 0  A n d  1 9 6 6 ,  t H e  s tAt e  I n  B u r u n d I  w A s  d e s t r O y e d 
and reinvented three times. At the beginning of the decade, Burundi 
was one-half of the territory of ruanda-urundi, controlled by Belgium 
under the terms of a un trusteeship, and just beginning to discover 
electoral politics. two years later it was an independent kingdom, des-
perately attempting to cling to internal unity while beset by fears of 
invasion from its republican neighbor, rwanda. in 1966, a military coup 
abolished the monarchy and instituted a new republic of Burundi, 
dressed in the trappings of a revolution but dominated by an authoritar-
ian and ethnically minded clique of army officers. in a few short years 
the people of Burundi saw the fundamental identity of the state shift so 
rapidly that the nature of their interaction with power and the terms of 
citizenship in their unstable nation were continuously under question.
 to some extent, whether commanded by authoritarian institutions of 
chieftaincy, monarchy, or military rule, or dominated by an overarching 
Belgian administration that neither expected nor desired any engage-
ment from the common people, the population of Burundi seemed to 
have little claim on the unstable yet hegemonic forms of control that 
ruled over them. the “field of citizenship” appeared dominated by the 
performance of subjecthood.1 each of engin isin and Bryan turner’s 
“axes” of citizenship (its extent, content, and depth) was substantially 
characterized by subjection.2 the extent of citizenship as a positional 
relationship—triangulating inclusion and exclusion between individual, 
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state, and the political community of the nation—was narrowly delim-
ited to those who accepted the uncontested domination of king, party, 
or military dictatorship. the content of citizenship—its rights and 
responsibilities—was defined more as narrow duties and obligations of 
obedience and loyalty owed by subjects to sovereigns. And the depth of 
citizenship was remarkably thin, depending almost entirely on the pub-
lic performance of subjection under the simple, bare labels of orthodox 
nationalism. the transformations of state might change the language 
and parameters of such citizenship, but the expectation of subjection as 
its primary expression was remarkably consistent.
 to echo mahmood mamdani’s influential dichotomy, therefore, the 
people appeared as subjects, not citizens;3 constrained by power, their 
relationship with the state took place primarily in terms of obedience 
and command, without recourse to the means of engagement or reci-
procity that might provide them with the possibility of influencing the 
actions of authority. yet the distinction of subject and citizen is simul-
taneously an informative and a misleading principle of analysis. on the 
one hand, it gives clarity in the search for patterns of behavior that may 
illuminate the nature of belonging within the political community of 
the nation, the practices that reproduce that community and mediate 
power within it, reflecting the agency and influence of people and state. 
At the same time, however, maintaining the distinction between the 
two concepts is impossible. the public performance of subjection of-
fered a wealth of possibilities by which the position of the subject could 
be used to claim the opportunities of inclusion and manage the pres-
sures of power; subjecthood was in part a discursive and constructive 
element within the field of citizenship, moderating both its extent and 
its content. As the terms and obsessions of state authority shifted, the 
people of Burundi certainly acted the subject, yet frequently too they 
made the claims of active citizens, blended obedience with negotiation 
and loyalty with invocation, and conformed to political realities while 
seeking to shift them toward their interest.
 in short, citizenship is a moving target of analysis. Across each of the 
crisis states in the early 1960s, we must take the exploration of a changing 
field of citizenship as a goal rather than a premise and look to the daily 
practices and expressions of people and state under each brief regime to 
discern it.4 to illustrate more clearly the complex issues at stake across 
such rapid change, this study focuses on one small area of Burundi, a 
stretch of borderland in the central north that most volubly displayed 
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the dynamics of obedience and engagement that were present to varying 
degrees across the nation. the analysis begins with an overview of the 
premise of national political community that was exposed in the acceler-
ated political development at the end of Belgian rule, a brief moment of 
internal democratic choice; the discussion then explores the transforma-
tion of such issues in an atmosphere of fear and suspicion, when the 
independent state faced crisis on its border. in both of these cases, the 
behavior of the population was substantially reactive to the state, and 
therefore we conclude with a glimpse at the early days of the military re-
public, seeing for the first time how individuals could instigate the same 
dynamics of citizenship in subjecthood to command the recognition and 
involvement of their undemocratic state. As Burundi stumbled on its 
way from colonial rule to independent nation, the nature of citizenship 
within it was molded and tested on its fractious edge. in the nature of 
popular engagement with each brief regime, we can see how the perfor-
mances of citizen and subject can overlap and complement each other, 
less identities than strategies of political agency, providing both flexibil-
ity and stability in times of dangerous change.
Belgian trusteeship: the Choice of the Subject
Burundi imagined itself as an ancient nation. in the last days of the 
colonial period, the actions and content of citizenship, of engagement 
between population and state, were partially encoded in the imagina-
tion of its extent, the recognition of identity and belonging within this 
time-honored nation. All the trappings of the archetypal imagined 
community were exerted to give substance to the identity of the “Ba-
rundi” as the corporate body of the nation, a “murundi” being an in-
dividual member within this body. Politicians celebrated a deep, shared 
national history and reveled in the celebration of language, culture, and 
a supposed national character of peace, defined negatively against the 
supposed fractious violence of neighboring rwanda.5
 Central to this conception of the body of the nation was its relation to 
the head: the mwami, or king. the position of the sovereign over and above 
his people was fundamental to all political rhetoric of the time. mwami 
mwambutsa was hailed as Sebarundi, the “father of the Barundi,” the 
royal motto Ganza Sabwa exerting his ordained right to “rule and reign,” 
and both his own sovereign right and his subjects’ duty of obedience were 
enwrapped in the ideology of the nation. this ideology denoted the ex-
tent of inclusion within the family of the nation as subjection to the king, 
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without consideration of political engagement with power. the content 
of such a citizenship of subjection was thus an obligation of obedience, 
reciprocated by a duty of protection from the “father” to his children. 
Legal rights of citizenship did not exist; Africans under Belgian trustee 
authority were officially ressortissants of ruanda-urundi, a term simply 
denoting a territorial origin rather than the legal rights and membership 
of a citoyen, “citizen,”6 and both Africans and europeans dwelt instead on 
the concept of the Barundi as a great family, subject to the mwami.
 the reality of colonial domination doubled this subjection, as 
throughout the daily practice of indirect rule the king was exerted as 
a veil for Belgian authority, “the familiar décor that permits us to act 
in the wings without alarming the masses,” as a report from 1925 put 
it.7 the attitude toward these “masses” was clear, and no engagement 
with power beyond the direction of the dual royal and colonial authority 
was expected. Alongside the mwami and the Belgian administration, 
the population was ruled by a third node of subjugating authority. the 
mwami himself reigned as an inviolable figurehead, but the state largely 
functioned through the division of power among the chiefs around 
him, even if this meant a near-constant pervasion of internal feuds that 
sometimes came perilously close to civil war.8
 the most outstanding of these chiefs was the great Pierre Baran-
yanka, who worked so passionately for the colonial project that the 
Belgians permitted him unchallenged authority within his territory 
along the central northern border with rwanda.9 the archetypal “de-
centralised despot,”10 empowered by a dynastic claim to rule as well as 
strong colonial support, Baranyanka’s authority within his territory was 
enforced through regular assemblies and displays of power in which 
the people were summoned and directed to participate in forced labor, 
especially the cultivation of coffee as the cash crop of development. 
tardiness, disobedience, or any other signs of marginal dissent were 
punished with physical abuse, such as the kiboko hippopotamus-nerve 
whip applied to the hands, feet, or buttocks of the disobedient subject.11 
they might glory in their subjection to the mwami, but the position 
of the population, firmly at the bottom of a stratified hierarchy that 
made the people doubly subjects of their chief, was readily apparent in 
the minds of the common people. “umwansi utagira aho umuhungira 
uramusaba,” ran the proverb: you bow to the enemy you cannot flee.12
 for much of the colonial period, political development was con-
fined to the adjustment and balance of authority between the Belgian 
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administration, the chiefs, and the mwami. When Burundi finally 
caught up to the current of political change across Africa in 1959, 
however, and the Belgians hurriedly implemented a system of partial 
democratization, the ensuing political contest both exemplified the pri-
macy of subjecthood within the field of citizenship and demonstrated 
the curious, if limited, possibilities of engagement with power that this 
position of subjection could, in fact, entail.
 When local elections were announced in late 1959, the dynamics of 
the newly formed party politics adhered considerably to the preceding 
dynamics of state.13 Parties were largely formed and directed by the 
chiefs, and coalitions of parties somewhat matched the dynastic divi-
sions of preceding chiefly contests. Baranyanka’s family formed the Parti 
démocrate Chrétien (PdC), which urged internal autonomy beneath a 
continued european stewardship; their principal rival was uprona, union 
et Progrès national, which demanded immediate independence and was 
led by Prince Louis rwagasore, the eldest son of mwambutsa and a chief 
in his own right. But quite aside from the question of independence, the 
sovereign authority of the mwami and the loyalty of the Barundi as his 
subjects became the vital stake of political argument between these forces, 
a field of ironic consensus over which the parties fought for ownership.
 for the uprona nationalists, kingship was tied to memories of glo-
rious history and resistance to colonization; they played obliquely on 
the monarchist sentiments of the population by conflating mwambutsa 
with his son, implying that the loyal obligation of Barundi subjects to 
their monarchy was to devote themselves to rwagasore’s nationalist 
cause. the PdC and Baranyanka, in particular, were portrayed as trai-
tors to the crown, enemies of the people. in response, the PdC insisted 
loudly and incessantly on its loyalty to the mwami, adding its voice to 
the political consensus of the relationship between sovereign and sub-
jects. But it extended this argument to proclaim that the mwami was 
so superior as to be beyond politics, that one could be a loyal subject to 
mwambutsa and still vote for whichever party one desired. All Barundi 
could be included as subjects to the king, while the political rights of 
engagement with power that were proffered by electoral democracy 
were limited to the state beneath him. the extent of citizenship was 
delimited by subjection to the sovereign, while its content encompassed 
the contestation and claim on the power of state.
 the Belgians, fearful of rwagasore’s success, duly held popular 
réunions d’information, information and propaganda meetings that 
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announced the mwami’s position “above the parties,” distributing public 
letters signed by mwambutsa and bearing his photograph. So successful 
was the concatenation of political voices and popular imagination all 
devoted to royal authority that the administration soon found that the 
people were refusing to accept or believe any political tract distributed 
by the Belgians that did not carry the mwami’s name or image.14 the 
celebration of obedient subjecthood to the mwami was never more em-
phatic than during the political contest over his perceived favor.
 Such electoral politics also necessitated the acknowledgment of 
power within the position of the subject, however. A citizenship defined 
by subjection still offered possibilities of rights and responsibilities in 
the management of power. it was indeed a central plank of uprona’s 
nationalist platform that the subject had the right and duty to choose 
his or her sovereign; the party simply relied on the fact that the choice 
had already been made. one uprona tract explicitly portrayed the ques-
tion of independence as a choice between the king of Burundi and the 
king of Belgium: “We have our king,” the tract declared; “[W]e shall 
not be subject to theirs.”15 uprona did not question that the Barundi 
would be subjects to power in the new independent order, but uprona’s 
conception of subjecthood required that the subjects themselves accept 
or reject the authority of their sovereign.
 furthermore, this necessity of consent and the possibility of choice 
within the position of the subject was brought even more powerfully 
to the fore in regard to the authority of the chiefs. Although the chief-
taincy system was formally abolished at the beginning of the political 
contest, the chiefs themselves retained enormous political authority. 
With most parties strongly associated with chiefly leadership, people 
who had always been subjects to their local chief could find themselves 
in a situation of explicitly rejecting his authority by choosing to en-
dorse a rival party. Powerful rumors passed around the country that 
a subject was obligated to vote for the party of his chief, rumors that 
were subtly endorsed by most parties within their own territory and 
angrily denounced in the territories of their rivals. it was a struggle over 
the nature of engagement between subject and state, the possibility of 
dissent and the endorsement of alternative authority balanced against 
the conceptions of duty, loyalty, and obedience that were fundamental 
to the position of the subject. As independence neared, the content of 
citizenship for a nation of proud subjects became the primary field of 
political contest.
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 given Chief Baranyanka’s great power and intense personal and po-
litical rivalry with rwagasore, the dynamics of this contest were most 
fractiously fought out in Baranyanka’s territory. Although the PdC 
portrayed itself as the champion of democracy against the supposedly 
“feudalist” calls of uprona, Baranyanka reacted with fury to the possibil-
ity that his subjects might choose to reject his authority. When uprona 
approached certain promising individuals within his chieftaincy, hoping 
to woo them toward becoming political pioneers in the PdC heartland, 
the men they chose were subjected to intense intimidation and threats 
by the local sous-chefs, Baranyanka’s delegate agents.16 When this failed 
to curtail the uprona incursion and more and more people began to 
express sympathy toward and loyalty to rwagasore’s cause, Baranyanka 
threatened extreme violence against his subjects. “i will bring to you 
the twa and the soldiers,” he is said to have declared in one region that 
showed growing uprona sentiment, “so that they may have intercourse 
with your wives and daughters.”17 He summoned individual uprona 
propagandists to stand trial before him in his personal tribunal, punish-
ing them with months in prison for failing to answer his summons.18 
While the content of an electoral citizenship as a legitimate contest of 
power was being shaped across the nation, it was countered by the rein-
forcement of terrorizing authoritarianism toward the murundi subject.
 However, in response to Baranyanka’s violence, upronists in his ter-
ritory continued to view party rivalry as a matter of the subject’s choice 
between sovereigns, between obedience to a chief and obedience to a 
king. rather than precluding any acts of political agency or dissent, the 
violence of the “decentralised despot” instead exacerbated the engage-
ment of his subjects with alternative political possibilities. the struggle 
was so intense that by 1961 it had spilled into violence, as propagandists 
for each party attacked each other in the streets.19 upronists were quickly 
dominant, glorying in their position as subjects to the mwami and obedi-
ent servants of rwagasore. But this was by no means a passive stance; 
they had chosen this loyalty in the face of intense intimidation from their 
own authoritarian chief and fought to bring their desired political order 
into being. they were, and desired to be, subjects of sovereign authority, 
but this in itself required the engagement of consent and active political 
struggle. the extent of citizenship was delimited by subjecthood, but its 
content still encompassed the right and duty of powerful political agency.
 eventually the violence in the north became so dangerous that 
the Belgians flooded the region with metropolitan troops, arms, and 
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helicopters to bring it under back under control. the key uprona activ-
ists were arrested, and the authority of Belgium and Baranyanka was 
reestablished. yet the PdC had lost the political war. in the 1961 na-
tional elections, uprona achieved a massive victory across the country, 
rwagasore becoming prime minister–elect with around 80 percent of 
the popular vote. the political contest both demonstrated the pre-
dominance of subjecthood beneath sovereign authority and illustrated 
the possibilities of engagement within this authoritarian relationship. 
Subjects were dependent on their superiors, but this was a “productive 
dependency”;20 the content of citizenship encompassed a competition 
for followers that created a degree of choice for the subject, one that he 
or she could, and did, fight to achieve.
 this balance of engagement within subjection was exposed by the 
choice offered by democratic contest. its incarnation was in direct re-
sponse to the form of domination and contest that the state represented 
at the end of the colonial period, but while specific to this context, it 
also represented some of Burundi’s most fundamental dynamics and 
assumptions of power. in 1962 the mwami’s reign continued into inde-
pendence, yet the choice of the subject was all but lost; the excitement 
of rwagasore’s campaign was brutally cut short, and in its place reigned 
fear and doubt. in this new political world, subjection and engagement 
remained in precarious balance, refined in strategy and expression to 
speak to a domineering yet insecure state. it is to this anxious time that 
we now turn.
independent monarchy: defensive Loyalty
Within weeks of his triumph, Prince rwagasore was assassinated, 
and the sons of Baranyanka were held ultimately responsible for his 
murder.21 independence came half a year later, on July 1, 1962, under a 
shroud of mourning and anxiety.
 in the first turbulent postcolonial years, a climate of fear and a cer-
tain siege mentality altered the political dynamics of the nation. With 
the PdC destroyed by association with rwagasore’s killers, uprona 
dominated Burundi almost unchallenged, although the state officially 
remained a multiparty system. yet having lost its talismanic and unify-
ing leader, uprona began to splinter, polarized into rival factions that 
seriously destabilized the state. many leading politicians began to look 
more and more toward ethnicity as a means of interpreting and express-
ing their struggles.22
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 All the while, relations with rwanda deteriorated alarmingly as soon 
as the two halves of ruanda-urundi separated into independent na-
tions. the last years of colonial rule had been dominated by a civil war 
in rwanda, resulting in the abolition of the monarchy and the creation 
of a Hutu-dominated republic. the new government, controlled by the 
Parti du mouvement de l’émancipation des Bahutu (Parmehutu), im-
placably opposed the continuation of monarchy in Burundi, and things 
took a turn for the worse in late 1963, when monarchist tutsi refugees 
from rwanda used Burundi territory to launch a bloody invasion of 
their homeland.23 the government of rwanda accused Burundi of sup-
porting these invaders, while Burundi denounced the rwandan internal 
reprisals against tutsi civilians as acts of genocide. the two countries 
teetered on the brink of war.
 on September 1, 1964, it seemed that the anticipated catastrophe had 
finally arrived. Across a broad stretch of the rwandan border, armed 
men appeared and attacked the local community, raiding and setting 
light to the thatched roofs of people’s homes. “invasion from rwanda 
has burnt huts and pillaged the borderland region,” reported the local 
governor in an urgent telegram; “gendarmes totally spent, situation 
grave.”24 the initial violence lasted about a week, but repeated incur-
sions marked much of the following two months. rwandans and Ba-
rundi clashed in local skirmishes, more huts were burnt exactly a month 
after the first attacks, and in november the local authorities appealed 
for support when up to three hundred men invaded from across the 
border once again. martial law was imposed across the borderland, and 
command was taken by an official conseil de guerre, a council of war.
 the attitude of the state toward its border peoples in this crisis was 
immediately clear. Soldiers swept into the regions affected, but despite 
the common belief that Burundi had been invaded by a hostile rwanda, 
the principal targets of state repression were the Barundi of the border-
land. the army arrested anyone found out in the open. People traveling 
home from their fields or gathering in groups of more than two to share 
a drink in the evening were taken away for interrogation under suspicion 
of revolt.25 the national population were treated not as citizens attacked 
by a foreign enemy and therefore owed a duty of defense by the state but 
as alien enemies of the state. the inclusion and exclusion of citizenship 
continued in much the same national terms as before but was expressed 
ever more negatively through political contrast with rwanda. the no-
tional unity of “the Barundi” was held up against “rwandan” ethnic 
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divisions, and in the unstable political atmosphere the state began to 
doubt that the borderlanders could still be counted within the national 
family. inclusion meant not only subjecting oneself to the mwami but 
also passing a political test that displayed voluble endorsement of up-
ronist orthodoxy against Parmehutu contagion. deeply suspicious of the 
borderlanders’ proximity to and quotidian interaction with rwandans 
across the border, the upronist state believed the borderlanders to be 
“infected” by ethnic, republican, rwandan politics, their loyalty to the 
state and their belonging in the nation fundamentally undermined. the 
field of citizenship presumed a national community coterminous with a 
political one, and in the eyes of the nervous state the rights of inclusion 
for a “murundi” could be sacrificed by suspected political betrayal.
 As the investigation proceeded, the state’s anxiety over the possibility 
of internal responsibility for the attacks was revealed to be not entirely 
a matter of paranoia. the initial reports of rwandan invasion soon gave 
way to a detailed account of a conspiracy, supposedly concocted by Ba-
rundi dissidents who were exploiting the territory of rwanda and the 
border area as a resource for mobilizing their opposition to the govern-
ment of Burundi.26 faced with an internal plot, the military urgently 
required the establishment of intelligence, and only the suspected local 
people could provide it. Civilians arrested en masse were given a chance 
at freedom by becoming informants for the state. it was a collabora-
tive process; the state approached the community aggressively, intent 
on purging its undesirable elements, and members of the community 
responded by volunteering identification and evidence of these unde-
sirables. the interdependence of two axes of citizenship, its extent and 
its content, was powerfully demonstrated; with their inclusion denied, 
members of the local community sought to engage with the state on its 
own terms to display their loyalty and claim the rights of recognition 
as obedient subjects. naming names and telling the soldiers what they 
wanted to hear, confirming the suspicions and rumors the state already 
feared, the borderlanders could prove their doubted loyalty to Burundi, 
show their usefulness to the state, and regain their inclusion in the po-
litical community of the nation.
 the loyalty displayed by these informants was substantially the loy-
alty of the subject. they had been arrested by a state that viewed them 
as the enemy, that denied their right to belong within the nation and 
suspected them of holding greater allegiance to rwandan politics than 
to Burundi, and therefore their response was to show total obedience to 
111
Burundi, 1960–67: Loyal Subjects and Obedient Citizens
the overbearing authority of government orthodoxy. there was no space 
to express the slightest hint of independent political thought; safety lay 
in the ability to perform loyalty, to show oneself as the obedient subject 
to state authority by agreeing and engaging with the state’s fear and 
suspicion of others. Adopting the position of the subject was an effec-
tive defensive measure, taken under duress.
 However, it could also be a far more active tactic, pursued by others 
who were not under arrest but wished to engage with the power of 
the state. despite its open hostility to the local population, the army 
stood as a potential resource of defense against the self-evident danger 
of true rebel militants on the border, and emphatic statements of po-
litical loyalty proved the key to acquiring the army’s protection. this 
political invocation was put into action by one small community that 
sought to exclude one of their neighbors. named rukushi isaac, he 
was a proud member of the pro-Hutu Parti du Peuple and therefore 
an open opponent of the uprona government. His arrogant political 
polemics terrified his neighbors, and a group of them took it into their 
own hands to imitate the state and place this dissident under a citizen’s 
arrest.27 dragging rukushi before the authorities, they recounted all 
the allegations that would most alarm the state. He visited the exiled 
leaders of his party in rwanda, they said, and received rwandans into 
his home; he conducted door-to-door propaganda, they claimed, in 
which he denigrated the mwami himself. most venomously, according 
to one woman’s testimony, he “declared that if ever our children should 
attempt to flee to him, he will take a sickle and cut off their arms and 
legs . . . [and] he declared that it would be better to cut off the right arm, 
the right leg and the right breast of each woman, and in that way the 
women would become wise.”28 As if such violent rhetoric might be in-
sufficient to prompt the state to take the action she desired, the woman 
continued with a statement of proud political loyalty to the government: 
“He said that because we are upronist women.” these informants posi-
tioned themselves as obedient members of the state’s political order but 
did so to engage actively with state power toward shared objectives and 
against shared enemies, shaping and displaying the content of citizen-
ship as a project of mutual dependency.
 the possibilities made available by engaging with the state to con-
firm its own prejudices were nowhere more powerfully exemplified than 
in the claims made by one enterprising man, named Kabanda Samson, 
on the border. the conseil de guerre was looking for evidence that the 
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attacks were a “racist” plot, concocted by the political enemies of the 
state to commit acts of genocide against tutsi and overthrow the mon-
archy.29 despite the fact that the raids were characterized by arson, not 
by murder, and that no one else had identified ethnicity as a factor in 
the selection of targets, Kabanda gave the state exactly what it wanted. 
He claimed to have been present at repeated meetings in rwanda, 
where he heard political figures such as the brilliant Hutu politician 
Paul mirerekano, widely known as a passionate monarchist,30 plot to 
become president of a new republic of Burundi; in Kabanda’s ac-
count, mirerekano declared that “every tutsi, even though he may have 
done good things in Burundi, must be put to the fire with his wife and 
children.”31 the informant seemed to be taking matters to the extreme 
in his active appeal to the state’s prejudice, winning substantial favor 
by confirming all the worst fears and accusations that the government 
held against its enemies. Kabanda displayed the loyalty of the subject by 
repeating the state’s own beliefs back to it, but in his remarkable testi-
mony he showed that there was considerable potential for advancement 
and engagement in the adoption of the subject position. He was only 
able to make his claims because he routinely traveled to rwanda, a fact 
that would naturally make him a person of high suspicion, yet through 
his bloodcurdling evidence Kabanda won a personal audience with the 
governor of the province and even maneuvered himself into a position 
to request a face-to-face meeting with the mwami. Volunteering him-
self as a subject loyal to king, nation, and political orthodoxy, Kabanda 
doggedly pursued a share in power as the reward of active citizenship.
 Constrained by violence and fear and deprived of the personal au-
thority of rwagasore and the vibrant choice of the last colonial years, 
the inclusionary extent of citizenship during the independent monarchy 
was still defined by subjection. However, this subjection was understood 
not only as obedience to the king but also as political obedience to cor-
porate uprona party strictures. furthermore, whereas the decolonization 
contest had seen subjecthood marshaled as a means of contesting power 
through the choice of authority, the instability of the independent state 
limited the content of citizenship to a complex yet binary relationship 
of recognition and mutual dependency between citizen and state; citi-
zenship entailed not the contestation of power but its mediation. indi-
viduals and communities claimed the reciprocal, protective obligations 
of the state toward its loyal subjects by performing the nascent actions 
of a political citizenship that incarnated political orthodoxy. Becoming 
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the obedient political subject was a sensible defensive tactic when con-
fronted by a hostile state or an aggressive, deviant enemy, but it also 
offered its own oblique possibilities of agency within local and national 
politics. “the positive content of citizenship,” as James ferguson frames 
it in relation to southern Africa, rested “precisely on being a rightful and 
deserving dependent of the state.”32 denouncing or apprehending those 
who transgressed the orthodox political order allowed the population 
to present themselves as the active political subjects the state lacked, 
engaging with power by making themselves essential to the state and 
not simply tolerated by it.
 Soon, however, the parameters of the field of citizenship would be 
transformed yet again. the year 1965 compounded disaster upon disas-
ter, as the Hutu prime minister was assassinated by a rwandan tutsi 
refugee, new elections delivered a Hutu majority that was prevented 
from forming a government by an interfering mwami, and an abortive 
coup attempt was met with mass executions of Hutu politicians.33 By 
1966 the country was falling apart. mwami mwambutsa seemed to have 
abandoned his subjects, eventually taking up permanent residence in 
Switzerland, and his son, rwagasore’s younger brother, took his place as 
king. Soon enough, the army stepped in to neutralize the new mwami 
and declared a republic of Burundi under the single party leadership of 
uprona. the monarchy, an institution of deep authority and affection 
among its subjects, however diminished it had been by the preceding 
years of crisis, was replaced by an institution of force, albeit one that 
claimed to aspire to reformist and progressive politics. Choice of 
leadership was officially abolished, not to be achieved again for twenty-
seven years. yet even in this context of ominous military domination it 
is possible to find the modalities of engagement playing out within the 
terms of subjection, and we may finally witness how this relationship of 
dependency could arise not only from the imposition of the state but 
also from the instigation of citizens.
republican rule: the Vigilant Citizen
the military republic was heavily dominated by tutsi officers from the 
south of the country, but one of their priorities was easing relations with 
the Hutu republic in rwanda. With rapprochement in the air, the new 
government no longer feared invasion, and by 1967 the northern border 
had lost a lot of its urgency in the eyes of the state. Political contagion 
remained a concern, however, as rumors suggested that the borderlanders 
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were in contact with rwandans who spoke disparagingly of the “half-
republic” that had brought the tutsi-dominated army to power.34
 in a relatively new development, the word citoyen began to creep into 
the state’s vocabulary. officials discussed how nos concitoyens (our fellow 
citizens) were being wooed by subversive rwandans who wanted to see 
a violent revolution south of the border.35 it was a possessive concept, 
the citizen imagined as an anonymous loyalist who was devoted to the 
propaganda of the peaceful military coup, standing in opposition to the 
bloodthirsty rwandans. the latter were described ambiguously as sim-
ply ressortissants, “nationals” of their country; the word recalled the legal 
limbo of the colonial period, in contrast to the positive inclusive figure 
of the murundi concitoyen. With the mythic sovereignty of the mwami 
no longer relevant, the inclusionary extent of citizenship had gained 
a new vocabulary but still remained defined by the negative example 
of the alien and continued to lack any formalized content of political 
engagement with the military government other than the expectation 
of obedient loyalty. the citizens of the republic were still subjects of an 
aspiring hegemonic state. However, given the necessary circumstances, 
the possibility of limited engagement remained within the grasp of 
these subjects, open to their invocation even when it appeared counter 
to the interests of the new politics.
 it so happened that one Saturday afternoon in July 1967, a man drove 
his cattle along the southern bank of the river that marks the border 
with rwanda, seeking better pastures in the higher ground.36 it was his 
regular routine, yet as he followed the line of the border this time, he 
was followed. A group of rwandan civilians had crossed the frontier 
and penetrated a kilometer into Burundi territory. they gave chase; he 
was caught and forcibly taken across the river, into rwanda. there were 
rwandan soldiers waiting on the far bank of the stream, and the man 
was stripped naked, dragged away to a hill at some distance from the 
frontier, and tied to a tree. the Barundi witnesses could not follow, and 
in the words of the provincial vice governor a week later, “to this day, the 
fate of monsieur nkurunziza is unknown.”37
 He shares a name with the current president of Burundi, but nku-
runziza was rwandan. He had lived in the area for over fifteen years, 
first moving under Belgian rule when the border was officially just an 
internal administrative divide within the single territory of ruanda-
urundi. Local authorities believed that nkurunziza, along with mem-
bers of the other six rwandan families who lived on the same hill, had 
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long been suspected by the rwandan state of being spies for militants 
among the tutsi refugees, who were known as inyenzi, “cockroaches,” 
and had launched numerous bloody attacks back into rwanda across 
the previous years.38 “the rwandan authorities,” reported the vice gov-
ernor, “have decided to liquidate systematically these seven persons.”39
 nkurunziza was not, therefore, a murundi, and the state’s language 
noted that his identity partially excluded him from the national com-
munity. But for all that it may have been a largely rwandan affair, the 
kidnapping of nkurunziza was a shocking moment in the borderland. 
it was a violent incursion by a foreign power that disconcerted the state 
and terrified the local people, and despite the pressure from the govern-
ment to get along with Parmehutu, the crime was sufficiently alarming 
to reawaken old fears. And the local people did all they could to fuel 
these proven paranoias. they described how they had confronted their 
rwandan neighbors on the border and had been met with ominous 
threats: “it will not take more than nine days to achieve what we have 
planned to do,” the rwandans reportedly claimed. “go and tell your 
leaders that we do not want inyenzi among the people, that Parmehutu 
will achieve its ends.”40
 once again the border people were eager to present themselves as 
faithful subjects of the regime, and they exploited the rich possibilities 
of the border to illustrate this loyalty by graphic opposition to foreign 
politics. the republican government might still have been a little doubt-
ful over the susceptibility of the borderlanders to rwandan influence, 
but unlike in similar circumstances under the monarchy, it no longer 
treated its peripheral citizens with open aggression. rather, the border-
landers themselves worked hard to rekindle the old border hostility of 
the state. in dereje feyissa’s terms, they labored to show themselves as 
“more state than the state”; they insisted on the “rigidification” of the 
frontier against the particular interest of the government, “mobilizing 
the state in a local struggle.”41 they had long been at odds with their 
neighbors in rwanda, engaged in reciprocal cattle raids that the state 
had done little to halt. now they exploited nkurunziza’s abduction to 
paint their pains in the language of political danger that the state un-
derstood. molested by the alien other, nkurunziza was retroactively 
incorporated within the inclusionary extent of citizenship, his neigh-
bors utilizing rwandan aggression to perform the necessary political 
orthodoxy that might invoke political recognition from the state. With 
the nights echoing with “cries of alarm . . . intended to create a spirit of 
116
AidAn Russell
insecurity amongst the peaceful population of Burundi,” the inhabit-
ants piqued the interest of the state by their revelation that their own 
Barundi political exiles, now refugees in rwanda, were “at the base of 
these ploys,”42 all the time “motived by a spirit of racism.”43 the op-
position between peaceful citizens and destabilizing others was played 
out just as the state conceived it, only set in striking contrast by the fear 
and danger conjured in the borderlanders’ words. engagement between 
state and society might only take place on the state’s terms, but through 
the judicious performance of loyalty and political peril, the limited con-
tent of citizenship, the rights and responsibilities of protection against 
foreign hostility, could be instigated by subjects even when the state was 
keen to move on from the antagonistic past.
 the people were no longer just borderlanders but border guards; 
having confronted Parmehutu militants on the frontier, they began to 
take the unusual step of enforcing a customs regime that they had previ-
ously flouted with little concern. the republican state had shown an in-
creasing interest in regularizing and bureaucratizing the border regime 
through identity checks and border passes, all the better to control the 
population and gather tax revenue, but the borderlanders themselves 
had never ceased to cross the border wherever and whenever they felt 
like it. yet three days after the abduction, “thirty pigs, three goats and 
a bullock coming from rwanda were seized by the people. . . . the 
animals had been sent to market by six rwandans, without a transport 
document and without a customs visa.”44 it was a transparent attempt 
to appeal to the state’s interest in taxation and control, something that 
offered little to the borderlanders themselves. But it was a judicious 
act; as the state began to speak of the citizen in terms of bureaucratic 
recognition, tested by inspection on the border and distinction from the 
foreigner, the people both offered to endorse this nascent language of 
authority and showed themselves necessary to bring the state’s desires 
into reality. the designation of the citoyen had been tentatively raised 
as a legalistic and possessive act of state, but the borderlanders offered 
to push it further and transform it into a collaborative engagement of 
mutual benefit to state and society. the state responded and once more 
flooded the borderland with soldiers, this time for the protection of its 
loyal citizens.
 this border dynamic was the realization of a nationwide project be-
tween state and citizen. Covertly expanding the tutsi domination of 
power, fearful that monarchist sentiments remained strong, and terrified 
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of a potential Hutu political movement, the military was desperate to 
see stability in the faithfulness of the people. it formed the Jeunesse 
révolutionnaire rwagasore ( Jrr), a youth league that invoked Prince 
rwagasore’s name to serve the republican order, and gave as its com-
manding slogan the word Vigilance.45 Watchfulness against political 
deviance, contagion, and incursion was to be the shared purpose of the 
state and its loyal citizens. through universal vigilance, the reproduc-
tion of the political community of the nation could be achieved, a per-
formance that maintained a loose link between citizens and state, kept 
them in contact, and confirmed the mutual ties of loyalty and obligation. 
to be a good citizen was to be a vigilant citizen. “Vigilance is a frontier 
phenomenon,”46 and it lent itself well to performance on the border, but 
it was only a local representation of a national mode of engagement. By 
reporting the incursion of individuals or ideas, one presented oneself 
to the state as belonging to the nation, claiming inclusion within the 
positional identity of citizenship, and deserving of state endorsement, 
sharing in the content of citizenship as interdependent obligations of 
mutual defense. Citizen and state spoke to each other in shared terms 
of vigilant political orthodoxy, and each provided a degree of protection 
to the other. there could be reciprocity, mutual obligation, and mutual 
protection in the collaboration of citizen and state.
 it was, nevertheless, a state-centered act, collaboration entirely on 
the state’s terms. the citizen performed vigilance as service to the state’s 
definitions of order and legitimacy. even while the government became 
more and more dominated by tutsi, few could denounce this insidious 
creep without falling foul of the powerful orthodox line that declared all 
talk of ethnic division to be a matter of rwandan “racism and violence.”47 
displaying one’s belonging within the nation, acting on behalf of the 
state and claiming its responsibility to protect, remained an acceptance 
of subjection to the state’s hegemonic political orthodoxy. “Citizenship 
is Janus-faced,”48 and when the state considered any other path of action 
or expression to be treasonous, then the duties of citizenship appeared 
synonymous with the obedience, even the silence, of the subject. Vigi-
lance was a “ritual of citizenship,” as described by Burgess, training a 
“new kind of citizen” who embodied both the political ideals and the 
needs of the aggressive state,49 but it retained much of the expectations 
of submission from previous modes of power. the political limitations 
on the extent of citizenship, the restrained content of citizenship as de-
fined by uprona paranoia under the mwami, had been formalized and 
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enhanced by the military state. dissent was as prohibited as ever, the 
army demanding the subjection of the population to its new version of 
uprona and acting swiftly to eliminate those who expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the new path of the state. But with the emotive power of the 
monarchy lost, the language of political orthodoxy provided the subject 
with its own means of engagement with power. the state had changed, 
but still one had to play the subject and find means of engaging and 
ameliorating one’s situation within the terms of subjection.
Citizenship is not about the realisation of a fully coherent and 
harmonious rational contract, but rather about the temporary (and 
never fully achieved) stabilisation of the polity around a set of 
participatory practices and new agreements, rooted in democratic 
and non-democratic contracts and rule making.
—Steven robins, Andrea Cornwall, and Bettina von Lieres, 
   “rethinking ‘Citizenship’”50
the pace of change in early 1960s Burundi was extraordinary, evidence 
of a state careering out of control. the flashes of engagement between 
people and state were frantic, improvised attempts at stabilizing this 
dangerous and often violent interaction of politics and power. in this 
compressed period of recurrent transformation, the potential for change 
within the field of citizenship was demonstrated in the adjustments that 
individuals made to relate to the new character of the state above them, 
while the resiliency of the fundamental premise of subjecthood stood 
in stark reminder of the continuities shared by colony, monarchy, and 
republic. Whether faced with a choice between rival authorities in the 
electoral moment of decolonization, confronted with a hostile state in 
the crisis period that followed, or seeking to involve a martial govern-
ment in local troubles, engaged and active citizens adjusted their ac-
tions and expressions to suit the time but did so within the constraints 
of the subject position. Loyalty and obedience were the performative 
language of engagement, demanded by the assumption that the state 
represented a dangerous, potentially violent hegemonic authority that 
would punish deviance, from Chief Baranyanka’s fury to the suspi-
cious postcolonial uprona or the covert military ethnicization of the 
republic. Within these parameters of loyal subjecthood, however, there 
lay the possibility for a citizen to include him- or herself in the politics 
of the nation and deflect or direct the dangerous powers of the state to 
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suit the circumstances of the subject community through the display of 
obedience. the fluctuating field of citizenship was delimited by political 
subjection and encompassed rights and duties of interdependence, but 
it was above all a performative act.
 the willingness for the subject to embrace the definitions and preoc-
cupations of the state and the potential for action, inclusion, negotiation, 
and engagement within this febrile relationship proved to be power-
ful tools of mutual benefit to state and society. rather than a choice 
between citizenship and subjecthood, it was a matter of productive de-
pendency, “a form of agency that seeks its own submission,”51 a means 
by which people could not only include themselves in the nation but 
also advance their interests beneath and within the state. And it found 
temporary success in each incarnation because the state, too, knew itself 
to be partially dependent on its subjects. each form of state needed to 
see subjects beneath it, subjects that accepted and endorsed its right to 
rule. the decade was defined by political instability, and while the fatal 
divisions most often emerged within the state itself, a nation of united, 
loyal subjects seemed to offer the only possibility of security for the 
aspirational hegemony. A citizenship of mutual dependency, predicated 
by the latent or active violence of the state yet nevertheless available to 
the instigation of the individual, offered a means of stabilization and 
marginal benefit for all concerned, most powerfully expressed in the 
settlement of vigilant citizenship under the republic.
 in Burundi, unlike many other African states around the time of in-
dependence, the nature of the nation was relatively settled and provided 
the most basic parameters of citizenship; the nature of the state and of 
the relationship between state and people was what troubled the fleet-
ing regimes of the 1960s, as the extent and content of citizenship were 
contracted and transformed. While placed under strain by the rwan-
dan threat in the early postcolonial years and then shriven of its royal 
component and redressed in modern language in the republican years, 
the imagination of Barundi familial unity provided a veneer of shared 
identity by which citizen and state could meet. yet despite such stability, 
as Burundi emerged from its furious change in the early 1960s, this axis of 
citizenship was what would be most fundamentally transformed as ethnic 
divisions took the place of proclaimed familial unity. As tutsi suprema-
cists consolidated power in the republic, the state they dominated increas-
ingly excluded Hutu from belonging within its ranks. When a Hutu 
revolt triggered a genocidal repression from this state in 1972,52 this 
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incarnation of Burundi’s political community was fundamentally bro-
ken, extraordinary violence firmly establishing the primacy of ethnicity 
over nationhood and redefining the “depth” of citizenship through the 
unofficial, yet pervasive, triangulation of national, political, and above 
all ethnic identity. the rapid transformations around independence saw 
the performance and action of citizenship adapt to extreme instability, 
but the most fundamental challenge to the limits and claims of belong-
ing and engagement between people and state was still to come.
 Citizenship, as was said at the outset, is a moving target, evolving 
and reforming according to the pressures of the moment. But for all 
that greater and more disastrous changes were on the horizon, the shift-
ing field of citizenship across the triple transformations of the Burundi 
state in the early 1960s illustrates the crucial potential in the behavior of 
citizen and subject as a spectrum, not an opposition. emerging from co-
lonial rule in crisis and uncertainty, with dangerous divisions within and 
aggressive enemies without, the Barundi in the 1960s refined a kind of 
citizenship that balanced the position of the dependent subject before 
an unstable yet hegemonic state with a degree of freedom within which 
citizens might engage with power, win inclusion and recognition, and 
somewhat mediate the political forces that raged around them. to the 
skillful actor, accepting the definitions of subjection could itself give ac-
cess to the deflection, negotiation, and mediation of power. the subject 
could embrace dependency and still invoke the fruits of a citizenship of 
mutual obligation, if not of rights.
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“Double Nationalité” and Its Discontents  
in Ivory Coast, 1963–66
H e n r i - m i C H e L  y é r é
s O O n  A f t e r  I n d e P e n d e n C e  I n  A u g u s t  1 9 6 0  A n d  t H e  A d O P t I O n  O f 
a citizenship law in december 1961, the president of ivory Coast, félix 
Houphouët-Boigny, introduced a new initiative, double nationalité, 
aimed at extending the scope of ivorian citizenship. this was first pub-
licly mentioned at a meeting held in September 1963 at the Abidjan 
stadium that bears his name:
i would like to express a feeling of affection toward all our broth-
ers—guineans, malians, Voltaics, Senegalese, nigeriens, etc., who 
have been with us during the heroic struggle for the independence of 
this country and who are engaged with us in the harmonious build-
ing of our young state. We would like to confirm that this country 
is also theirs and that in the coming months we will open talks with 
the leaders of their respective countries, so as to grant them dual 
citizenship [double nationalité], in order to foster the African unity 
under way as we speak and to allow them to be a full party in the 
harmonious development of the ivory Coast, who opens her mater-
nal arms to them, just like the autochthonous ivorians.1
 in its classical understanding, double nationalité (dual citizenship) 
entitles an individual to bear the passports of two different countries, 
which was not how Houphouët was using the term. rather, he was 
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referring to the creation of a “supranationality” in which nationals of 
different West African states could benefit from the same rights and 
duties as citizens of their host country without being citizens.
 Houphouët-Boigny presented this decision as one bringing fran-
cophone West Africa a step closer to African unity. Although he was 
speaking to a large constituency of African residents within ivory Coast, 
the scope of this initiative was first narrowed down to the citizens of 
member states of the Conseil de l’entente (upper Volta, niger, da-
homey, togo, and ivory Coast) and was finally defeated early in 1966.2 
it is crucial to understand the context of the birth of this project, its 
life, and most critically the reasons why it was abandoned. the history 
of this failed project highlights the nature of divisions over questions 
of nationality and citizenship within the ivoirian leadership while also 
demonstrating the challenges involved in aligning domestic ivoirian 
politics and the regional politics of West Africa. this also tells the story 
of the articulation of oppositional politics within the context of a one-
party state with the ruling party in question as it engaged in the process 
of asserting its hegemony over different parts of ivoirian society and 
within state institutions.3
ivorian nationality before independence
nationality can be defined as the cornerstone of international sover-
eignty, the marker of the distinct character of a state.4 the history of 
ivorian nationality did not start with the proclamation of independence, 
even though nationality is generally defined as that which sets the citi-
zen of a country apart from another one in the international sphere. the 
question of the existence of an ivorian nationality started within the 
framework of the Communauté.5
 the Communauté was a new entity under which france and its Af-
rican colonies came together in the 1958 constitution. Article (titre) 
Xii of the constitution dealt with the relationship between france and 
its overseas territories. it stated that france’s colonies could choose to 
remain under france’s umbrella either as départements, autonomous 
republics, or in the form they already were, as overseas territories. the 
colonies (except for guinea) all became republics. A prime minister 
headed each of them, while the head of the Communauté remained 
the president of the french republic. the Communauté republics had 
autonomy in all matters except for foreign affairs, defense, tertiary edu-
cation, external transportation and communications, and strategic raw 
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materials. Because the Communauté was a political organization that 
brought together several autonomous states, the discussions hinged on 
whether there would be one nationality for the whole of the Commu-
nauté or whether each of the autonomous member-states would have its 
own nationality. Hence, at the time, debates within the Communauté 
were centered not on ivorian nationality but on the question of what 
the nationality of citizens from the Communauté republics would be. 
As early as february 1959, ahead of the Communauté’s first executive 
council meeting, held in Paris, the heads of state of the new republics 
raised the question of nationality within the Communauté.6 in their 
eyes, being a republic entailed numerous prerogatives, including having 
an independent nationality. the problem was that the 1958 constitution 
had not been explicit on the question of the nationality of Communauté 
citizens. in its Article 77, it simply stated that “il n’existe qu’une citoyen-
neté de la Communauté” (there shall be one citizenship within the 
Communauté).7
 As if to confirm the constitution, french president Charles de gaulle 
declared that the only nationality recognized within the Communauté 
was that of the french republic. this decision was made only a few 
days after the first executive council meeting, which took place in Paris 
on february 3 and 4, 1959.8 All Communauté citizens were thus french 
nationals. Such a state of affairs did not satisfy all of france’s African 
partners, among them the government of Soudan. Soudan was com-
mitted to claiming an independent nationality. not only that, for the 
Soudanais leadership, an independent nationality was a necessity for 
genuine economic development.9 the ivorian leadership, in contrast, 
had a very different conception of nationalism, whereby independence 
was not a political prerequisite for economic development.10
 in September 1959 the Communauté leadership decided to hand 
the question over to an experts committee made up of representa-
tives, mainly legal experts, from all Communauté governments and the 
french republic.11 After a series of meetings, the experts delivered their 
first conclusions in a report in december 1959. their main proposal 
was a new concept of nationality, nationalité superposée (juxtaposed 
nationality).12 this notion maintained a clear distinction between the 
concepts of citizenship and nationality, in keeping with the french tra-
dition embodied in the 1946 constitution.13 Citizenship referred to a 
regime of rights and duties open to every member of the political com-
munity within the entire Communauté. nationality was a marker of a 
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state’s sovereignty, the way in which it distinguished the people under 
its authority from others. the experts committee proposed that each 
state would retain its individual nationality within the Communauté 
but that outside of the realm of Communauté each of these citizens 
would be regarded as french nationals and citizens.14 the model of 
a passport proposed would indicate the nationality of the citizen ac-
cording to his or her Communauté state (for example Senegal) with a 
footnote indicating that internationally the citizen would be regarded 
as french.15 french nationality thus assumed the status of a “suprana-
tionality” within the Communauté. in addition, by being recognized 
as french citizens, the citizens of Communauté states stood to benefit 
from all the international treaties that france was party to. A Senegalese 
man traveling to the united States was to be regarded by the American 
authorities as a french citizen under the protection of french consular 
authorities. this formula gave a legal existence to African nationalities, 
a psychological win for many Communauté leaders. nationality, as one 
of the reports noted, made one feel one step closer to independence.16 
nationalité superposée ushered ivorian nationality into the realm of the 
possible. in Houphouët-Boigny’s perspective, ivorian nationality could 
exist so long as it was reinforced and protected by french imperial citi-
zenship, giving it international weight and making ivorians potentially 
eligible for french social benefits.
 But this was before August 1960 and the independence of ivory 
Coast. in december 1961, the ivorian national Assembly adopted a 
nationality Code. the bill was made up of 105 articles and was divided 
into seven headings. Birth on ivorian soil was the main principle for 
attribution of ivoirian citizenship.17 this decision to base citizenship on 
birth was for practical reasons. given that the civil registrar (état-civil ) 
was not fully operational in the early years of self-government, proving 
the descent of most ivorians on the basis of administrative papers such 
as birth certificates would have been impossible. most people did not 
have birth certificates at that time. Hence, descent could not be used as 
the sole basis for the establishment of ivorian nationality as nationality 
of origin.18 the bill also included the conditions for acquiring ivorian 
nationality through marriage (Articles 12 to 16), for children born of for-
eign parents on ivorian soil. in the case of a foreign woman who married 
an ivorian, she could acquire ivorian nationality immediately unless she 
explicitly renounced it. An ivorian woman who married a foreigner, 
however, maintained her ivorian nationality unless she explicitly chose 
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her husband’s nationality (Article 51). no explicit clause provided for 
the case of ivorian men who married foreign women. the assumption 
was that men could not be affected in the same way because they were 
hardly expected to “follow” their foreign wives to the latter’s country. 
Children born to foreign parents living in ivory Coast could become 
ivorians through a simple declaration once they reached age eighteen 
(Article 30). furthermore, any foreigner who had resided for at least five 
years in ivory Coast could acquire ivorian nationality (Article 26). A 
last article, Article 106, was added to the bill just before deputies voted 
on it. it stated,
the persons who have established their residence in ivory Coast 
before 7 August 1960 and who do not wish to become ivorian 
citizens, shall retain all the rights they enjoyed before that date, 
except for the right to vote and the right to be elected in a political 
assembly.
 Change of residence only shall cancel the effects of this measure.19
 in explaining how they intended to vote, the deputies stated their 
pride in the fact that they were adopting a liberal code, which confirmed 
ivory Coast as a country of hospitality and fraternity. Vamé doumouya 
insisted that this code was in line with the ideals defended by the presi-
dent of the republic, in particular the ideal of being a land of immigra-
tion.20 Jean thes asserted that the right to work had to be guaranteed to 
all those who wanted to participate in building the ivorian nation. He 
added, “demain, il ne devra plus y avoir dans ce pays que des nationaux 
à part entière, égaux devant la loi” (tomorrow there shall only be nation-
als in this country, equal before the law).21 mamadou Coulibaly, who 
spoke on behalf of the Parti démocratique de Côte d’ivoire’s bureau 
politique (the highest body of the ruling party, the PdCi), suggested 
that all naturalizations be watched over by the party, “pour ne permettre 
à personne d’entrer dans la communauté ivoirienne sous la forme de 
ce qui fut le Cheval de troie” (so as not to allow anyone to enter the 
ivorian community in the manner of a trojan Horse).22
double nationalité against the  
Jeunesse du rassemblement démocratique Africain?
this was the backdrop against which Houphouët delivered the 1963 
speech in which he announced his double nationalité initiative. the 
main purpose of the 1963 speech was to foster national unity, as well 
132
Henri-MicHel Yéré
as to reassert his authority over the country. the speech came in the 
context of a year that had started with political turmoil in ivory Coast. 
in January 1963, numerous people had been arrested and charged with 
high treason, accused of attempting to assassinate the president.23 these 
individuals came from a group of ivorian university graduates who 
studied in france during the late 1940s and the 1950s. many of them 
had been active members of student organizations in france during the 
1950s. the most important of these organizations was the fédération 
des étudiants d’Afrique noire en france (feAnf). feAnf members 
represented the radical wing of the nationalist movement in french 
Africa.24 this was despite the fact that many of these students “owed” 
their scholarships to Houphouët-Boigny, at the time a french cabi-
net minister.25 upon returning to ivory Coast, many of these students 
sought positions within the PdCi, a party Houphouët had founded in 
1946, which had established its political hegemony after its sweeping 
victory in the 1957 elections. they seized the first opportunity to get into 
the PdCi-rdA at its third Congress, held in 1959 in Abidjan.26 many 
party members had eagerly awaited this congress, given that the last one 
had taken place in 1947.
 Born in April 1946, PdCi, a section of rassemblement démocra-
tique Africain (rdA), was the brainchild of the Syndicat Agricole 
Africain. its initial brief had been to defend the citizenship rights of 
its African base, as was clearly illustrated by its founding leader’s coup 
d’éclat of April 1946: an act suppressing the practice of forced labor in 
all french colonies. the rdA’s parliamentary alliance with the french 
Communists pitted the colonial administration firmly against the party 
members, and in the years 1949 to 1951, a conflict ensued in ivory Coast, 
whereby the colonial administration had decided to destroy the move-
ment. the confrontation came to an end after Houphouët-Boigny 
heeded the call of the french government and broke the PdCi’s al-
liance with the french Communists. the party then effected a move 
toward french interests in the colony, to the extent that after the victory 
of the french Socialist Party (Sfio) in the parliamentary elections of 
1956, Houphouët was asked to join the french cabinet. in ivory Coast 
itself, 1956 marked the PdCi’s great comeback, and its crushing vic-
tory at all levels of power allowed it to summon the other parties to 
come into its fold. By 1957, PdCi had become the sole political party 
operating in the land. thus had the one-party state been established as 
a system of governance in ivory Coast.
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 in spite of this domination, the third Congress can be regarded as 
a defeat for Houphouët-Boigny. His longtime companion Auguste de-
nise lost his position as secretary general of the party to Jean-Baptiste 
mockey.27 in addition, the Jeunesse du rassemblement démocratique 
Africain ( JrdACi) was formed two weeks before the congress, with 
Amadou Koné as its secretary general. the JrdACi wanted to exist 
independently within the party with the freedom to criticize the party 
line.28 the existence and position of the JrdACi was accepted at the 
congress. As a result, Houphouët-Boigny found himself in a minority 
within the party. His time as a cabinet minister in Paris had brought him 
esteem and prestige but had also given him the reputation of a remote 
leader not aware of local realities. moreover, many regarded the man who 
had been elected to succeed denise as one of the more radical figures 
within the party. mockey was one of the eight party leaders who had been 
imprisoned by the colonial administration in 1949.29 He had not agreed 
with Houphouët’s view that the PdCi should break their parliamentary 
alliance with the french Communists in 1950. now as secretary general of 
PdCi-rdA, deputy prime minister, minister of the interior, and mayor 
of grand Bassam, Jean-Baptiste mockey suddenly became a contender 
to reckon with, one of the most powerful men in the country.
 in november 1959, Houphouët-Boigny employed an unexpected 
strategy to respond to mockey’s growing status in the party; he ac-
cused the deputy prime minister of plotting his assassination. A photo 
of Houphouët was allegedly found in the bowels of a dead black cat in 
his gardens in yamoussoukro. the man who put it there was a mar-
about that mockey had allegedly hired to put a spell on Houphouët 
that would cause his death. Houphouët revealed this information to a 
stunned audience of militants and party cadres in yamoussoukro. Party 
members found it shocking that mockey would resort to such extreme 
measures.30 the strength of the accusation made it difficult for anyone 
to defend mockey, as doing so would have meant supporting the idea of 
Houphouët’s assassination. As a consequence, mockey was discharged 
of all his responsibilities within the party and the republic with no sign 
of argument from his supporters.31 this event came to be known as the 
“black cat plot” (complot du chat noir). Phillippe yacé, the speaker of the 
legislative assembly, replaced him as secretary general. the event was a 
warning to the JrdACi cadres who supported mockey that they should 
be careful. the possibilities on the political playing field had suddenly 
widened, and this left Houphouët’s contenders uncertain of what his 
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next move would be. following this, the January 1963 arrests removed 
many prominent figures from JrdACi from the political scene. most 
notably, minister of Health Amadou Koné, minister of Agriculture 
Charles donwhai, minister of defense Jean Konan Banny, and min-
ister of education Joachim Bony were arrested and jailed. JrdACi as 
an organization was banned, and its leaders were accused of plotting to 
overthrow the government of Houphouët-Boigny and plotting his as-
sassination. Parliament created a special tribunal, cour de sûreté de l’Etat, 
with Philippe yacé as its prosecutor. Houphouët appointed none other 
than Jean-Baptiste mockey to preside over this new tribunal. A climate 
of suspicion took hold of the country at this time, with more than one 
hundred people arrested in January 1963 alone.32 the first sentences, in-
cluding five capital punishments, were passed in April. in September 
1963, there were more arrests, including veteran PdCi figure and Justice 
minister germain Coffi gadeau, Amadou thiam, and Jean-Baptiste 
mockey. in April 1964, the chief justice of the Supreme Court and one 
of the founding figures of JrdACi, ernest Boka, who had resigned ear-
lier in the year in protest against Houphouët’s arbitrary manipulation of 
power, was found dead in his prison cell at Assabou, near yamoussoukro. 
the official report stated that he had “committed suicide.”33
 Hence, the primary purpose of the president’s speech in September 
1963 in which he first mentioned double nationalité was to justify the 
repressive turn that his policy had taken. in the view of Amadou Koné 
and marcel Amondji, the purpose of double nationalité was to prepare 
the ground for Houphouët-Boigny to create an alliance with cadres 
from other African countries to replace those who had been jailed.34 for 
Houphouët, these new cadres would present the advantage of having no 
family (clan or ethnic) ties in ivory Coast and were hence more likely 
to be exclusively at his beck and call. According to this view, double 
nationalité was primarily driven by Houphouët-Boigny’s need to assert 
his political supremacy within ivory Coast. the “plots’” victims were 
vindicated in 1970 when Houphouët-Boigny recognized that there had 
been no such a thing as a plot for eliminating him. He publically apolo-
gized and started reintegrating into his government some of those who 
had been arrested in the early 1960s.
more than Africanization, ivorization
As for those who had not been imprisoned during the wave of arrests 
following the plots, they used whatever venue they could find to pose 
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implicit challenges to the double nationalité project. the PdCi’s fourth 
Congress was one such place. the 1965 congress, or party conference, 
was the first since independence and inaugurated the practice of defining 
party policy orientations for the following five years; the practice became 
a feature of these congresses. new faces within the party also emerged 
at this gathering. With his main “opponents” imprisoned, Houphouët 
could easily promote his clients within the political organization. these 
included the youngest member of PdCi’s Politburo (bureau politique), 
Henri Konan Bédié (born in 1934), who had been the ambassador of 
ivory Coast in Washington, dC, for the previous four years. Bédié read 
the closing speech at the congress and in it he spoke of the need for an 
acceleration of Africanization, a key theme among the young cadres of 
the party.35 Africanization was the idea that first the public administra-
tion and then the private sector, both of which had been dominated by 
the french, should be handed over to ivorian nationals. this had been a 
bone of contention between Houphouët-Boigny and the trade unions.36 
from their perspective, Africanization was a normal consequence of 
ivory Coast being an independent sovereign nation. But in 1959, dur-
ing a parliamentary debate with union representatives on the issue, 
Houphouët, then prime minister, had responded, “Pas d’africanisation 
au rabais! ” (no cheap Africanization!), a phrase that became famous.37
 the young cadres felt particularly concerned by this. Because many 
of them were university graduates (Bédié, for instance, was a lawyer 
by training), they would be the first ones to gain from Africanization. 
A few years later, the term “ivoirisation” came to replace “Africanisa-
tion.”38 Commenting on the presence of numerous french assistants 
techniques within the ivorian administration, Bédié explained that the 
“best french advisor or assistant technique is the one who will willingly 
train the African and who will hand over his position to his trainee 
without any intriguing.”39 He went on to say that private businesses 
should prioritize Africanizing their staff on the basis of competence. 
in the same breath, Bédié expressed, on behalf of the party’s youths, his 
unconditional support for double nationalité between entente states. 
Bédié was speaking more of an effective ivorization; in effect, despite 
all his apparent support, he was making an implicit statement against 
double nationalité, which is made evident by the fact that all the ar-
guments that were used against the french technical assistants were 
similar to the ones applied to the potential African newcomers within 
the framework of the implementation of double nationalité, as would 
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become evident in the course of the discussion that took place after the 
signing of the double nationalité convention.
 Support for the project also came from another one of the young 
leaders within PdCi, Arsène Assouan usher, who at the time was 
the ivorian representative at the united nations in new york. usher 
(1930–2007) wrote an article asserting that double nationalité was the 
surest way to create a genuine African union and that soon enough 
the entire continent would follow suit.40 However, when i interviewed 
him in September 2007, the former ambassador assured me that he 
had actually been against the double nationalité project, because in his 
eyes, the risk was too great that ivorians would be definitively held at 
bay when it came to accessing strategic and important positions within 
the state administration. in a political climate defined by suspicion and 
arbitrary actions, however, keeping up the appearance of support for 
the president’s positions was important. in the face of these implicit 
oppositional stances, it is a fair question to ask how many among those 
who expressed public support for the double nationalité project from 
within the leaders of PdCi were sincerely committed to supporting 
the president’s project. through his speech on Africanization, Bédié 
was expressing a fear held by the younger generation of ivorian profes-
sionals that they could not easily access positions that they deserved. it 
is reasonable to assume that those who had not been arrested in 1963 
felt that they were especially deserving of prominent positions that had 
been left empty by those who were jailed. So in Bédié’s words, although 
the french were explicitly referred to, anybody who could represent a 
potential barrier in the way of the local cadres effectively occupying the 
state apparatus was targeted. the point of double nationalité, according 
to the president, was to create the possibility for “a Voltaic to belong to 
the ivorian or the nigerien cabinet.” on that basis, i contend that the 
young PdCi cadres were no different on this issue than their comrades 
imprisoned on account of the complots. they, after all, did belong to the 
same generation and studied at the same time in the same universities.
double nationalité on the African Stage
Houphouët’s offer of double nationalité was consistent with his notion 
of the “necessary stages” that had to be taken in a gradual approach to 
African unity. Before the oAu was formed in may 1963, francophone 
African states had founded a common organization, the union Africaine 
et malgache (uAm).41 Houphouët-Boigny introduced his double 
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nationalité concept to his African peers at the uAm’s second meeting 
in dakar, Senegal, in february 1964. He wanted them to join him in 
creating a common position on nationality within francophone Africa. 
He added, however, that if the uAm did not accept double nationalité, 
ivory Coast would continue the project with niger and upper Volta.42 
His francophone peers did not accept Houphouët’s offer.
 Seeing that his project could not fare well within the larger continen-
tal organizations, the ivorian president settled for Conseil de l’entente 
as his testing ground. in december 1964, during an official trip to upper 
Volta, the ivorian president defined this project in a speech dubbed the 
Déclaration de Ouhahigouya.43 He spoke of the fraternity that linked 
upper Volta, niger, and ivory Coast, while fixing the scope of his ini-
tiative within the framework of the Conseil de l’entente: “our initia-
tive means that Voltaics in ivory Coast and ivorians in upper Volta 
would have the same rights and the same duties without having to give 
up their respective national qualities. . . . Citizens of these three states 
(ivory Coast, niger, and upper Volta) would vote and could be elected 
in each country, and one day an ivorian would become a cabinet min-
ister in ouagadougou and a Voltaic would belong to the ivorian or the 
nigerien cabinet.”44
 Scaling down the number of countries that were part of this project 
can be interpreted as a strategy to focus on the ivory Coast’s immediate 
sphere of influence. not only did the entente lend itself geographically 
to such a project, but also geopolitically the Abidjan-ouagadougou-
niamey axis made sense. dahomey’s absence from these initial conver-
sations was attributable to internal political feuds, which resulted in the 
country being isolated internationally. As of 1965, many entente meet-
ings took place with togo in attendance as a new member of the group. 
the extension of membership to togo led to the postponement of the 
launch of the project to late 1965. Because this decision was made to ap-
pear as the future central piece of the entente edifice, the organization 
needed to prepare itself to welcome new members, taking into account 
the changes that were going to be introduced by this future disposition.
 on december 30, 1965, the heads of state of ivory Coast, niger, 
upper Volta, dahomey, and togo signed the double nationalité Con-
vention in Abidjan.45 the five governments adopted the principle that 
when resident in any of these countries, the citizens of the member 
states could benefit from the same rights and duties as citizens of the 
state in which they resided. the actual definition of double nationalité, 
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the acquisition and loss of it, and the particular cases of students, mi-
grant workers, civil servants, and the military was to be defined in 
another convention developed after the first one signed in december 
1965. A second article dealt with the economic aspects of the conven-
tion, which, according to Jacques Baulin, worked almost exclusively 
to the advantage of ivory Coast.46 this article recommended the har-
monization of the member states’ industrial and agricultural policies 
and their investment codes. moreover, Article 2 suggested a “study of 
the external markets that each member state represents for one an-
other in order to reach a sense of balance in the commercial exchanges 
between states.” it concluded by affirming the principle that coastal 
states would grant landlocked states access to their ports to enable 
goods to be transported easily.
PdCi members Bury the Project
However, on January 21, 1966, three weeks after the convention was 
signed, the secretary general of PdCi issued a communiqué announc-
ing that the implementation of the double nationalité Convention was 
postponed until further notice. this suspension was explained as due 
to the “perhaps legitimate worries of some of [PdCi’s] most dedicated 
activists” in relation to the agreement.47 Houphouët-Boigny asked for 
a national council meeting during which he would clear up all misunder-
standings with the militants, “so that the party’s enemies [would] not 
take advantage of the situation to pursue their sad political ends.”48 the 
need for an explanatory session testifies that a gap existed between the 
perspective of the president and the bulk of party activists. during the 
session, the president explained that double nationalité would not be 
abandoned, but the project would be implemented on a continental 
scale only when the organisation Commune Africaine et malgache 
(successor institution to the uAm) and organization of African unity 
(oAu) countries followed suit. He emphasized that PdCi committees 
could decide which Africans could enjoy double nationalité privileges 
in the ivory Coast. in doing so, he acknowledged the party activists’ 
opposition to the idea of double nationalité. According to Arsène As-
souan usher, during the session, a old activist from Lakota rose and told 
the president, “today is a day for frank truths. . . . if you want to sell 
the country off, then you must show us where to go!”49 As Houphouët-
Boigny acknowledged almost twenty years later, “i would like to say that 
it was on only three occasions throughout the time of my presidency 
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that my people did not follow me. the first time was when i presented 
a project aiming to create a dual citizenship in this country.”50
 Houphouët also acknowledged that the young ivorian profession-
als feared that double nationalité would allow cadres from places like 
dahomey (notably) to occupy positions from which they could not be 
removed.51 Lambert Amon tanoh, at the time the ivorian minister for 
education, confirmed that these were some of the reasons behind the 
local cadres’ refusal of double nationalité.52 there was a strong fear in-
herited from the experience of the Bildungsrückstand of the colony of 
ivory Coast, as opposed to places like dahomey and Senegal. in ad-
dition, in 1965–66, memories of the 1958 riot directed against the da-
homeyans and togolese living in ivory Coast were still fresh. the main 
motivation behind these riots was the perception that dahomeyans had 
access to better professional situations, to the disadvantage of ivorians, a 
stance voiced by the Ligue des originaires de la Côte d’ivoire (LoCi).53
entente’s Poor Consensus
the dominant assumption in ivory Coast was that if double nationalité 
was approved, West Africans were likely to “invade” ivory Coast. After 
1951, ivory Coast had become the most important economy in french-
speaking West Africa.54 in favor of the double nationalité project, 
Houphouët spoke of the fact that the current prosperity of ivory Coast 
was the result of the collective effort of all West African populations liv-
ing on ivorian soil, especially of Voltaics.55 What ivorians did not know 
was that the project did not have a good reputation in upper Volta ei-
ther. on the contrary, in upper Volta it was viewed as another instance 
of subordinating Voltaic interests to ivorian ones, a stance that had come 
to define the presidency of maurice yaméogo. yaméogo emerged as a 
key figure in Voltaic politics in the 1950s, particularly after the death 
of ouezzin Coulibaly in 1958. yaméogo’s authoritarian style of ruling 
and his seeming insensitivity to the economic difficulties of the country 
made him an unpopular leader.56 in addition to this, he spent a good deal 
of his time (some argued up to 40 percent) outside his country, mostly in 
ivory Coast. As a result, yaméogo was seen as Houphouët’s “lackey,” his 
“spokesman,” who publicly spoke on matters of African politics in a way 
that Houphouët himself would not.57 When maurice yaméogo returned 
to ougadougou with the double nationalité Convention, trade unions 
were mobilizing protests over a recent 20 percent cut in civil servants’ 
salaries. the convention added fuel to this in a context within which 
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the unions felt they were not being heard by their president. Within 
three days, yaméogo was forced to step down and hand over power to 
the military chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Sangoulé Lamizana, who 
reluctantly assumed the office of head of state.58
 yaméogo’s fall, which came as a surprise, hit the Conseil de l’entente 
hard. deliberations within the entente, essentially a heads-of-state 
organization, were based on personal relationships. Hence, the heads 
of state in the group referred to each other as “brothers.” upper Volta’s 
membership in the organization was also essential, as it was the one en-
tente country that had borders with all the others.59 yaméogo’s departure 
closely followed the departure of Sourou migan Apithy, the president 
of dahomey, who was overthrown by general Christophe Soglo in no-
vember 1965. Hence, the axis Abidjan-ouagadougou-niamey came to 
a sudden halt.
 this new political situation left Houphouët and Hamani diori 
of niger as the only ”historic” leaders of the entente. fresh evidence 
reveals that the nigerien president was actually not an enthusiast of 
double nationalité but had agreed to it out of solidarity with the bloc.60 
He “sold” his signature on the convention in exchange for the promise 
of investment commitments in niger by his ivorian and Voltaic peers. 
Hamani diori also did not want to lose control over the civil service of 
his country and hence ensured that in the initial template agreement, 
a clause was included detailing a selection process for applicants from 
other entente countries.61 the oppositions to the project inside ivory 
Coast and in upper Volta, when added to President diori’s reluctance, 
dashed the hopes of the remaining original authors of the project for 
pursuing it as they saw fit. the fact that the project ended in this way 
illustrates that it was a heads-of-state affair to which the rest of the 
population had hardly been attached. in this context, popular hostility 
to the project might have been a consequence of the lack of explana-
tion of what the project entailed. in ivory Coast, PdCi’s leadership 
thought it useful to launch a major explanation campaign (campagne 
d’explication) only after the convention had been signed. this campaign 
made the authorities realize that party activists were in the main op-
posed to the idea.
félix Houphouët-Boigny launched the double nationalité initiative in 
1963 in a national climate heavy with suspicion (because of the plots) 
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in an attempt to revive the spirit of nationalité superposée. double na-
tionalité could be regarded as a concrete step toward the ideal of African 
unity that had found a compromise arrangement in the same year (1963) 
in Addis-Ababa. it could also be seen as an instrument intended to 
strengthen the influence of ivory Coast over its francophone peers.
 one of the main obstacles to the realization of this vision was ivorian 
cadres and youths concerned about professional ivorians’ possibility of 
finding employment in their own country. the cadres’ acute conscious-
ness of their fragility as an interest group—at the mercy of a presiden-
tial whim, as demonstrated by the plots—when added to the historic 
problem of a dearth of cadres available for the needs of the growing 
economy, pushed them to resist an attempt at opening the playing field. 
these groups were convinced that double nationalité would open the 
doors for African foreigners to take over positions that they saw as their 
righteous preserve, and they used the PdCi structure to vent their op-
position. the political context of West Africa did not lend itself to a 
prolongation of the initiative, as maurice yaméogo in upper Volta had 
been toppled by a coalition of trade unions. Among their many dis-
contents was the double nationalité initiative, which they saw as a way 
to further undermine upper Volta vis-à-vis ivory Coast, the historic 
“older brother.”
 double nationalité was a clear instance of a confrontation between 
two different views on nationality and citizenship in ivory Coast. But 
the defeat of the project revealed a wedge between the top leadership 
of ivorian politics and the party base over the meaning of indepen-
dence from france. Whereas Houphouët-Boigny had only reluctantly 
accepted the effective break from france that the proclamation of inde-
pendence in August 1960 entailed, the base of his party and its cadres 
had interpreted the immediate outcome of sovereignty as the possibil-
ity to assert the right of ivorians (as opposed to the french and other 
Africans residing in the country) to be the primary beneficiaries of the 
new state of affairs. furthermore, in subsequent reforms of the ivorian 
nationality code, the tendency has been to restrict the possibilities for 
access to ivorian citizenship, in the context of an important flow of 
incoming migration, mainly from other West African countries. Such 
a trend came with many implications, in a country whose cash-crop 
economy had since the 1930s heavily relied on a labor force imported 
mainly from Burkina faso and mali. this tension between the “liberal 
school” of an ivorian citizenship opened to West Africa and a more 
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“conservative” school centered on the interests of ivorians first has been 
a feature of ivorian political and social life ever since.
 more than anyone else, the figure of Henri Konan Bédié best em-
bodies this reality. Bédié, after his speech at the fourth Congress of 
PdCi in 1965, stood to benefit immediately from Africanization as he 
became the first African minister of finance in the country’s history 
in 1966, succeeding raphaël Saller, a frenchman. Later in life, Bédié 
became the second president of ivory Coast, after Houphouët-Boigny’s 
death in 1993. one of the first measures that he introduced during his 
nascent presidency was a modification of the electoral law, which stated 
that to be a candidate for president, a person had to “be an ivorian, born 
to a mother and a father themselves ivorian born.”62 He simultaneously 
launched a new concept, which he hoped was going to become the locus 
for the summation of what it meant to be an ivorian in that day and age. 
He named this concept “Ivoirité.”63 the consistency in Bédié’s thinking, 
in a political life spanning at least three decades, allows me to assert that 
this way of thinking participates in the ideological landscape of ivorian 
politics and, although it intervenes in a “politics of autochthony” visible 
in many other parts of the African continent, is not just a consequence 
of the acceleration of the globalization of the world economy.64
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s I x
The Nubians of Kenya
Citizenship in the Gaps and Margins
S A m A n t H A  B A L At o n - C H r i m e S
t O d A y ’ s  K e n y A n  n u B I A n s  A r e  A  m A r g I n A l I z e d  m I n O r I t y , 
discriminated against in access to national identity cards, unrecognized 
(at least until 2009, and then only ambiguously) as a tribe of Kenya, 
and landless. the nubians’ story is more than anything else the story of 
a search for a home, and like all human stories, it is one of contradic-
tions. it is a story of displacement and uneasy settlement, of shifting 
and divided loyalties, and of sometimes-conflicting strategies aimed at 
constructing themselves as citizens. Perhaps the only consistency in the 
nubians’ story is their status as in-between or outside the categories 
that dictate, in formal and informal terms, belonging in the communi-
ties in which they found themselves.
 the various and often paradoxical ways in which the nubians have 
successfully or unsuccessfully negotiated their status—as askaris,1 de-
tribalized natives, and ultimately ethnic strangers—are emblematic of 
ways in which political membership has historically been negotiated in 
dialogue with, rather than purely determined by, colonial (and post-
colonial) legal and political status. this case draws attention to the ways 
in which categories through which colonial authorities sought to govern 
the colonized were unable to absolutely capture the lived realities of 
identity, difference, mobility, settlement, rights claiming, and belong-
ing. instead, colonial legal and administrative categories, and the gaps 
between them, gave rise to different and variable opportunities for Af-
rican subjects to form identities within and (sometimes simultaneously) 
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against the colonial state and each other. in doing so, Africans actively 
contributed, albeit within significant constraints, to the construction of 
citizenship as a (limited) form of political membership and a license to 
make meaningful use of (some) rights and resources.2
 the nubians originated as an ethnic group in the quasi-slave armies 
of nineteenth-century egypt and Sudan and were subsequently incorpo-
rated into the colonial east African armed forces, and later Kenya. their 
role and position in colonial Kenya and around the time of independence 
were deeply ambiguous, and this history has had consequences for their 
citizenship in postcolonial Kenya as well as for our understanding of 
colonial and postcolonial citizenship categories. the way in which to-
day’s nubians are marginalized by the nation’s contemporary citizenship 
regime, which privileges indigenous and autochthonous ethnicity, can be 
understood only with a full appreciation of this story.
Strangers introducing Strangers
A great deal of misunderstanding has surrounded the term Nubian 
in east Africa, often uncritically associating those communities who 
identify themselves with it as originating in the nuba mountains or 
the ancient nubian Kingdoms dating around 2000 BC to 1500 Ad in 
the area that is now known as nubia in northern Sudan and southern 
egypt. in fact, the terms Nubi and Sudanese have been used at differ-
ent times for different purposes, most notably to refer to slaves from 
nubia, one of the major sources of slaves, prior to european imperial-
ism.3 in particular, today’s Kenyan nubians have their origins in the 
slave armies of nineteenth-century north Africa, armies composed 
of various tribes not only from nubia but also from throughout the 
Sudan.4 in the course of their migration, the soldiers lived in zara’ib, 
or garrisons, which were not only military but also social and economic 
communities of great complexity, including not only soldiers but also 
wives, concubines, domestic servants, and gun boys.5 As the higher 
ranks of soldiers were populated with slaves captured in muslim, 
Arabic-speaking areas of egypt and northern Sudan (including nubia), 
the command of these officers over the more southern Sudanese in the 
context of their living together accelerated their Arabization (at least in 
terms of language) and islamization.6 the nubians of today continue 
to speak Kinubi in Kenya and uganda; however, it is islam that remains 
the most fundamental aspect of nubian identity across east Africa.7 
today’s Kenyan nubians have their origins in one particular group of 
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soldiers and their dependents: those who were stationed in equatoria, 
a province of the Sudan cut off from the egyptian administration in 
1883 during the mahdist revolt.8 After a two-year period of isolation, 
these soldiers were incorporated into the imperial British east African 
Company by frederick Lugard, and they later became the backbone of 
the protectorate armed forces, then of the colonial armies of uganda 
and Kenya, playing a crucial role in the imperial project in east Africa.
 the contemporary status of the nubians must be understood against 
this background. that the Sudanese soldiers were introduced into east 
Africa, and their role determined by europeans, themselves strangers, 
upset indigenous power structures and precluded to a large degree the 
possibility of hospitable incorporation into local African communities.9 
the British considered the Sudanese a martial race, not only deploying 
their military force against local populations but also elevating the Su-
danese soldiers and their families above other Africans.10 the military 
actively promoted the isolation and therefore “breeding” of this “race”. 
Particularly in the early King’s African rifles, groups such as nubians, 
but also other muslim foreigners—Swahilis and Somalis—constituted 
the bulk of the armed forces because “they had no emotional ties to the 
east African population.”11 the influence of these ideas of a martial race 
on shaping the early and persistent identity of the nubian community 
cannot be underestimated. Although “[i]n reality, the military orienta-
tion of these southern Sudanese communities was a vestige of military 
slavery and not some innate cultural characteristic,”12 their treatment 
by the British as a superior, homogenous race served to promote a self-
consciousness, the forming of external group boundaries, and the inter-
nalization of beliefs in their superiority to other Africans.13 As michelle 
moyd notes in relation to askaris in german east Africa, the fiction of 
a martial race served the dual function of allowing colonizing forces to 
feel confident in their African armed forces and allowing those forces 
to access and justify an enhanced status vis-à-vis other Africans.14 this 
mode of incorporation of the Sudanese askaris and their families into 
east Africa has had long-lasting consequences for the community, be-
cause the nubians sustained this uneasy isolation from the communities 
that surround them for more than a century after this initial migration.
detribalized and Landless natives
more than any other factor, the issue of land and settlement has 
consistently illuminated the anomalous status of the nubians and 
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the limitations of colonial authorities’ efforts to categorize and con-
trol subject populations. their daily physical and social realities were 
messier and more demanding than the veneer of bravery and loyalty 
many colonial authorities chose to privilege in their interactions with 
the soldiers and their families.15 unlike the locally recruited soldiers, 
who were subject to “retribalization” upon retirement, the Sudanese 
soldiers no longer had anywhere they thought of as home to return 
to.16 With land being of such paramount importance to African liveli-
hoods and identities, and the great majority of the nubian community 
being dependents rather than askaris, their plea for some land to settle 
on was both urgent and important.
 By 1912, colonial and military authorities had decided that the soldiers 
and their dependents would be allowed to settle at Kibra, a forested 
area of 4,197.9 acres on the edge of nairobi where the community had 
been settled since 1904.17 the area was surveyed in 1917 and gazetted as 
a military reserve in 1918, supported by the protectorate government’s 
thinking that the ex-soldiers needed somewhere to live, that families 
were a good moral influence on the soldiers, and that the descendants 
of the original soldiers could be called upon as reserves in the event 
of any future need, particularly for World War i.18 ex-askaris of more 
than twelve years’ service, and their dependents, were given permission 
to live on a plot in the area, graze a limited number of cattle, and grow 
food, as long as they had a shamba pass issued by the military.19 there 
were 291 of such passes, though many families settled without one.20
 recognizing the advantages of their position, the soldiers and their 
descendants maintained their ambivalent attitude toward other Afri-
cans, as well as a sort of voluntary isolation in terms of religion, lan-
guage, and, as we shall see, urbanization, evident most tangibly through 
their legal and institutional separation in the military. While Kibera was 
a military reserve and its occupants under military rule, the nubians 
enjoyed and came to identify with a relatively privileged status in the 
protectorate and, later, the colony, which they actively sought to protect 
as long as the British were there to formally sanction the status. most 
notably, they were exempt from native tribunals and taxes and enjoyed a 
relatively higher rate of pay than civilians, as well as preferential recruit-
ment into government jobs after retirement from the military.21 they 
maintained their claim to this privileged treatment mainly on the basis 
of their military service but also their social system and religion, which 
further internalized the idea that they were superior to other Africans, 
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an idea encouraged by the British.22 this early period of settlement (and 
even up until the early days of independence) is remembered with great 
nostalgia as a “golden age” by the oldest living generation of nubians. 
mama “Jonuba” explained,
Life was very good at that time. food was plenty, yet very cheap. . . . 
We had no problems. We grew up in a very wonderful place, and a 
good life. We used to eat meat, meat was cheap, about some cents. 
that used to feed the whole family until we were satisfied. . . . 
during the white man’s reign we could even buy clothes as cheap 
as two shillings. enough for the elders, enough for the children. 
Very cheap. even though their salary was somehow low, but life 
was at its best.23
 However, before long, conflicting interpretations of the ownership of 
the land emerged. it was normal practice in the Anglo-egyptian and 
colonial east African militaries to give land in lieu of a pension.24 the 
Sudanese therefore understood that the land was given to them in per-
petuity and seized on this interpretation in consistent pleas to authori-
ties, as well as in their physical occupation of the area. the colonial (and 
independence) governments, however, continued to claim in all official 
correspondence with the Sudanese that they were only allowed to live 
on the land until the death of the immediate dependents of ex-askaris.
 Kibera had upset town planning and the colonialists’ desire for so-
cial order based on principles of racial segregation. African locations 
in urban areas were meant only to house Africans who had to be in 
towns for work purposes, and in nairobi, Pumwani location was de-
veloped for this purpose. All other Africans were meant to live in the 
reserves. Kibera was the only African settlement to escape demolition 
in the 1920s and 1930s while the nairobi City Council pursued its ra-
cially segregated plan for the city, primarily because it was protected by 
military patrons who admired the Sudanese soldiers. during the 1920s 
and 1930s, facing reduced military income and with a high number of 
widow-headed households, nubians began, initially just on a small scale, 
renting out their structures or occasionally building new structures to 
rent out to the increasing African urban population to increase their 
income.25 this further riled the British, who could barely tolerate the 
ex-askaris out of a sense of obligation and certainly could not stand the 
idea of other—less desirable—Africans living in the city.26 in 1933, there 
were 251 Sudanese and 320 non-Sudanese living in Kibera.27 the city 
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authorities made several administrative attempts to evict the Sudanese 
and reclaim Kibera but had no success. By 1939, with all other options 
exhausted, the Sudanese were told they were allowed to stay, but the area 
was deliberately neglected in terms of service provision, and the land 
was encroached upon on all sides for the railway, settler sporting clubs, 
and settler residences.28 By 1947 there were only 1,700 acres remaining.29 
Kibera had become, and remains, a highly visible manifestation of the 
state’s incapacity to govern with the levels of control it desired, and this 
incapacity extended to the determination of the askari families’ place in 
Kenya.
 throughout this protracted land battle, the economic value of the 
land overshadowed a far more important problem: the Sudanese sol-
diers were an anomalous category in the colonial system of governance 
and land allocation. during this period, a land tenure and administra-
tive system was evolving that would have long-term consequences for 
the relationship between land and citizenship in Kenya, and in which 
the nubians, and all detribalized natives, were an anomaly. As the colo-
nial government balanced its protective and extractive imperatives, the 
white settlers were more or less forcibly taking over the fertile Central 
Highlands for agricultural purposes, while other areas of the protector-
ate less valuable to the europeans were declared “native reserves,” os-
tensibly to protect Africans’ “undisturbed and exclusive” access to land 
forever.30 the native reserves had the effect of, to a large extent, freezing 
claims of different tribes to particular pieces of land that they could 
call home, as well as calling an externally induced halt to the dynamic 
interactions that various tribes had with each other and with their land 
before european colonization.31 As Sara Berry puts it, “[t]he reserves 
were organised on tribal lines, thus linking land rights firmly with social 
identity,” a social phenomenon that continues to a large extent in Kenya 
today.32 the social and political formations that Africans developed in 
close connection to land during this period would have long-term con-
sequences for determining belonging in Kenya on the basis of indigene-
ity or autochthony, itself defined, explicitly or implicitly, in reference to 
colonial native reserves.
 the “problem” of where and how to settle the Sudanese ex-askaris 
and their dependents, who were assertive about their privileged status 
and refused to move, and how to govern them in a context where all 
other Africans lived in native reserves made it apparent in the most tan-
gible way that they were anomalous in the colonial social order.33 the 
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nubians pleaded, “We repeat that we find it difficult to appreciate how 
we can be classed as natives of Kenya. to us it seems elementary that we 
can only be classed as ‘natives’ in the place where we have native rights, 
where we have our tribal lands, or at any rate, certain land rights.”34
 in making this claim, the union of Sudanese revealed an ambigu-
ity, and indeed ambivalence on the nubians’ part, about their place in 
Kenya. this quotation can be simultaneously interpreted as an appeal 
to be recognized as superior to natives and an appeal for the same land 
rights as natives, a position that could only be contradictory under the 
colonial legal structure, distinguishing as it did between settler and na-
tive. Although the Sudanese had the esteem of the military and were 
thought to be the best kind of African, they were still African and as 
such not entitled to the same access to land as a white settler or even 
an Asian.35 Without any “tribal land” or the private property rights of 
white settlers, the Sudanese were legally squatters in Kibera.
 despite the lack of clarification regarding landownership, in 1928 the 
military reserve was handed over with very little transparency to civil-
ian rule under the district commissioner for nairobi.36 this marked a 
significant change in the special relationship between the Sudanese and 
the colonial government. though the nubians had always been classi-
fied as “detribalized natives,” the government was spared the difficulty 
of figuring out how to govern them while they were under military ju-
risdiction. once they came under civilian rule, it became obvious that 
the British were quite unsure what to do with this category of African. 
the nubians’ efforts to position themselves as legitimate, and indeed 
privileged, members of the political community (relative to other Afri-
cans) therefore took place in a context where they had some scope to try 
to define a space for themselves, less constrained by the tighter controls 
over “native subjects” in reserves, but also without any certainty about 
their legal and political status and rights.
 Just as Africans were territorially segregated by ethnicity in native 
reserves, so too were they segregated by ethnicity administratively, with 
each supposedly homogenous reserve and its inhabitants governed by a 
“customary” native administration. the reserves acted as administrative 
units, and ethnic communities were governed though the characteristic 
indirect rule of the British empire, that is, through “chiefs”—either ap-
propriated, manipulated, or invented—who were under orders from the 
protectorate and later the colonial government.37 though the adminis-
tration of Africans was not as tightly organized as it was made out to be, 
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no problem was greater than that presented by those who could not be 
made to fit into the structure of native authorities.38 Kibera not being a 
native reserve and with the nubians not being considered an indigenous 
tribe in Kenya, the departure of the military as the authoritative body in 
the area left an authority vacuum, and Kibera became an “administrative 
grey area.”39
 there is no particularly clear legal or political definition of “de-
tribalized natives.” it was instead a category that absorbed a range 
of anomalous Africans who could “not be sent home as they either 
[did] not know to what reserve they belong[ed] or [had] lost all desire, 
and even the means, to live in the reserve to which their fathers be-
longed.”40 in practice the category included “(a) the retired ex-King’s 
African rifles or police askari; (b) ex-employees of europeans; (c) 
natives who really have no reserve which they can call their own. 
these are almost invariably the offspring of town natives and the 
result of mixed marriages; [and] (d) the old and destitute who have 
spent most of their lives in towns.”41
 in short, “detribalized natives” were mostly Africans displaced with 
various degrees of force by the British in order to serve them, and they 
had developed urban lifestyles disconnected from those of their former 
ethnic communities. in their dealings with this category of native, the 
colonial civil (as opposed to military) authorities focused more on the 
former trait—their disconnection from their ethnic community—than 
the latter, their service for the colonial order. there prevailed a desire 
to provide such Africans with the means to serve the British in the 
“modern” ways they required (in this case militarily), while maintain-
ing “traditional” forms of social order. While content to benefit from 
Africans’ exposure to urban living, the colonial authorities did not be-
lieve Africans were morally “equipped to deal with the vicissitudes of 
town life” and did not yet deserve urban citizenship.42 Whatever else 
the British thought of this category of people, the colonial government 
agreed that “we should keep tribal life as long as we can. A detribalized 
native is at present a menace to himself and to other people.”43 By way 
of justifying their position, the colonial government argued that “[t]he 
natives in this country with the exception of the nubians and Swahilis 
and a few others have good reserves, and there should always be a home 
under natural and reasonable conditions for them there. their land is 
a priceless asset to the natives of this country and they should not be 
allowed to deprive themselves of it.”44 What should be done with these 
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select few groups without the “priceless asset” of a native reserve was a 
difficult problem for the authorities, to say the least.
 the handover to civilian rule in 1928 marked the beginning of a pe-
riod of great disorder in Kibera, doing nothing to improve the colonial 
authority’s opinion of detribalized natives. the nubians formally lost 
their privilege but continued to perceive themselves as owed special 
treatment, and they made use of their de facto control over Kibera, in the 
absence of a clear and implementable state-based governance structure, 
to develop economically, despite the authorities’ objections. the nu-
bians themselves did not cause as much disturbance as other residents 
and visitors to Kibera, and the authorities recognized this.45 However, 
the nubians’ activities did facilitate activity on the part of other Afri-
cans that colonial authorities found problematic but failed to control. A 
late 1940s census of the area pegged the population at 3,085, nearly half 
of whom were non-Sudanese, and almost all the non-Sudanese (often 
landless Kikuyus) were tenants of the Sudanese or worked for them 
in an agricultural capacity.46 this expanding population brought with 
it prostitution by tenants and a market for nubian gin, especially for 
the large number of Africans who visited Kibera by day but left before 
nightfall.47 these activities—most of all the gin brewing—sustained a 
superior economic status for the Sudanese compared to other Africans, 
with the income from gin raising the average income of a Sudanese 
family to up to five times that of a particularly good salary for a nubian 
and nearly twenty times the average salary for other Africans.48
 in this context of a fragile superiority, and throughout the remain-
der of the colonial period, the nubians tried but largely failed to shore 
up their formerly special relationship with the government as a means 
of securing a place and privilege in Kenya. As Britain’s military needs 
were reduced after the cessation of hostilities, and as the military bud-
get was similarly reduced, the sons of the Sudanese KAr soldiers were 
not needed as much as had been anticipated, and the period between 
World War ii and independence was one of adjusting to a less mili-
tary, more urban lifestyle for the community. during the 1930s the Su-
danese marketed themselves to the government as a source of future 
military recruits because their special relationship with the government 
depended on it.49 However, another generation of askaris never ma-
terialized. Partly this was because the British considered the upcom-
ing generation to be undesirable “degenerates,” based largely on their 
perception of the disorder in Kibera.50 However, there were also other 
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reasons. even earlier, around the beginning of World War i, the British 
thought it wise to ethnically diversify their colonial armed forces, and 
the Sudanese had begun to face competition in this regard. younger 
nubians also declined to join the military because the rates of pay in 
the military had dropped, and instead took up other occupations. they 
increasingly earned their income as clerks, merchants, supervisors of Ki-
kuyu sharecroppers, traders, butchers, bus drivers for the nascent Kenya 
Bus Service, police, and of course landlords, while others did not see the 
need to work at all, given the excellent income that women were making 
from gin.51 though many took government jobs, they were nevertheless 
a small minority within those occupations and did not have the strategic 
effect of their cousins in West nile or Sudan or askaris in german east 
Africa in terms of creating the basis for the new colonial order by working 
in other coercive and administrative jobs and enacting the daily routines 
of colonialism.52 furthermore, while some families were still able to do 
well from rental properties, gin, or salaried employment, other fami-
lies began to fall through the cracks beginning around the 1930s.53 the 
reluctance of the Sudanese to educate their children in government or 
Christian mission schools, preferring to educate their children in ma-
drassas,54 contributed to longer-term economic challenges.55
 it was, then, not only land and settlement but also issues related to 
day-to-day governance that illuminated the anomalous stranger status 
of the nubians in the colonial legal order and underscored the pecu-
liar quality of their political place in Kenya and the often improvised, 
ambiguous, and imprecise forms of colonial governance.56 during this 
period, as detribalized natives, the nubians were not subject to either 
settler law or any native authority. instead, they were governed by an 
ambiguous and inconsistent constellation of ad hoc rules and authori-
ties, both state and nonstate, and were subject to many general pieces of 
legislation governing natives, such as the native registration ordinance 
of 1915, which ordered that all male Africans over the age of fifteen carry 
registration papers called kipande.57 only in 1949 was a specific set of 
by-laws established to govern Kibera, the “African Settlement (Kibera 
Settlement Area) rules, 1949,” and for technical reasons they did not 
become enforceable until 1957 by a european superintendent.58
 Scholars of the nubians, notably timothy Parsons and douglas H. 
Johnson, make a significant point of the petty privileges and the supe-
rior status the nubians had access to as a “martial race,” as well as the 
nubians’ attempts to hold on to it.59 for example, Parsons argues that 
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the preceding eighty years or so of shared military experience and life 
in Kibera had resulted in a sense that they “were entitled to the same 
official ‘non-native’ status enjoyed by Asians, ethiopians, Comorrians 
and certain Somali clans, even though their position in Kibera granted 
them roughly the same privileges while sparing them a higher rate of 
taxation.”60 this aspect of the nubians’ colonial self-identification is 
important. However, it is also important to note that their exceptional 
status carried with it many serious disadvantages. As michelle osborn 
explains, “in some ways, the exceptional detribalized status of the Suda-
nese had left them with more privileges, not having to answer directly 
to traditional or european authority; however, in other ways, there were 
few people within the government to advocate for the basic provision-
ary needs of Kibera residents. Kibera had been left to fend for itself.”61
 it is evident, then, that the British hoped such people, including the 
Sudanese, would simply fade away. As a result, the colonial authorities 
failed to legally protect the askaris’ and ex-askaris’ land or establish a 
secure place for them in the political community. the nubians had to 
overcome those barriers to meaningful citizenship themselves.
uhuru and Split Loyalties
if these contradictions had not already put the nubians in a tenuous 
position, then uhuru (independence)62 did. decolonization presented 
a particular set of challenges for the Sudanese, pulling their loyalties 
in two directions as they navigated the difficult task of establishing 
themselves as Kenyans in political and not just military terms, after 
more than six decades of being identified, and identifying themselves, 
as distinct from (and superior to) African Kenyans.63 despite being 
unable to categorize and govern them absolutely, some of the colonial 
authorities saw the askaris as a potential ally in a context of African na-
tionalism and in some ways continued to offer them special treatment. 
for example, although the 1957 version of the Kibera rules allowed for 
evictions, the government resisted enforcing them systematically, out of 
fear that the Sudanese would be driven into the hands of the increas-
ingly popular African politicians and the nationalist movement more 
generally.64 Some government voices argued that the British govern-
ment should seriously consider making moves to appease the various 
Sudanese grievances to maintain this loyalty in the face of the resistance 
being built among the African community to colonial rule. for example, 
Colonel La fontaine, the welfare officer appointed to Kibera, argued, 
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“it would be a fine gesture for government in its search for a settlement 
area, acceptable to them, to override all obstacles in the way. it would 
strengthen, if that were possible, a loyalty unshaken by the attempts of 
seditious Africans of other tribes to undermine it. it would deepen a 
love for the British connection, that stands out like an island in a sea of 
native unrest.”65 However, on balance, the 1950s was really the twilight 
of the era of special treatment for the Sudanese. rather than take La 
fontaine’s advice, the government simply allowed the Sudanese to move 
even further into the background of their concern, and again their gov-
ernance took on an ad hoc and neglectful, rather than intentional and 
effective, character.
 A complex and seemingly paradoxical position emerged within the 
community in response, as it did in many ethnic communities in Kenya 
at the time, where some sustained a loyalty to the British, while others 
sided with the African nationalists. members of the older generation 
clung to the increasingly tenuous relationship they had with the British 
as a matter of pride in their military history but also to preserve their 
privilege and even their very right to a place in Kenya, which they likely 
perceived that the African nationalists might be reluctant to grant.66 
As michelle moyd notes in relation to the askaris loyal to the german 
colonizers in east Africa, this was not a loyalty to the colonial project 
so much as a reflection of the askaris’ understandings of the significance 
and mutual obligations of their relationships with the colonial state, 
often personalized in the figures of senior military men.67 to prove their 
loyalty to the British, the people of the older generation made efforts 
to distance themselves from mau mau and the emerging nationalists. 
Worried about the government’s concern that Kibera would harbor 
mau mau, they requested that the school that was built for them be re-
stricted to Sudanese to avoid “contamination” of the students by nation-
alists.68 even earlier, the lifting of the exemption from paying the hut 
tax in 1940, even though the tax was not collected until 1946, prompted 
dramatic efforts on the part of this generation to try to secure their 
privileged position.69 the older Sudanese felt strongly that because of 
their special relationship to the colonial government, they should not 
be treated like other Africans, and they pled to Lugard in London (in a 
likely bluff ) that they “would rather pay [the] non-native poll tax than 
be included [in the] category indigenous natives.”70
 the older generation perceived the threat of a loss of their special sta-
tus as an injustice and responded by seeking repatriation to the Sudan. 
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their application for repatriation was rejected in part because of costs 
but also because they were deemed insufficiently Sudanese, having lost 
all connection with the rural Sudanese way of life.71 the repatriation 
attempt and the deliberate distancing from African nationalists must 
therefore be understood not simply as expressions of attitudes of superi-
ority and attempts to retain privilege but also as attempts to compel the 
government to recognize the intractability of their belonging to Kibera, 
and Kenya, and to legally protect their status and land rights, which they 
had by and large established of their own accord since Kibera moved to 
civilian rule.72 their attachment to the British (and associated privilege) 
must have appeared to these old soldiers as the only protective strategy 
they had for guaranteeing somewhere they could stay and continue to 
live with their families.73 At this point in history, the nubians experi-
enced a subtle but crucial shift in the quality of their stranger status. 
Whereas under the colonial authorities they could continue to think of 
themselves as sojourners, maintaining (however vaguely) the possibility 
of leaving Kenya, with the departure of the British it became imperative 
that they seek not only residence but also membership, and not only 
socially but also politically.74
 A strong sense of belonging in Kenya (albeit in a peculiar category) 
and aspirations, therefore, for full citizenship were taken up much less 
ambiguously by the younger generation.75 this generation was begin-
ning to identify with the African nationalist cause and rebuffed the idea 
of returning to the Sudan.76 they were beginning to see that mere toler-
ance or social acceptance would not be enough. instead, the postcolonial 
era required political integration as citizens.77 furthermore, they started 
referring to themselves as nubians, detecting the need to adopt an iden-
tity that would be more conducive to identifying as an ethnic group of 
Kenya after independence.78 the members of this generation take pride 
today in the fact that during the mau mau rebellion they were sympa-
thetic to the cause of independence and even hid Jomo Kenyatta and 
other wanted Kikuyus in their houses, including “nyumba Kubwa,”79 
in Kibera.80 ismail ramadhan, himself a nubian, explains in a news-
paper article seeking to improve the public perception of the nubians 
that “[a]fter the . . . Second World War, the nubians gradually reduced 
ties with the British and moved towards sharing a common vision and 
goals with fellow Kenyans. As the struggle for independence gathered 
momentum in the 1950s and peaked in the early 60s, they readily associ-
ated with themselves with the nationalist political parties—mr James 
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gichuru’s Kenya African national union (KAnu), mr tom mboya’s 
People’s Convention Party (PCP) and mr ronald ngala’s Kenyan Af-
rican democratic union (KAdu).”81 indeed, mboya’s nairobi People’s 
Convention Party in particular had taken an interest in Kibera and at-
tempted to exploit the lack of service delivery there to convert the local 
population to the nationalist cause.82
 We can see in this generational struggle, and the competing inter-
pretations of history, the much deeper struggle for a place in Kenya. 
Ambiguous as the older generation’s claims about Sudan may have 
been, the overwhelming point of the repatriation attempt was that the 
Sudanese really did, by that time, have nowhere else to go to. Kibera 
was the only home they knew, and they had deep and affective ties to 
Kenya whether they liked it or not. for example, some Sudanese wrote 
at the time that “[i]t is also common knowledge that owing to such long 
and continuous service we have entirely lost touch with our country of 
origin and have owing to such service embraced Kenya Colony as our 
country of adoption; We wish respectfully to emphasize that if we are 
forced to return to our country of origin we and our wives and children 
could be absolute strangers in the Sudan.”83
 At the moment of independence in 1963, despite the fact that Kenya 
had effectively become their home, the nubians remained in an am-
biguous position in the country. the British left in too much of a rush 
to resolve the status of the Sudanese community. neither the tenure of 
the land in Kibera or the other nubian settlements nor their status as 
Kenyans was ever clarified, and the political sensitivity of ownership 
of land in Kibera has perpetuated the neglect and marginalization that 
began after the transfer to civil rule in 1928, if not earlier. As osborn 
puts it, “Somewhere between being Kenyan and non-Kenyan, national-
ist and British supporter, privileged and impoverished, legal and illegal, 
owner and squatter, the status of the nubian community has remained 
tenuous.”84 for nubians, citizenship has been experienced in this inse-
cure way ever since, and efforts to interpret and enact citizenship in 
meaningful ways have sought, above all, security of political and legal 
membership, as well as associated rights, resources, and recognition.
ethnic Strangers
the decades after independence marked a rapid decline in the status 
and lifestyle of the nubians in Kibera. the political landscape in Kenya 
changed in ways the nubians were neither well positioned nor well 
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equipped to handle. Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, established 
a highly centralized patrimonial state, which his successor, daniel arap 
moi, sustained. Both presidents stacked the upper echelons of power 
with their ethnic kinsmen, promoting the idea that to access resources 
or have any decision-making influence in Kenya, you must have “one 
of your own” in government or the civil service. ethnic patrimonial-
ism became the hallmark of Kenyan political culture, and even smaller 
recognized ethnic groups found it difficult to advance their interests at 
the national level. despite the nationalism of the younger generations, 
by and large the nubians felt lost without their former military patrons 
and unsure of how to proceed with claiming their rights and establish-
ing themselves as rightful members of the Kenyan community. not 
only were they too small in number to have much electoral influence, 
but also their colonial loyalties and activities worked against them, 
reinforcing their stranger status. the nubians only became more 
marginalized socially, economically, politically, and on the land they 
perceived as their own.
 Around the time of independence, the nubian population was 
around 3,000 out of about 9,000 Kiberans on the remaining 1,150 acres 
of land.85 over the coming decades, the immigrant population in Kibera 
would increase dramatically, bringing the area’s population from 20,000 
in 1975 to 60,000–65,000 in 1980. At the same time, encroachment at 
the fringes of the area also continued, mainly for middle-class housing 
estates, which largely failed to benefit the nubians.86 the size of the 
land decreased from 800 acres in the mid-1970s to 700 acres by 1980 and 
only 550 acres by 1990.87 Kibera is now one of nairobi’s most famous 
slums. though the nubians still claim the area to be their ancestral 
land, they are severely outnumbered, and though many of them make 
a living from renting out structures, they are but a small percentage of 
the landlords in Kibera. most structures were built and are owned by 
patrons of previous mPs and chiefs in the area. the nubians consti-
tute only about 10,000–15,000 people in Kibera, out of a total popula-
tion of between 200,000 and 300,000 on only 550 acres remaining of 
the original 4,197.9 acres.88
 until the last few years, the nubian community was to a large degree 
socially invisible and, when visible, members of the community are often 
still perceived as foreigners, not Kenyan but Sudanese.89 Johnson puts 
it dramatically but accurately when he says that “[t]he final irony is that 
the nubis’ earlier arguments [about their exceptional status] have at last 
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been accepted by the postindependence Kenyan government, but as a 
way of disenfranchising them.”90 nubians report feeling like “refugees” 
and being told by other Kenyans to “go back to Sudan,” a land most of 
today’s nubians have never known. few Kenyans think of the nubians 
as part and parcel of Kenya’s ethnic makeup.
 from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, nubians faced discrimina-
tion in access to id cards on the basis of their nonindigenous identity.91 
they would be asked to provide impossible documents such as their 
parents’ birth certificates to prove they were born in Kenya to Kenyan 
parents. this is despite their constitutional right to the documents. 
until 2009, the nubians were never counted in national censuses, and 
although they were counted as one of 111 tribes of Kenya in 2009, popu-
lar belief maintains that Kenya is made up of “42 tribes,” of which the 
nubians are not one.92 As such, the nubians are disadvantaged by not 
having an electoral or administrative district considered their home and 
in which they can dominate decision-making and access benefits such as 
quotas for government employment, educational bursaries, and second-
ary school places. Because of their small number, the nubians have also 
had difficulty electing “one of their own” to any political office above 
ward level and so have been unable to secure their political, social, and 
economic position in the country through political patronage.
 despite these barriers to recognition and inclusion of the nubians 
as legitimate citizens of Kenya, the nubians have, particularly since 
the opening up of democratic avenues of contestation after the return 
to multipartyism in 1992, continued to assert their allegiance to Kenya 
and their right to Kenyan citizenship. their strategy for doing so, like 
the history of their negotiation of their place in Kenya, runs deep with 
tensions. on the one hand, in coalition with ngos like the Centre for 
minority rights and development, they have identified themselves as a 
marginalized minority and exploit the growing human rights discourse 
in the region. on the other hand, they have simultaneously sought to 
identify themselves as indigenous and autochthonous to Kibera and 
therefore in need of the protection of their homeland and their place 
in the country in the same way as Kenya’s other tribes but in a way that 
sustains notions of ethnic territorialism.93
 As various scholars of east Africa’s nubians have noted, a nubian 
identity has always been a manipulable and strategic phenomenon.94 
the continued evolution of their identity in this way—toward indige-
neity and even autochthony—can be understood as a response to the 
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prevailing social and political norms governing belonging and mean-
ingful citizenship in Kenya. Just as they adapted to slave soldiering and 
the colonial forces, so too do they adapt to the postcolonial polity.
Subject race and ethnic Strangers
the nubian case calls for an evaluation of the way in which we under-
stand the influence of colonial citizenship categories on colonial and 
postcolonial citizenship in practice. the distinction between settler and 
“native,” citizen and subject, is often talked about as the paradigmatic 
distinction of colonial African history. According to mahmood mam-
dani, white settlers were governed by civil law as civic citizens, while na-
tives were governed by customary authorities, differentiated horizontally 
on the basis of ethnicity.95 natives were ethnic citizens but in the civic 
sphere only subjects. this is a binary order in which the nubians had no 
place. mamdani, in his study of the tutsi in rwanda, felt compelled to 
come up with a new category to capture groups of people who were not 
white colonizers or settlers but also were not straightforward “natives,” 
subjugated where they were found. He calls them subject races.
 Subject races were those who were, in colonial law, hierarchically in-
ferior to white settlers but superior to natives. they were colonized, not 
colonizer. in this category, mamdani includes indians of east, central, 
and southern Africa; Arabs of Zanzibar; tutsi of rwanda and Burundi; 
and the “Coloureds” of southern Africa.96 Critically, they either were 
nonindigenous immigrants or were constructed as nonindigenous by 
the colonial powers through racial theories of superiority (for example, 
the “Hamitic” tutsis). though they were (second-class) citizens in the 
sense that they were governed by civil rather than customary law, they 
were still oppressed peoples, the difference being in the nature of that 
oppression. While natives in reserves were subject to despotic customary 
authorities, subject races were homeless, rootless, and, though governed 
by civil laws, lacking in both civil and ethnic rights, notably to land.97 in 
the postcolonial era, with their legal superiority over other Africans lost, 
they became mere ethnic strangers, with a victim consciousness like that 
of the native but without the newfound civil rights and sense of rightful 
place in the postcolony.98
 nubians can be considered something like a subject race turned ethnic 
stranger. A proper extension of the category of subject race to the nu-
bians requires some further explanation. mamdani explains that “subject 
races usually performed a middleman function, in either the state or the 
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market, and their position was marked by petty privilege economically 
and preferential treatment legally.”99 in the case of the nubians, the na-
ture of their middleman involvement was military—they were the force 
behind the British colonization of east Africa. this role, combined with 
the community’s active reinforcement of their privileged place in Kenya, 
exacerbated the contradictions of their status, especially around indepen-
dence. As such they are a more unusual kind of stranger in comparison to 
the economic migrants who have occupied more attention in studies of 
the incorporation of strangers in African societies.100
 there was some degree of preferential legal and economic treatment, 
but the nubians were not subject to civil law exclusively—first they were 
subject to military regulation, and they did not come under civil rule until 
1928. even then, they were categorized as “detribalized natives,” subject 
to ad hoc locality-specific native by-laws. in this sense, the use of the 
term subject race to describe the nubians is an important conceptual and 
historical extension of this broad category. However, as we have seen 
above, and as James r. Brennan suggests, the categories of native-sub-
ject, nonnative subject race, and settler-citizen must be understood not 
in terms of effectively imposed, internalized, and meaningful categories 
but as efforts at categorization that were, in practice, often contradic-
tory, underresourced, challenged from within and outside the colonial 
apparatus, sometimes subverted, and sometimes reinforced, depending 
on the agential behaviors of the people they were designed to govern.101 
the nubians’ broadly conceived status as a “subject race” did not entail 
absolute subjection but rather denotes a particular position from which 
different kinds of negotiation, rights claims, status enactment, and daily 
social and economic practices become possible and sometimes desirable, 
compared to those available to the other very broad categories of native 
subject or settler citizen.102
 Like other subject races, upon independence, the nubians were forced 
to negotiate a new social and political order in which not only was 
their privilege lost but also they were a minority in a community they 
had helped pacify and had considered themselves superior to. that is, 
they were ethnic strangers. in postcolonial societies, equal citizenship 
became the marker of integration and meaningful inclusion, demand-
ing that strangers take on political and not only social, cultural, and 
economic identities that would facilitate harmonious relations with 
the “host” political community.103 furthermore, being native-strangers, 
rather than racially distinct, put the nubians in a particularly difficult 
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category.104 While europeans could recast themselves as mere expatriates, 
and the economic security of Asians, the other significant strangers in 
Kenya, acted as something of a buffer from the host community, African 
strangers were in the peculiar position of being different enough to be 
strangers but similar enough to their hosts to preclude any of the other 
strategies by which other, racially different kinds of strangers got by.105 An 
understanding of the background of the nubians in Kenya is therefore 
essential for an understanding of their contemporary situation.
rethinking Citizenship
the nubians’ negotiation of their legal and political status in pro-
tectorate, colonial, and postcolonial Kenya illuminates one of many 
citizenship conditions, discussed elsewhere in this volume, that unsettle 
top-down accounts of colonial citizenship as straightforward legal 
status effectively and absolutely constructed and conferred by colonial 
authorities. instead, this case calls for an account of citizenship as a 
multidimensional legal status and political condition that is constructed 
and contested by agential political subjects.106 the nubian case is one in 
which, at least until the eve of Kenyan independence, African subjects 
sought to reinforce their privileged status as military middlemen as a 
“protective strategy,” while simultaneously exploiting, albeit with vari-
ous levels of success, their de facto control of Kibera with expeditious 
economic exploits made possible by the gaps in colonial systems of con-
trol.107 they were not passive recipients of their relatively privileged (in 
some senses) status as detribalized natives. Similarly, as independence 
approached, the younger generation sought to redefine their political 
status for the same reasons, in a different political climate.
 this case is an important one for enhancing our understanding of 
ways in which colonial encounters involved neither absolute subjecti-
fication nor fairly negotiated power relations but rather constructions 
of citizenship that were contributed to in different ways, at different 
times, in different measure, not only by colonial legal constructs but 
also by the political subjectivities of colonized, colonizer, and those 
caught in the middle.108
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s e v e n
Divided Loyalties and Contested Identities
Citizenship in Colonial Mauritius
r A m o L A  r A m t o H u L
C I t I z e n s H I P  H A s  l O n g  H e l d  C O n t e n t I O u s  m e A n I n g  I n  m A u r I t I u s , 
an African island nation in the indian ocean, because of its particu-
lar history. unlike most of Africa, mauritius was never a subsistence 
economy but instead was a plantation economy in which its inhabitants 
became part of the global capitalist economy from the start and were 
thus proletarianized at an early stage. most of the theoretical writings 
on citizenship in African contexts highlight the divisions between na-
tives and colonizers, settlers, or migrants, which led to a differentiated 
and unequal form of citizenship, often along racial and ethnic lines,1 
with land being a major factor that was weighed into claims for citizen-
ship. the mauritian experience makes an interesting case study because 
of the nature of its population and settlement dynamics. mauritius did 
not have an indigenous population and was populated entirely by mi-
grants during successive waves of colonization. the distinct experiences 
of the different population groups, which later formed communities 
strongly bound by ethnic and religious identities, largely affected the 
sense of belonging to the country and the meaning of citizenship for 
the people. the construction of citizenship is an integral component 
of state and nation building. However, the construction of community 
and identity in mauritius differed from the majority of African expe-
riences primarily because of the absence of a native population. yet in 
mauritius, as in most other African nations, colonial rule and settler 
colonialism emphasized race and later ethnicity as the primary source 
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of social divisions, leading to the construction of citizenship based on 
ethnic and civic identities. the early divisions were largely based on 
the form of migration to the island. the people who were brought 
as cheap foreign labor suffered from the worst conditions, whereas 
those who were the first settlers claimed to be the “authentic” citizens 
of the island. the implications of the divisions in the population on 
the foundation of citizenship and belonging are significant in a newly 
independent mauritius.
Citizenship in African Contexts
Citizenship is a highly contested concept that carries immense political 
value and contains within it the issues of political and social identity as 
well as rights and obligations. in his seminal work on citizenship and 
social class, thomas H. marshall expanded the conceptualization and 
theorization of citizenship in terms of rights granted to the individual 
by the state.2 According to marshall, citizenship entailed civil rights 
such as liberty of the person and freedom of thought or religion; po-
litical rights such as the right to participate in the exercise of political 
power; and social rights such as the right to economic welfare and se-
curity, to work, and to have a minimum standard of living. more recent 
approaches indicate that citizenship goes beyond the legal and political 
relationship between individual and the state, to involve participation in 
civil society.3 Citizenship has also been historically linked to the privi-
leges of membership of a particular kind of political community.4 yet 
the fact that citizenship presupposes membership in and belonging to 
a community also relates to identity; in this context, redie Bereketeab 
stresses the pertinence of two types of citizenship: ethnic citizenship and 
civic citizenship.5 ethnic citizenship aligns with group rights, whereas 
civic citizenship links with individual rights. the cornerstones of civic 
identity and citizenship are civic institutions, whereas ethnic citizenship 
rests on the basis of community of descent.6 these different forms of 
citizenship assume significant importance when analyzing citizenship 
in African contexts, including mauritius, which has a population com-
posed of different ethnic and religious groups.
 the focus on and theorization of citizenship in African contexts is 
relatively recent, as classic writings have centered mainly on experiences 
of Western societies. yet Western concepts of citizenship hold little 
relevance for African nations, largely because of the manner in which 
the process of state formation took place in colonial Africa.7 Citizens 
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were defined on the basis of their experiences as subjects in colonial 
states, which led to Africans being variously characterized as citizens, 
protected persons, or aliens in their homelands during the colonial 
period.8 However, the traditional African notion of citizenship states 
that “no matter where you are born, you are the son or daughter of 
the original soil or homeland of the parent through whom you trace 
your descent.”9 Here, the emphasis is on land and ethnic community 
as determining factors for claims for citizenship. Peter ekeh examined 
citizenship as an ideology of legitimation in Africa, recognizing the 
fact that colonial rule had bisected African attitudes toward rights and 
obligations.10 ekeh’s work highlighted the emergence of “two publics,” 
wherein the meaning of citizenship depended on whether it was con-
ceived in terms of the “primordial public” or the “civic public.” At the 
level of the primordial public, the individual saw his or her duties as 
moral obligations to benefit and sustain the primordial public of which 
he or she was a member. the citizenship structure of the civic public dif-
fered because there, emphasis was largely on economic value. in ekeh’s 
view, the differing stances toward the two publics could be explained by 
the ideologies of legitimation that were introduced by colonial rulers 
and later maintained by their African successors, giving credence to the 
myth that the civic public could never be impoverished whereas the 
primordial public needed care.11
 the more recent theoretical writings on citizenship in African con-
texts also emphasize the colonial influence in African societies, high-
lighting the divisions that colonization caused between natives and 
colonizers, settlers, and migrants.12 Colonies were largely founded on a 
basis of racial and ethnic distinctions that justified the gaps in standards 
of living and legal rights between rulers and the ruled. According to 
mahmood mamdani, the colonial state divided the population into two 
categories—races and ethnicities—and each existed in a different legal 
universe. races were viewed as a civilizing influence, albeit at different 
levels, while ethnicities were considered to mark people in great need 
of being civilized.13 races were governed by civil law, whereas ethnici-
ties were governed through customary laws. mamdani’s seminal work, 
Citizen and Subject, profoundly examines the magnitude of racial dis-
crimination perpetuated by colonialism in Africa and the implications 
for citizenship.14 mamdani shows how colonialism created two catego-
ries of people in the African public sphere in the colonies: citizens and 
subjects, or the native and the citizen. this led to a differentiated or 
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bifurcated form of citizenship that was also unequal. european settlers 
had full citizenship, which gave them the same rights as their relatives 
who lived in the colonial metropole or home country, whereas Afri-
can “natives” were subjects, or subordinate beings without full rights. 
the colonizers controlled the domain of the central state, which was 
largely urban based and governed by civil laws, whereas the natives or 
the colonized were governed by a local state or the native authorities, 
which enforced customary laws. direct rule was in the form of urban 
civil power, which granted rights-based privileges to citizens, whereas 
indirect rule signified a tribal authority that incorporated natives into 
a state-enforced customary order. Colonial law therefore made a fun-
damental distinction between the native and nonnative, or indigenous 
and nonindigenous, whereas postcolonial regimes failed to break the 
distinction between citizen and subject and retained a regime of dif-
ferentiation while deracializing the colonial state.15
 Peter geschiere has analyzed citizenship in African contexts in terms 
of “belonging.”16 He uses the concept of “autochthony,” which was an 
expression of the “local” representing the most authentic form of be-
longing.17 to facilitate ruling over the population of the colonies, co-
lonial regimes amplified the differences between natives and migrants, 
including racial differences and the belief that identity should be rooted 
in the soil.18 Autochthony was about “having been there first,” belong-
ing to the land and therefore being the “authentic” citizens. Access to 
land represented citizenship at a regional level in many African societ-
ies, and anticolonial nationalism was often driven by historical griev-
ances pertaining to the expropriation of land and the ensuing removal 
of legitimacy and livelihood from local populations.19 in countries such 
as South Africa and Zimbabwe that experienced “settler colonialism,” 
the public image of difference was racial, between the “white settlers,” 
viewed as “oppressive aliens” by the “local population” and undeserving 
of citizenship, and the “natives,” who regarded themselves as the “real” 
citizens.20 the land issue therefore had a major role to play in the con-
flicting relations between the locals and the settlers, especially because 
the settlers had taken over the best land.
 the above overview of the theoretical writings on citizenship in Af-
rican contexts highlights the pertinence of specific factors that shaped 
the way citizenship was experienced by different groups of people dur-
ing the colonial period. the native and nonnative or settler status led 
to a differentiated form of citizenship, which placed those classed as 
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natives in a lower position. A racist ideology was also employed to jus-
tify unequal rights and inferior treatment and therefore the denial of full 
citizenship to the indigenous population, or “natives.” given the high 
significance of land as representative of citizenship in many African 
societies, access to land or the denial of access to land as well as expro-
priation of land by settlers and ancestral claims to the land were major 
sources of contestation with regard to citizenship in the former African 
colonies. moreover, the distinct experiences of different communities 
shaped the strength of loyalty toward the state on the one hand and to-
ward the community on the other. the relevance of these factors toward 
the construction and experience of citizenship in mauritius is analyzed 
in the next sections.
Hierarchies of Citizenship in Colonial mauritius
mauritius is a volcanic island of about 720 square miles, in the south-
west quadrant of the indian ocean. the island was uninhabited prior to 
its discovery by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century.21 mauritius was 
first colonized by the dutch, who left in 1710, after which the french 
claimed the island in 1715, naming it ile de france.22 in 1722, the french 
east india Company brought colonists from the neighboring island of 
Bourbon (now known as réunion), and settlers were given tracts of 
land and slaves.23 Society in ile de france was highly stratified, with 
extremes of wealth and poverty and the french elite largely dependent 
on slave labor. in the absence of a native population, the french settlers 
became the first landowners, permanent settlers, and citizens on the 
island. A combination of factors including landownership, trade, and 
the exploitation of slave labor enabled the french settlers to accumulate 
substantial wealth.
 the British captured ile de france in 1810 in the napoleonic Wars 
and named the island mauritius, which is the original name given by 
the dutch after the dutch stadholder maurits van nassau.24 under the 
capitulation agreement, the British undertook to preserve all existing 
rights and institutions.25 the British held administrative rule of the 
country but did not settle in mauritius. on this issue, Hugh tinker 
states, “Although the union Jack waved over mauritius for 160 years, 
the island never effectively became British . . . mauritius never ceased 
to be the Ile de France.”26
 the descendants of the french settlers came to be known as franco-
mauritians. they owned and controlled most of the resources on the 
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island and became the economic and political elite of the country, in-
fluencing policy making with the British governors. following franco-
mauritian demands for political representation, the Constitution of 
1885 was instituted and limited elections to the legislative council were 
introduced by the governor in 1886. the 1885 constitution provided 
political rights to franco-mauritians and to a small segment of urban 
Coloured or light-skinned Creole elite.27 Political participation was 
determined by high property and educational qualifications; access to 
land thus was a key factor that determined political citizenship. Be-
cause the franco-mauritians were the first permanent settlers and were 
given access to land and eventually some political rights, this set the 
stage for them to become the first “citizens” of mauritius under Brit-
ish colonial rule, with economic, civic, and political rights, although 
they were still British subjects. franco-mauritians believed that there 
could be no claim of rights and entitlements prior to the french settle-
ment because of the absence of natives and that their ancestors had 
spearheaded the development of the island, with the assistance of their 
slaves.28 they were essentially making an argument for rights on the 
basis of autochthony as the first permanent inhabitants on the island, 
despite the fact that they were also descendants of migrants.29 thus, ac-
cording to tinker, the dominant economic and cultural position of the 
franco-mauritians in society was strengthened such that they claimed 
to be the “true” mauritians.30 in their efforts to cast themselves as the 
true “natives” of mauritius, franco-mauritians also made use of “lin-
guistic ideology,” whereby french was portrayed as the true language 
of mauritius.31 french culture and language were presented as the true 
mauritian nationalism because they integrated and “civilized” the other 
ethnic groups, with their cultural differences.32 today many of the is-
land’s daily newspapers are still in french, notwithstanding that the 
most commonly spoken language is the local Kreole.
 the “Coloureds,” also known as the free people of color, gens de cou-
leur, or Creoles, are members of an ethnic category that emerged during 
french colonial rule.33 most free people of color were born on the island, 
and they emerged as a category of citizens with different status, rights, 
and entitlements than those of the franco-mauritians. Although they 
were perceived to be of an inferior standing compared to the franco-
mauritians, they nonetheless had access to many privileges that the 
other population groups were denied, including education and the right 
to acquire property, especially land. Access to education enabled them 
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to move into white-collar professions. from the beginning of British 
rule, the free Coloured population grew, and their social status and civil 
rights were enhanced after 1826, when they pressed for the removal of 
racial discrimination toward them.34 the ability and right to acquire 
property proved to be crucial to the Coloured population’s attempts to 
carve out a niche for themselves in colonial society.35 they were also the 
first nonwhite population group to obtain political rights in the country 
in 1885.
 Within the British empire, the franco-mauritian planters found a 
vast market for sugar, leading to an expansion in the cultivation of sugar-
cane and an increased demand for cheap labor. this demand was quelled 
through the importation of cheap, exploitable servile labor—African 
slaves and, later, indian indentured laborers. A hierarchy of citizenship 
developed, in which African slaves and indian indentured laborers were 
dominated and exploited by the franco-mauritian planters. African 
slaves were governed by a different set of laws, which largely drew from 
their status as cheap labor.36 Slavery was abolished in 1835, but former 
slaves were subject to a six-year apprentice system that bound them to 
the plantations.37 the apprenticeship system was designed to prepare 
the former slaves to manage their new roles and responsibilities as free 
individuals. However, despite the new “freedom” obtained, vagrancy 
laws were established to compel apprentices to remain on estates, and 
they were beaten by order of the courts for infractions of the law.38 the 
apprentice system was highly exploitative and became notorious, lead-
ing to its abolition by law in march 1839. While the British government 
offered franco-mauritian planters a generous financial compensation 
for the loss of their slaves, the former apprentices were not given any 
compensation to assist their transition toward life as free inhabitants of 
the colony.39 many became dejected and destitute, living a life of abject 
poverty.
 following the abolition of slavery, cheap labor for the cane fields 
was sourced from india in the form of indentured labor. the indians 
brought a radical and permanent change in the ethnic composition of 
the population of the island, making up two-thirds of the population of 
the island by 1871.40 the same prejudices of white colonial society toward 
African slaves and apprentices were transferred to the indians.41 Apart 
from the fact that indian laborers were subject to racial discrimination, 
42they faced extremely harsh working conditions,43 with minimal wages 
that were subjected to numerous deductions by the planters,44 such that 
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the indentured labor system was described as a “new system of slavery.”45 
under the terms of indenture, immigrants signed an initial contract of a 
mandatory five years of indenture with an additional five years of work 
or reindenture, at the end of which, immigrants who chose to remain 
in the colony as “old immigrants” became legal residents of the colony 
of mauritius.46 However, indians suffered from additional discrimina-
tion from which non-indians were exempt. Strict vagrancy laws that 
severely limited the geographic and occupational mobility of “old im-
migrants” were passed to enable the planters to retain indian workers on 
the estates even though they were technically free to earn their living as 
they chose. thus, as tinker states, for one hundred years (1840–1940), 
indians remained “[s]trangers in mauritius.”47 upward social mobility 
of the indian community began in the 1880s when some indians who 
had saved capital were able to acquire property, leading to a new class of 
landowners and economic power and set the stage for indo-mauritian 
demands for political rights.48 Access to land was therefore a major fac-
tor that led to the eventual emancipation of the indian population in 
mauritius and their claim for equal citizenship.
 Chinese migrants were initially brought to mauritius as indentured 
workers, but in much smaller numbers, and they were also an exploited 
group.49 they later became merchants and traders or shopkeepers after 
their period of indenture.50 the experience of the Chinese immigrants 
has been less extensively documented than that of the other groups, yet 
they also experienced discrimination from the colonial authority and 
franco-mauritians. the emancipation of the Chinese immigrant com-
munity was hampered by an 1842 law that prevented foreigners from 
acquiring and inheriting property on the island. Whereas indians had 
been classified as British subjects, Chinese were considered as aliens 
and were therefore subjected to restrictions on land- and property own-
ership, unless they applied for and were granted naturalization.51 As 
such, Chinese traders were not able to invest their profits in property. 
While the Chinese community did not endure the extreme forms of 
exploitation that indian indentured laborers and African slaves had ex-
perienced, they did not have the rights that the franco-mauritians and 
Coloureds were entitled to and received a differential treatment largely 
due to their status as migrant workers and aliens at that time.
 While these different groups of migrants were not “subjects” in 
exactly the same terms as described by mamdani, since neither group 
was native to the island, they nevertheless did not have the same rights 
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and entitlements as the franco-mauritians and Coloureds, and most 
significantly, the law denied them access to land.52 this law grievously 
affected all immigrants living in mauritius because it prevented them 
from acquiring land and moving up the social ladder and, in the case of 
indians, reinforced their dependency on the franco-mauritian planters. 
Access to land was also rendered difficult for the former slaves because 
the cost of land was deliberately raised when they expressed interest in 
purchasing land.53 moreover, these groups experienced extreme forms 
of exploitation including racist discrimination on the sugar plantations. 
Attempts were made to wipe out their ancestral cultures and convert 
them to Catholicism. this was successful with the descendants of the 
African slaves and with the Chinese to some extent, but the indians 
resisted it and preserved their ancestral culture and languages.
 Colonization and the politics under colonial rule largely shaped the 
formation of communities, the rights of the different groups, and their 
experiences as permanent inhabitants and British subjects on the island 
of mauritius. the absence of an indigenous population implied that 
the native/nonnative contestation for citizenship was not relevant, as 
the population was entirely composed of the descendants of migrants 
who came to the island for specific and distinct purposes. instead, the 
purpose of migration was what determined the rights, status, and en-
titlements of the different groups of migrants and their descendants 
on the island. those who came as settlers, namely, the french, became 
the first “citizens” of the island, because they had access to property, 
education, and civil and political rights. thus, in the absence of an 
indigenous population, the franco-mauritian elites claimed that they 
were the most “deserving” citizens and closest to being natives of the 
island. As the country moved toward independence, the hierarchies 
of inclusion and exclusion became increasingly unstable, especially as 
the deprived groups began to protest against exploitation and claimed 
equal rights. to preserve their privileged economic, cultural, and politi-
cal position, the franco-mauritian elites worked hard to exclude the 
other groups from political rights and for their group to retain the 
claim of being the “authentic” mauritian population that legitimately 
deserved to lead the country.
decolonization and Citizenship
With no native population and the formation of distinct communities 
based on ethnicity and community, anticolonialism in mauritius was not 
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as clear-cut as in most other colonies in Africa, Asia, and the West 
indies. While the British represented political rule imposed by the 
colonial power, economic and cultural domination was imposed by 
franco-mauritians, who, together with the elite Coloureds, dominated 
the politics of the country. Life was extremely harsh for non-franco-
mauritians, and little was done to improve their situation.54 the franco-
mauritians had the support of the British and even the governor of 
the colony of mauritius from 1938 to 1942, Sir Bede Clifford, who con-
sidered them to be the natives of mauritius. in his writings, he stated, 
“[t]here could be no question of introducing into mauritius a franchise 
that would take the rule of the colony abruptly out of the hands of the 
whites, who were the indigenous population and were responsible for its 
development, in order to transfer control over to the indian newcomers, 
whose chief claim was their numbers and their unskilled labour.”55
 given the tacit collaboration between franco-mauritians and the 
British, decolonization was the primary means for the exploited groups 
to gain the rights and entitlements they had thus far been denied, in-
cluding political, economic, and social rights. on the one hand, those 
who enjoyed rights and entitlements as “citizens” did not want to relin-
quish their existing privileges; on the other hand, those who were on an 
inferior standing sought equal rights and the ability to participate in the 
political and economic management of the country. to preserve their 
dominant position, the franco-mauritians reinforced local ethnic and 
communal identities, although the short-term presence of indian politi-
cal leaders such as mahatma gandhi and his envoy, manilall doctor, also 
contributed to the rise in the political consciousness of indo-mauritians 
and to some extent reinforced their identity as an exploited ethnic group 
at that time. the growing emphasis on ethnic and communal identity 
fragmented the political process of decolonization and undermined the 
construction of a sense of national identity and belonging to the new 
independent mauritian nation. the franco-mauritians, along with the 
elite Coloureds, sought ethnic citizenship, which entailed group rights, 
whereas the indo-mauritians, led by the Hindus, sought civic citizen-
ship with individual rights. this rendered the meaning of citizenship 
problematic to the population of mauritius. Seewoosagar ramgoolam, 
who became the first prime minister of mauritius, aptly described this 
situation: “mauritius did not struggle for its independence from the 
British Colonial government with a united voice and as one people[,] 
thanks . . . to the franco-mauritian population which long controlled 
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power under the Colonial system and so was afraid of losing its vested 
interests. . . . they dreaded the approach of expropriation of their prop-
erty, of loss of power and prestige, of an inevitable decline in their social 
and economic importance.”56
 the upper-class Coloureds were the first to challenge the dominance 
of the franco-mauritians and claim political rights. this led to their 
representation in the legislative council in 1907, while limited politi-
cal representation was extended to Hindus in 1921 and to muslims in 
1940.57 Although the franchise qualifications did not specify ethnicity as 
a criterion for inclusion, yet its correspondence with the specified class-
based qualifications established the political significance of ethnicity. 
this helped reinforce the salience of ethnicity as a cost-effective stra-
tegic resource in mauritian politics.58 Calls for reform to enable a more 
balanced representation of the different segments of the mauritian 
population in the legislative council caused franco-mauritians to fear 
the loss of their political and economic privileges to indo-mauritians, 
especially Hindus, because of their demographic numerical superior-
ity. this fear of change also marked the beginning of communalism 
in mauritian politics.59 Communalism is the mauritian equivalent of 
ethnic politics and has been described as the “scourge of contemporary 
mauritius.”60 it highlights the preponderance of ethnic and religious 
communities in the public sphere and society.61 Communalism also 
denotes the affiliation and loyalty of mauritians first to their alleged 
community and then to the nation.
 the political uprising of the indo-mauritians began in the early 
twentieth century, largely sparked by the severe wage crises in the 1930s.62 
during this period, political and workers’ organizations emerged, with 
the aim of organizing the working class—the Creoles and indo-mauri-
tians—to articulate their economic and political rights more effectively. 
one of the most prominent was the mauritius Labour Party (mLP), 
founded in 1936 by maurice Curé, a member of the elite Creoles. the 
mLP, which also had indo-mauritians in key positions, fought for 
political reforms, wider representation in the council of government, 
and better labor laws. Constitutional reform was deemed essential for 
any change to happen, and following agitations from the working class 
for political citizenship and representation in the legislative council, a 
new constitution was adopted in 1948. the new constitution imple-
mented the franchise qualification of basic literacy favored by the indo-
mauritian leaders but also introduced female suffrage, as suggested by 
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the franco-mauritians, who had proposed the introduction of female 
suffrage subject to educational and property qualifications as a means 
to widen the franchise.63 this proposal was rejected by the mLP and 
mainly Hindu political leaders who had campaigned for male adult suf-
frage. their main point of contention was that female suffrage subject 
to qualifications would favor the privileged franco-mauritian and Co-
loured women, whereas the majority of indian and Creole women were 
illiterate and would not qualify for the franchise.64
 the franco-mauritians were disappointed with the new constitu-
tion because the British had left out most of their suggestions.65 Con-
stitutional reform led to a radical widening of the franchise, and many 
indo-mauritians (muslims and Hindus) were able to vote for the first 
time in the 1948 election. this led to the transfer of political power from 
franco-mauritians to Hindus and signalled the end of franco-mauritian 
hegemony. this situation, Patrick eisenlohr has argued, threatened the 
franco-mauritian claim to be the original and most authentic mauri-
tians; they had used the french language and the fact that most mau-
ritians spoke patois créole or Kreole, which was “corrupt” french, as the 
main justification for a central position in a mauritian nation.66 in an 
attempt to maintain their privileged social and economic position and 
delay the political rising of the working classes, the franco-mauritians 
began to employ a divisive strategy based on community, religion, and 
ethnicity, a strategy that eventually undermined the formation of a sense 
of national identity and belonging in an independent mauritius.
 Catherine Boudet uses the concept of mythomoteurs to examine the 
strategies employed by franco-mauritians during the decolonization 
process and the impacts on the formation of a mauritian identity.67 
mythomoteurs are constitutive myths that give an ethnic group its 
sense of purpose, and they often involve deliberate efforts to mobilize 
latent solidarities behind a political programme.68 According to Boudet, 
franco-mauritians introduced two mythomoteurs—“foundation” and 
“Hindu peril.” the “foundation” argument legitimized the accession of 
citizenship by ethnic groups based on their contribution to the devel-
opment of land and therefore clearly favored franco-mauritians, who 
were the biggest landowners in the country. However, this argument 
did not hold for long, as the other groups also claimed to have con-
tributed to development. Boudet contends that the “Hindu peril” argu-
ment was one of the most powerful mythomoteurs put forward by the 
franco-mauritians. it led to the forging of political alliances between 
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franco-mauritians and other minority ethnic groups against the Hin-
dus. Whether the Hindu peril was indeed a myth or not is debatable. 
on the one hand, minority communities, led by the franco-mauritians 
and Coloureds, genuinely feared for their future in an independent 
mauritius governed by a numerically superior Hindu population.69 
the difficult economic and social conditions prevailing in the country 
at that time, combined with large-scale illiteracy among the Hindus, 
largely contributed to this fear, especially that of a loss of economic and 
political privileges to the previously disadvantaged groups—mainly the 
Hindus. yet, on the other hand, the “peril” never happened.
 the transfer of political power to the Hindus had also made Creoles 
and other minority groups fear for their representation.70 to incite 
further division, the franco-mauritian-owned newspaper Le Cernéen 
reported that eleven indo-mauritians, seven Coloureds, one franco-
mauritian, and not a single muslim had been elected in the 1948 elec-
tion.71 following this election, franco-mauritians sought political allies 
on an ethnic basis, which they found in the Coloureds and Creoles, who 
were all roman Catholic, as well as among the Chinese and muslim 
minority groups. ethnic considerations began to dominate mauritian 
politics as the basis of political divisions shifted from class to commu-
nity and the leadership of the mLP moved into the hands of Hindus. 
this prompted the three key minority groups—franco-mauritians, 
Creoles, and muslims—to form a loose political alliance known as the 
ralliement mauricien in 1952 to combat the Hindus.72 in 1955, it was 
turned into an organized political party known as the Parti mauricien, 
focused on representing the interests of minority communities in the 
constitutional negotiations during the decolonization process. the ral-
liement mauricien, mainly financed by franco-mauritian planters, was 
led by Jules Koenig, a franco-mauritian lawyer. it opposed the mLP 
program, universal suffrage, and the shift of power from the colonial 
government to local officials.73 from 1955, the Parti mauricien began its 
campaign for proportional representation of the different communities 
in parliament while highlighting the dangers of “Hindu hegemony.”74 
Jules Koenig stated, “if we want . . . a common citizenship, we must 
resort to what has been described. . . . We must resort to a form of 
government of all the people, by all the people, and for all the people by 
Proportional representation.”75
 the main emphasis was on ethnic citizenship as opposed to civic 
citizenship. through articles written by franco-mauritian journalist 
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noel marrier d’unienville, also known as n.m.u., the newspaper Le 
Cernéen attacked Hindus, the mLP, and its leader, Seewoosagar 
ramgoolam, stressing the notion of “Hindu peril” and annexation 
of mauritius to india to instill fear among non-Hindus and oppose 
universal suffrage.76
 Whereas the trend in most African colonies was of the local popula-
tion fighting for independence from the colonial power, in the mauritian 
case, the divisions in the population and a weak sense of national iden-
tity led to bitter contestation over decolonization and independence. 
Citizenship in an independent mauritius was viewed as a route toward 
emancipation and liberation for some, but the divisive strategy initi-
ated by the franco-mauritians to protect and preserve their interests 
led to the division of the working-class Hindus, muslims, and Creoles. 
it also led to a stronger sense of belonging to one’s community and 
fractured the formation of a sense of nationhood and national identity. 
the Hindu community was divided along linguistic and caste lines, 
and divisions between Hindus and muslims deepened following the 
partition of india. in 1940, muslims obtained limited representation in 
the legislative council, and after the 1952 census, muslims and Chinese 
were classified as distinct and separate communities. during the process 
of decolonization, from 1948 to 1968, the Colonial office gave further 
prominence to communalism. Here one can draw a parallel with ekeh’s 
“two publics” because loyalties in mauritius became stronger toward the 
community, and this affected the meaning of citizenship as indepen-
dence approached. the divide-and-rule strategy was not a novel one, as 
it had been adopted by colonial powers in other colonies in Africa and 
also india. yet in mauritius, rather than the colonial authority, franco-
mauritians adopted this strategy to preserve their privileged position 
and protect their interests.
 in 1955, a constitutional conference was held in London, where the 
mLP pleaded for universal suffrage and responsible government.77 this 
increased the minority communities’ fear of Hindu domination. the 
Parti mauricien opposed universal adult suffrage and responsible gov-
ernment, arguing that the demands of mLP for universal adult suffrage 
and a reduction in the number of nominated members in the legislative 
council would lead to Hindu hegemony.78 Jules Koenig believed that 
proportional representation would ensure a “common citizenship” for 
all mauritians.79 At the London conference, British authorities agreed 
to introduce adult suffrage and to consider minority interests for the 
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mode of voting, while voting would be along party lines to avoid com-
munalism. An electoral commission was set up to work on the most 
adequate electoral system to ensure that each ethnic group had ad-
equate opportunity to secure representation in the legislative council 
and that each constituency had reasonable geographical boundaries.80 
this process led to the setting up of an electoral system based on forty 
single-member constituencies and up to twelve nominated members. it 
was believed that with the new electoral system, the franco-mauritians 
and Chinese would rely on the nominated seats to be present in parlia-
ment, whereas the other communities would be adequately represented 
and parties would be encouraged to present muslim candidates where 
there were large concentrations of muslims.81 the constitution was 
changed in 1958, leading to the proclamation of universal adult suffrage, 
and the next election was scheduled for march 1959. the 1959 election 
witnessed a massive victory of the mLP under Hindu leadership, but 
following this election, communalism became the dominant force in 
national politics, and communal parties were formed. the independent 
forward Block (ifB) emerged under the leadership of Sookdeo Bis-
soondoyal to represent the interests of the poorer low-caste Hindus, 
whereas the mLP was dominated by the professional, middle-class, and 
high-caste Hindus. the Comité d’Action musulman (CAm) was set 
up by razack mohamed to represent the interests of the muslims. A 
significant issue here is that universal adult suffrage was approved only 
when minority communities were guaranteed some form of representa-
tion in parliament. thus, franco-mauritians and their allies were partly 
successful in lobbying for the protection of their interests and some 
form of ethnic citizenship, although the gradual loss of their political 
power was imminent.
 Another constitutional conference was held in London in 1961, to 
proceed to the next step in the decolonization process. By that time, 
seventeen former African colonies had become independent from Brit-
ain, and franco-mauritians panicked because it was evident that mau-
ritius would follow suit.82 the Parti mauricien focused its campaign on 
the opposition of independence and dividing the island into numerous 
minority groups that it claimed to represent and to be prepared to defend 
against the threat of a Hindu majority.83 gaëtan duval, a charismatic 
Creole lawyer who later became leader of the Parti mauricien, urged 
Creoles to vote for him and his party to save mauritius from Hindu 
domination. Attempts were also made to divide Hindus along linguistic 
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lines (especially the tamil-, telugu-, and Hindi-speaking Hindus) and to 
weaken CAm by encouraging one of the CAm leaders to set up a sepa-
rate muslim political party called the muslim united Party.84 the Chi-
nese community, which had previously stayed away from politics, allied 
itself with the Parti mauricien. According to ramgoolam, the Catholic 
Church was also employed as an ideological apparatus to spread the mes-
sage of the Parti mauricien, especially anti-Hindu sentiments.85 thus, 
the Parti mauricien was able to garner the support of the Coloureds, 
Chinese, Creoles, Christian indians, and tamil indians. Christian unity 
was emphasized together with tamil and muslim separatism and caste 
divisions among Hindus. the elite and educated Coloureds who held 
high positions in the civil service feared the loss of their jobs to Hin-
dus. With the financial support of franco-mauritian planters, the Parti 
mauricien was able to entice members of other political parties to join 
and support its cause. under the leadership of Jules Koenig, it proposed 
the integration of mauritius into the united Kingdom. Koenig asked 
for separate electoral registers and stressed Hindu domination and the 
victimization of minority communities under Hindu political leader-
ship in an independent mauritius. However, the British were in favor of 
constitutional advance leading to independence, despite the opposition 
of the Parti mauricien.
 the last constitutional conference paving the way for mauritius to 
achieve independence took place in 1965. Political tension unfortunately 
led to ethnic tension, resulting in clashes between Creoles and Hindus 
in may 1965 and a few deaths.86 the constitution was amended in 1966, 
and a new electoral system was designed to ensure proper and adequate 
representation of minority communities in the legislative assembly.87 in 
the mid-1960s, the mauritian population became subdivided into the 
categories of general population, Sino-mauritian (Chinese), Hindu, 
and muslim. franco-mauritians were incorporated into the general 
population category along with the Coloureds, Creoles, and mixed-
race groups. the mLP, ifB, and CAm formed an alliance called the 
independence Party, and they campaigned in favor of independence, 
whereas the Parti mauricien proposed the association of mauritius with 
Britain, arguing that independence would isolate mauritius and lead 
to mass unemployment, poverty, starvation, and famine. on August 7, 
1967, a general election bearing close resemblance to a referendum was 
held to decide the independence of mauritius. the results of these elec-
tions showed that 44 percent of the mauritian population had voted for 
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the Parti mauricien, which opposed independence.88 following these 
elections, a motion was tabled by the premier of mauritius, Seewoo-
sagar ramgoolam, requesting the secretary of state for the colonies to 
accede to the desire of the mauritian population for independence; the 
date was set for march 12, 1968. A few weeks preceding the accession 
of independence, communal riots between the Creoles and muslims 
broke out in Port Louis, causing about a dozen deaths. While little is 
known on who had orchestrated ethnic tensions in the country, these 
disturbances nonetheless highlight the success of the franco-mauritian 
strategy in instilling fear and amplifying existing divisions in the popu-
lation along ethnic and religious lines. Apart from the fear of Hindu 
hegemony, there was also worry that independence was not economically 
sustainable for mauritius. many middle-class franco-mauritians and 
Coloureds emigrated to Australia, South Africa, or europe because they 
feared the onset of Hindu hegemony and the loss of political power and 
were concerned about job prospects in an independent mauritius.89 thus, 
independence did not lead to any form of political or national unity in 
mauritius, and mauritians remained deeply divided on this issue. the 
forging of a spirit of nationalism and unity was fractured, causing a weak 
sense of national identity in the new independent mauritius.
this chapter traces the construction of citizenship in mauritius, argu-
ing that the purpose of migration to the island was a major factor that 
determined the status and rights of the inhabitants under colonial rule. 
in the absence of a native population, boundaries of inclusion and ex-
clusion were in a flux, and the french settlers considered themselves as 
the “natives” of the island. those with an inferior standing had come or 
were brought to the island as migrant workers, whereas those who had 
privileges as “citizens” were the french settlers and later the Coloureds. 
the process of decolonization in mauritius highlights the complexities 
of nation building and citizenship in the island, as boundaries of in-
clusion and exclusion weakened further. franco-mauritians fought to 
preserve their political, economic, and cultural privileges, employing a 
racist ideology to maintain the status quo and to deny the other groups 
civic and political rights and access to landownership. for the former 
disadvantaged groups (of which Hindus were the most numerous), in-
dependence meant opening up political, economic, and educational op-
portunities that had previously been denied to them. for them, therefore, 
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independence carried the promise of fuller citizenship, whereas for 
franco-mauritian and Coloured elites, it carried the possibility of a more 
diluted form of citizenship that offered them fewer privileges and carried 
the risk of erosion of existing ones. Koenig described their situation as 
a bourgeoisie “in peril” fighting to survive.90 yet the “survival” strategies 
adopted by the elites had significant effects on nation building and citi-
zenship in an independent mauritius. the franco-mauritian elites drew 
on the support of other minority groups and tried to block independence 
by instilling a divisive policy that fuelled communal sentiments and divi-
sions in the population. this led to stronger allegiances to the specific 
ethnic and communal groups and a rather weak sense of belonging to the 
country and, hence, fractured citizenship. Consequently, mauritius never 
developed a truly national spirit or a national independence movement.91 
following independence, the franco-mauritians withdrew from active 
politics but maintained their elite economic position in the country, 
given the vast resources they still owned and controlled.92 the damage 
done by the communal political campaigns during decolonization still 
persists today, as communal loyalties remain very strong, especially with 
regard to representation in positions of political and economic power. 
the electoral system that was instituted at the end of decolonization is 
still operational at present and has been criticized for misrepresenting 
the opposition, causing the underrepresentation of women and divid-
ing the mauritian nation. Successive governments, since the 1990s, have 
unsuccessfully attempted to introduce electoral reform, largely because 
of communal lobbies and opposition from minority communities be-
cause of their concern over parliamentary representation. While civic 
citizenship is formally acknowledged, ethnic citizenship remains strong, 
and therefore a true mauritian nation is still under construction. yet 
despite the contested claims over identity, citizenship, and belonging 
during decolonization, independent mauritius has maintained a stable 
and strong democracy and has been a model for peace, stability, and eco-
nomic development in the African region. the mauritian case therefore 
highlights successful management of diversity in a plural society, and 
efforts are being made to incorporate the different identities into  a wider 
form of national identity.
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thinking of nigerians, directing their thoughts on political power, 
political participation, resource allocation, and the distribution of in-
dividual benefits. Among political elites, issues that affect the whole 
nation are often considered through the lens of group rights. As Bonnie 
iwuoha, media adviser to the Abia State governor, wrote in 2011, it is 
common with nigerians “to adopt positions that suit their ethnic, state 
and regional interests while looking at issues of national unity, integra-
tion, religion and development.”1
 ethnic group identity is projected over national identity and “ethnic 
group nationality” over nigerian nationality in the determination of 
the citizenship of the individual. the contradiction in nigeria’s ethnic 
group rights thought is the insistence of a given ethnic group on its cul-
tural and political autonomy within its autochthonous territory, as well 
as free access to the resources of the autochthonous territory of another 
ethnic group. this is most exemplified by the demand of the predomi-
nantly muslim northern nigeria for political and cultural autonomy 
and also a larger share of the oil revenues derived from the niger delta 
in the southern part of nigeria.2
 the main objects of group rights thought in nigeria are revenue 
allocation (that is, allocation of revenues derived from crude oil pro-
duction in the niger delta); the distribution of government political 
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offices to regions, states, and local communities; and the dispensation 
of government benefits.3 the assumption is made that any benefit or 
advantage won in the name of the group—elective or appointive office, 
or infrastructure such as an educational institution or industrial estab-
lishment, is for the whole group, which, of course, is also assumed to be 
homogenous in composition and bound by an undivided interest. But 
Vernon Van dyke, a foremost advocate of ethnic group rights, candidly 
admits that some group rights ultimately benefit individual members of 
the group and not the whole group.4
 the narrative of nigeria’s political history is the groundswell of the 
argument, which derives from an essentialist view of the group, for eth-
nic group rights.5 evidence from nigeria suggests that scholars have 
been misled by the pronouncements of politicians in that they have paid 
little attention to the ways in which individual lives no longer follow a 
pattern of ethnic-based exclusivity. far from ethnic group rights being 
the basis of a progressive citizenship, a progressive citizenship would, 
i argue, be one based on individual rights. rabid particularistic group 
claims have hindered the evolution of an integrated political commu-
nity by inhibiting negotiation, compromise, and coalition building for 
peaceful coexistence among the diverse social and cultural groups in 
nigeria. A group could be loyal to its ethnic identity yet universalis-
tic by including a stake for members of other groups upon which it is 
making a demand for special treatment. no universal citizenship, no 
development! in addition, the twin assumption of homogeneity within 
a group and common interests or equal access to group benefits among 
all presumed members of the group is false. through the case study 
of nigeria, i show that group rights practice violates not only indi-
vidual rights but also group rights—the rights of minor groups within a 
group—if, in practice, the rights of its major group command overrid-
ing attention. 
the roots of divided Citizenship
group rights, Claude Ake argues, are intrinsic to African thinking 
about rights. that Africans think and act as groups, not as individuals, 
then, predates their colonial domination.6 Contrary to Basil david-
son’s suggestion of the colonial origin of group rights, colonial rule did 
not originate the group rights thought of Africans but strengthened 
it by encouraging ethnic federations as an integral part of administra-
tive policy, known as indirect rule.7 indeed, the British colonial power 
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relied on precolonial cultural patterns of association to divide Africa 
into administrative areas.8 Consequently, African states emerged from 
colonialism with the “communalist argument, that is, the argument that 
individual rights are irrelevant in a community.”9
 the observed orientation of nigerians has been used as evidence in 
support of the entrenchment of “indigene-ship” or the particularistic 
principle of citizenship. this includes the practice of immigrants taking 
their dead for burial or building a house or marking festive occasions in 
the country home of their ethno-regional group. Based on this, Bolaji 
Akinyemi, a political scientist and nigeria’s former external affairs min-
ister, claims that “indigene-ship” is rooted in nigeria or Africa. in other 
words, preference for an indigene/nonindigene dichotomy is natural for 
nigerians given the fact that nonindigenes look elsewhere rather than 
their place of abode as home. thus, the behavior of nigerians as de-
scribed above is sufficient proof of their preference for the discrimination 
between indigenes and nonindigenes in the administration of rights.10
 But there are problems with this analysis. first, what is presented as 
the behavior of nigerians is a partial representation of evidence to the 
extent that it generalizes the behavior of a part of the group of nige-
rians regarded as nonindigenes. the distinction that must be made is 
between (old) nonindigenes who are several generations removed from 
the place of what indigenes still regard as their homeland and (new or 
first-generation) nonindigenes with recent migratory history in other 
locations in nigeria. examples of the old nonindigenes are Hausas and 
fulanis in the Jos area, Zango-Kataf, and other parts of northern nige-
ria and modakeke yorubas in ile-ife. What is claimed as observed be-
havior of nigerians is not true of this group. it is partially true of (new) 
first-generation—of very recent migratory history—nonindigenes (this 
will be returned to later). the solution suggested by Akinyemi is actu-
ally a misunderstanding of even the extent to which it is true of the new 
nonindigenes.
 Both the understanding of behavior and the solution proffered 
amount to blaming the victim. the behavior of some new nonindi-
genes ought to be understood as defensive behavior. this is the kind of 
behavior that meets the various challenges occasioned by the negative 
attitude of the state government and so-called indigenes toward them. 
the so-called nonindigenes’ behavior is a response to their branding as 
settlers or temporary residents and subsequent denial of integration by 
indigenes and the local political community.
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 Some aspects of this behavior were a product of immediate past ex-
perience. for example, the igbo of eastern nigeria lost lots of landed 
property in different parts of nigeria especially Port Harcourt to the 
nigerian civil war of 1967–70. Hence, in the few decades that followed 
the war, young igbos gave priority to owning a landed property in their 
village in igbo heartland in the eastern part of nigeria. However, the 
observed trend is a resumption of acquisition of property even by new 
igbo nonindigenes in their place of abode, that is, non-igbo ethnic 
territory. indeed, in their will, new nonindigenes have expressed their 
preference to be buried in their place of abode.11 the generalization 
of this defensive behavior also loses sight of the observed tendency 
of even some new nonindigenes of wanting to stay in their abode. As 
mahmood mamdani has written, the new tendency is for those dubbed 
nonindigenes to stay and fight it out rather than head for “home” when 
there is a clash between them and indigenes.12
 Local political communities’ ethnic group–based discriminatory 
practices have been explained as compensations for lost ground or past 
losses.13 this is a recast of the historical “disadvantage due to exclusion” 
argument for group rights.
 thus, pro–ethnic group rights scholars have tended to echo the 
continued predominance of group rights demands, exclusive claims in 
which groups within the same African state continue to discriminate 
against each other.14 effectively, the citizenship discourse in twenty-
first-century Africa is confined to “citizenship-as-legal-status, that 
is, as full membership in a particular political community instead of 
citizenship-as-desirable-activity, where the extent and quality of one’s 
citizenship [are] a function of one’s participation in that community.”15
 new attitudes toward ethnic identification, which challenge fixed 
ethnic boundaries that need to be taken into account in theorizing group 
rights, are emerging. So-called nonindigenes are adopting the ethnic/
group identity of their place of domicile and are using it to demand state 
benefits and privileges. But the organization and administration of vari-
ous administrative areas on the basis of a fixed ethnic identity impede 
the evolution of an inclusive local and national political community in 
Africa. Scholars, for their part, have failed to perceive the impediment 
that the ethnic language of rights poses to political accountability in an 
ethnically diverse political community. in their veneration of the ethnic 
language of rights, they continue to propagate the view that an ethni-
cally homogenous polity best guarantees the individual’s well-being.
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 the premise of the extant scholarship on political community in Af-
rica ignores the rights of new minorities in the midst of the “indigenous 
group.” However, migration and cultural diversity are facts of life. it 
is their mismanagement that produces such consequences as genocide, 
population displacement with the attendant humanitarian crisis, and 
further underdevelopment, since violent ethnic conflicts cost human 
and material resources.
 there are two basic reasons why pro–ethnic autonomy scholars can-
not recognize the contradictions of the ethnic or particularistic language 
of rights. the first reason is the assumption of an unyielding preference 
of Africans for the primordial public as the administrative framework. 
this assumption finds the greatest rationalization in Peter ekeh’s “theory 
of two publics in Africa,” in which he regards the primordial public as 
the bastion of moral purity.16 Although the literature recognizes that the 
preference for the ethnic principle that underpins the preference for the 
primordial administrative framework has been championed by political 
elites mostly for their own benefit, investigation into the contradictions 
of ethno-territorial language of rights is not deemed necessary, because 
of the generalized utility of ethnic identity.17 Consequently, there is an 
implicit acceptance in the extant literature of the impossibility of a so-
cially and politically integrated African multiethnic state as the united 
States of America has substantially achieved, without first critically 
examining the political, social, and economic implications of the exclu-
sionist policies of autonomous political units for individual well-being, 
group (minority) rights, and the national polity in Africa. the need for 
a critical examination of the primordial public is highlighted by Browne 
onuoha, who shows that the attribution of moral chasteness to it is 
misplaced given the massive evidence of corruption within it.18
 As i have argued elsewhere, the second reason scholars cannot rec-
ognize the problems of an ethnic language of rights is the essentialist 
view of ethnic group identity that is based on three assumptions:19 that 
all (presumed) members of the group want to preserve the group’s iden-
tity because it is only in that identity that their well-being lies; that all 
(presumed) members of the group regard its boundaries as sacrosanct; 
and that all (presumed) members of the ethno-territorial group wish 
to remain permanently in it and harbor no desire for membership of 
another group. As a consequence of this essentialist view and reification 
of group identity, an examination of the ethnic polity as the guaran-
tor of individual well-being and the empirical trends that challenge or 
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deviate from attachment to ethno-territorial boundaries is not deemed 
necessary. examples of deviations worthy of examination include the 
mismanagement of homogenous ethnic administrative authorities and 
permanent migrations across nigeria, representing increasing detach-
ment from the culture of the point of migration and increasing cross-
cultural interactions in nigeria.
 in the existing conceptual and philosophical background of scholar-
ship on group rights, the question of the self-negating, internal and 
external ethnic diversity–amplifying ethno-territorial language of rights 
does not arise. not surprisingly, works on the oil-based conflict in nige-
ria have simply justified exclusivist remedial solutions to the grievances 
of ethnic minorities of the niger delta.20 these works are theoretically 
and philosophically limited, taking evidently anti-coexistence discrimi-
nation as given.
the Preference for Citizenship rights Based on ethnic identities
in nigeria, postcolonial elites have adopted a strategy of recognizing 
citizenship rights on the basis of ethnic group identities. residents of 
northern nigeria first demanded group rights with “guaranteed repre-
sentation in political bodies, and veto rights over specific policies that 
affect” it, on the basis of a presumed higher population figure and a lack 
of Western educational qualifications, which were required for recruit-
ment into public service institutions.21 However, the north is largely 
responsible for its residents’ backwardness in Western education. dur-
ing British colonial rule, the muslim leaders, because of their desire to 
preserve and protect their islamic religion, prevented Western educa-
tion from spreading to their domain.22
 thus, no ethnic group can honestly claim a historical disadvantage 
from exclusion in nigeria. it is not the ethnic group but women who 
have suffered the historical disadvantage. While differentiated citizen-
ship claims hold sway for the ethnic group in advocacy and practice, they 
remain largely feeble for women. now, all nigerian political communi-
ties (that is, ethnic groups)—whether in reality they are better off or 
worse off, politically dominant or not—engage in discriminatory prac-
tices, backed by the postcolonial nigerian constitutions of 1979 and 1999.
 the legal basis of elites’ ethnic-based citizenship practices lies in the 
1999 constitution, section 14, subsections 3 and 4, and section 147, subsec-
tion 3. this constitutional foundation of discrimination was replicated 
from the 1979 constitution. Section 14(3) of the 1999 constitution states,
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the composition of the government of the federation or any of 
its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in 
such a manner as to reflect the federal character of nigeria and 
the need to promote national unity, and also to command national 
loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of 
persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional 
groups in that government or in any of its agencies.
Similarly, section 14(4) states,
the composition of the government of a State, a local government 
council, or any of the agencies of such government or council, and 
the conduct of the affairs of the government or council or such 
agencies[,] shall be carried out in such manner as to recognize the 
diversity of the people within its area of authority and the need to 
promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the people of 
the federation.
in section 147, which is about the composition of the federal cabinet, the 
constitution provides in subsection 3 that
[a]ny appointment under subsection (2) of this section by the 
President shall be in conformity with the provisions of section 
14(3) of this Constitution:—provided that in giving effect to the 
provisions aforesaid the President shall appoint at least one minis-
ter from each State, who shall be an indigene of such State.
 the state as a constituent of the nigerian federation or local govern-
ment as a constituent of the state is the intended group of these consti-
tutional provisions, which are better collectively known by nigerians as 
the federal character principle. However, in implementation, the ethnic 
group is their underlying identity.
 in reality, the government (federal, state, or local) and individuals 
define group identity differently. the government’s concept of the indi-
vidual’s group identity, which is inspired by ethnic identity, is (ancient) 
paternal ancestry with the group entity shifting, depending on the con-
text of resource sharing, between the collectivity of individuals and the 
territory.23 it is simultaneously rigid and fluid: rigid in the sense that 
paternal ancestry remains its basis in whatever group entity it takes, but 
also fluid, in that the government’s concept of group identity could be 
a state of the federation, a local government area, a territory compris-
ing several states, a nonterritory/ethnic group, a local government, or 
a city or village, depending on the context in which sharing of public 
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resources and advantages is taking place. it can also be a religious group, 
namely, Christianity or islam.
 ethnic groups are proving very powerful in the government’s concep-
tion of the individual’s group identity and evolution of citizenship prin-
ciples in nigeria. But as the practice of ethnic citizenship moves from 
the smallest political community to the federal or national level, the 
territorial meaning or concept of ethnic group has assumed supremacy 
over the collectivity of individuals’ meaning. Here lies the contradiction 
in ethnicity’s termination of its role in the development of citizenship 
at ethnic citizenship rather than move it to the broader level of national 
citizenship: the ethnic group self-negation, which is the differentiation 
of individuals from individuals it originally defined as its members.
 mamdani undercuts this power of the culture of the ethnic group in 
the development of citizenship principles in the assertion that “both 
race and ethnicity need to be understood as political—and not cultural 
or even biological identities.”24 if this were a reference to the counterpart 
role that politics (or the political) plays in the process of ethnic identi-
fication or the determination of citizenship, he is right. He is wrong in 
seeing ethnic identity or race, and therefore, a citizenship definition or 
practice consequent upon it, entirely as a derivation of the political.
 this is because both the nature and the application of law could be 
a matter of cultural disposition. if an existing law appears to be uncon-
nected to a cultural norm, selective application reveals it. individuals or 
groups may choose to ignore the law that sanctions ethnicity or racism 
depending on their cultural, including materialist, disposition. Hence, 
the determination of citizenship is ultimately cultural.25 evidence of the 
cultural roots of ethnicity or race (nationality) can be seen in the prior 
existence of a society of people bound by shared norms before the estab-
lishment of a political society held together by law and a constitution. A 
diverse political history, beginning at the time of the establishment of a 
city-state, is characterized by the use of the law to fight entrenched be-
liefs, habits, and practices to extend nationality and citizenship to more 
people—women, former slaves, non–property owners, and immigrants. 
the failure or partial success of the attempt to use law or the constitu-
tion to confer nationality and citizenship reflects the power of culture. 
Successful use of law reflects the dynamism of culture.
 this is made clearer by the interaction between the moves and coun-
termoves that produce a law. there is no gainsaying that if moves are 
weightier, a law is born, but not if countermoves are weightier. the 
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outcome, whether birth or nonbirth of a law, is a reflection of the domi-
nant cultural attitude expressed as an overriding political force. mam-
dani’s assertion does not recognize this contention in the making of laws.
 therefore, the rejection of universal citizenship by the political class 
of nigeria is a reflection of cultural attitudes prevailing in nigeria. the 
political class has led various nigerian groups to pitch their tents with 
divided citizenship at one time or the other. for example, the Constituent 
Assembly of 1977/78 dropped the draft that proposed outlawing discrimi-
nation by the state of origin.26 thus, there is nothing natural about the 
rejection of universal citizenship; it is a choice that politicians have made.
 As suggested above, group identities are more fluid than prevailing 
political discourse suggests. Second and succeeding generations of im-
migrants are claiming the nationality or ownership of the place in which 
they were born and reside, and thus they have not stuck to paternal 
ancestry for ethnic identification. in the survey (in-depth interviews) 
i conducted in September–october 2013 in the ethnically diverse areas 
of Lagos—Agege, makoko, Ajegunle, and obalende—Hausas and yo-
rubas born in these places are laying claim to them as their indigenous 
home (see table 9.1). As a Hausa resident in Agege put it, “i was born 
table 9.1. the claim or denial of the indigene-ship of the place  
of domicile other than the place of ancestral ethnic origin
 Location/ancestral  Has claimed  Has not claimed
   ethnic origin of respondents
Agege
 Hausa 7 
 yoruba 4 
makoko
 yoruba 2 
 egun 1 
 ilaje 2 
Ajegunle
 yoruba 4 
 Hausa  2
 igbo  1
 itsekiri 1 
obalende
 igbo 1 
 yoruba 4 
 togolese 1 
 esan 1 1
Source: field survey conducted by the author in September–october 2013.
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here. . . . most of my businesses are here. i understand the people. in 
fact, the people i know in Lagos State are more than those i know in 
Sokoto or Kano state. . . . it is also important to note that all the wealth 
my parents and i made was all made in Agege.”
 A Hausa male respondent born in Agege noted that he had cho-
sen Lagos as his state of origin many times. He asserted, “Whenever 
i travel to Kano, the people there greet me with the saying, ‘Lagosians 
are here.’” He added that he claims Agege because he grew up, went to 
school, and has his friends there. Another male respondent, fifty-three 
years old, whose grandmother was born in Agege, said that he normally 
rejects being labeled Hausa by some yorubas, reminding them that he 
entered Agege with his head, a reference to his birth. A fifty-eight-
year-old Hausa male respondent noted that many yorubas and Hausas 
in Agege have blood ties through generations of interethnic marriages. 
this perhaps explains why it is so easy for Hausas to claim they hail 
from Agege and why yorubas do not dispute their claims.
 in the same vein, many yoruba respondents concede that Hausas 
born and bred in makoko can claim being from there. An Ajegunle 
yoruba and political leader, Alhaji Kudus nurudeen, noted that the 
baale (traditional political head) of Ajegunle recommends Hausas and 
igbos for the indigene-ship certificate of Ajeromi ifelodun, a local gov-
ernment area. A seventy-eight-year-old igbo born in obalende said he 
claims Lagos but if a public form requires him to state his state of ori-
gin, he would claim enugu State. However, he noted that he feels safer 
in obalende than in the enugu State place of origin of his parents. the 
seriki hausawa (traditional political head of Hausas) of Ajegunle also in-
formed me that the Lagos State government in 2013 told the Hausas to 
register themselves on a government form as indigenes of Lagos State. 
for these respondents, only the traditional political stool and aspira-
tion to elective political office are not open to “immigrants.”27 even so, 
according to the Honorable Bolaji oso, the community development 
association chairman of Alayabiagba in Ajegunle, the vice-chairman of 
the local government of Ajeromi ifelodun is an igbo.
 only a few first-generation igbo and edo migrants do not claim that 
they are from the place of their birth or residence in Lagos State. But 
many of their children do claim the indigeneship of Lagos. An esan sixty-
year-old man who migrated to obalende in 1971 noted that neither he nor 
his children claim Lagos State as their place of origin, for two reasons. 
first, the nigerian state does not encourage or support such claims. As he 
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declared, “if the Lagos State government pronounced that anybody who 
has lived in Lagos State for a defined period of time can claim Lagos State 
origin, my children and i are very disposed to accepting the offer.” Second, 
his children have not been constrained to do so. igbo respondents who are 
not inclined to claim Lagos origin want to maintain their state of origin 
in the igbo heartland. As a sixty-seven-year-old put it, “if i deny my igbo 
origins, my tribe and my language will disappear someday.”
 nigerians who have exploited supportive cultural attributes to rede-
fine their group identity talk about it in whispers. nevertheless, ethno-
graphic data indicate that individuals are using residency to redefine 
their group identity and are using paternal ancestry for their group 
identification when it is beneficial to them. When desirable and where 
possible, they are using birthplace or residency and the possibility of 
adopting a new residency, drawing on any cultural attributes such as 
personal names and fluency in the language and religion of the local 
community to redefine their group identity. that is why its prevalence is 
difficult to establish. Some young southern nigerians seeking admission 
into federal universities, which maintain lower entry requirements for 
northerners, have admitted in confidence to me and to other researchers 
at the university of ibadan in southwestern nigeria that they redefined 
themselves as northerners, drawing on northern cultural attributes.28
 A professor of medicine based at the Ahmadu Bello university 
Zaria, in the northwestern part of nigeria, confessed to Professor Bola 
osifo, a yoruba woman based at the university of ibadan, that he was 
born in the north of yoruba parents but defines himself as a northerner 
to enhance his career.29 nigeria’s former head of state, general murtala 
muhammed, who claimed Kano State (northern nigeria) origin until 
his death at an assassin’s hand in 1976, is reported to have hailed from 
Auchi in edo State (southern midwestern nigeria). So does the first 
republic politician and elder statesman Alhaji maitama Sule. Such 
reports draw credence from the religious and physical similarities be-
tween Auchi people and Hausas. it is instructive that Hausas and Auchi 
people are mostly muslims and bear muslim names. Similar cases of 
group self-reidentification for favorable consideration for recruitment 
into local, state, and federal government establishments are common in 
modern nigeria. As noted above, some of the cases of group redefini-
tion have been endorsed by traditional rulers.
 many so-called nonindigenes are asserting themselves differently 
through their quest for representative political office in the place of 
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domicile outside their ethnic territory. elections have been lost or won 
for seats on the local government council in the states where they are 
regarded as nonindigenes by the government’s concept of groups. Some 
of the electoral victories have been facilitated by the preponderant 
population of fellow ethnics/nonindigenes. Such victories were recorded 
in the march 28, 2015, national assembly elections, in which three igbo 
contestants, Chief oghene egboh, mrs. rita urji, and tony nwoolu, 
won seats into the federal House of representatives on the platform of 
the opposition party, the People’s democratic Party, in predominantly 
yoruba-speaking Lagos State. those electoral victories are remarkable 
even though the igbo candidates defeated yoruba candidates in the 
heavily populated constituencies of Lagos State. Chief egboh so much 
agrees when he declared, “[m]y success . . . was very significant being a 
non-indigene to have won the seat for the first time in Amuwo odofin 
federal constituency.”30
 So in the self-motivated individual’s concept of group identification 
lies the possibility of building a nigerian political community or na-
tional belonging. unlike the government’s rigid historical construction 
of the individual’s identity, it agrees that “the identity of individuals 
is . . . historically constructed as well as analytically conceptualized.”31 
But the way the government’s concept of the individual’s ethnic iden-
tity interacts with cultural attitudes continues to work against national 
integration and the nigerian political community by withholding legal 
backing of the freedom of the individual to choose an ethnic group iden-
tity. in this regard, national constitutions and government policies are 
partly culpable for exclusive citizenship practices in nigeria.32 Contrary 
to the government’s stance on ethnic identity, nigerian ethnic cultures 
have shown the inclination to assimilate individuals of other cultural 
backgrounds.33 Kate meagher also notes “the absorption of other ethnic 
groups—such as ibibio and igala settlers—into igbo communities, and 
the ease with which communities have federated into larger units when 
encouraged to do so by the structure of political incentives.”34
 new generations of nigerians, especially bright and potentially suc-
cessful ones, are showing no attachment to their government-“assigned” 
primordial roots. they are making close friends across ethnic boundaries 
and cultures, as can be gleaned from advertorials of well wishes and 
obituaries. thus, the government is partly to blame for the refusal of 
some cultures (of “indigenes”) to admit certain individuals (deemed 
“nonindigenes”) into their group or ethnic identity. this is because the 
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government acts on the definition of the ethnic identity of a person not 
by the person’s current circumstances—birthplace or residence—but by 
the person’s ancient paternal ancestry.
is the ethnic Basis of Citizenship Working?
the motive of nigeria’s federal character principle is clear from the letter 
of the constitution, namely, to ensure fair representation in government 
for all ethnic groups. Put differently, it is to prevent the domination of 
government establishments by individuals from a particular region. But 
the implementation of the principle is based on the discretion of the chief 
executive (president or governor), making it open to abuse. thus, the 
state or local government may be represented and not its ethnic groups. 
the shifting basis of group identity also makes the implementation of 
citizenship based on it inherently discriminatory against one and all.
 nigeria is, indeed, now in a situation where everyone is in need of 
confirmation of their citizenship, depending on the proclivity for per-
sonal political participation or the level of personal political and admin-
istrative ambition. the acceptance of this need of confirmation of one’s 
citizenship in nigeria in the subconscious is complete: claimants of an 
ethnic group nationality, as well as ownership of a geographic area,35 
regard other nigerians as nonindigenes or non–ethnic group citizens 
and, of course, themselves as indigenes or ethnic group citizens, while 
nigerians regarded as nonindigenes agree, regardless of whether they 
were born or have lived all or most of their lives in that area. indeed, it 
is striking that the term indigene has now replaced the term citizen, es-
pecially in the sense of rights in many African states. the dissatisfaction 
with the ethnic group basis of citizenship can be seen in the growing 
tendency of young nigerians to use, wherever they can, residency or 
other criteria, versus the government’s rigid reliance on paternal ances-
try, to redefine their group identity and, consequently, citizenship in the 
local political community.
 the appointment of ministers by the federal government from Kogi 
and edo States between 1999 and 2010 illustrates the absurdity of 
the legal foundation of group rights practice in nigeria. All the three 
ministers appointed from Kogi between 1999 and 2007, the first nine 
years of nigeria’s current democratic dispensation—david Jemibewon 
(minister of police affairs), eyitayo Lambo (minister of health), and 
Bayo ojo (justice and attorney general of the federation)—were okun 
(yoruba), a subgroup of President olusegun obasanjo’s yoruba ethnic 
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group. Some might see this as ethnic balancing, given that the governor 
of the state at the time was from the most populous igala ethnic group. 
this rationalization crashed in 2007 when a new helmsman, President 
umar yar’Adua (a fulani from the north), took over. Between 2007 
and 2010, the two appointees to the ministerial post from Kogi State 
were igala: gabriel Aduku (minister of health, 2007–9) and Humphrey 
Abbah (minister of police affairs, 2007–10), while an igala remained the 
governor of Kogi State.
 members of Kogi’s third major ethnic group, igbira, began having 
their shot at the ministerial office with the appointment of mohammed 
Adoke as minister of justice and attorney general of the federation in 
2011 under President goodluck Jonathan (of ijaw, a southern minority 
ethnic group). if Kogi State is also composed of smaller ethnic groups, 
the above clearly shows that the major groups are the ones being repre-
sented in the federal cabinet.
 edo State presents a similar graphic picture of the affirmation of 
existing group structures and domination. All the ministers appointed 
from edo State between 1999 and 2015, a period of sixteen years, ex-
cept one, that is, godwin Abe (Bini, 2007–9) were esans, namely, tony 
Anenih, odion ugbesia, Chris ogienwonyi, and mike onolomemen. 
this means that the ministerial representation of edo State is being 
monopolized by the Bini and especially the esan. the force behind the 
esan monopoly of edo State’s slot(s) of the federal executive Council 
is Chief tony Anenih, an esan powerful member of the ruling People’s 
democratic Party (PdP) of that period. He was serving a second time 
as the chair of PdP’s board of trustees during the period.
 the foregoing illustrations of group rights practice in nigeria by edo 
and Kogi States make it clear that the state of the federation has been 
equated with the major ethnic group(s). in this regard, the major ethnic 
group enjoys a double advantage. first, it dominates representation in 
the establishments of the state. Second, it dominates representation of 
the state in federal establishments and institutions. from the ministerial 
representations of edo and Kogi States, the practice of group rights 
based on states boils down to majority rule/representation. it defeats the 
goal of balkanization of nigeria into states and local governments, that 
is, to grant minorities equal access to executive power. only a minus-
cule number of minor groups, major groups among them, are benefiting 
from it. the rest of the minor groups in much larger number have been 
excluded. this is beside the point.
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 the assumption that a government of representatives of the group 
(state) will ensure that the interests of the group, that is, all members 
of the state, are protected must be proven to be true for the current 
state-based representation to be valid. the only valid proof is govern-
ment that works for the welfare of all. if this is not the case, as the 
quality of life of most ordinary nigerians indicates, then the existing 
practice of group representation in government is simply government 
of the elite for the elite. group rights advocates may insist that such 
a government serves the purpose of group representation by ensuring 
that no one major group monopolizes executive power. However, this 
is not the case, because the philosophical basis of this variant of group 
representation, the interest of the entire group, is not being satisfied.
 the variable meaning of “group” makes its use for administering 
rights arbitrary with regard to the underlying motive of the constitu-
tion. Consider two persons of the same ethnic group but from different 
states and regions. When state is the basis of group rights, the yoruba 
person from Kwara or Kogi State may be favored over the one from 
oyo or ogun State, on the basis of an adjunct criterion of educational 
disadvantage of the former group of states. At another time, the same 
yoruba person may be favored when region is the basis of group rights, 
for the same adjunct reason that Kwara and Kogi States are part of 
the north, which is adjudged as deserving preferential treatment on ac-
count of educational disadvantage compared to the south, of which oyo 
and ogun States are a part. in this regard, one can speak of a double 
advantage being enjoyed by certain persons in nigeria’s group rights 
practice. the concern for group rights was based on identifiable groups. 
But the identity of groups whose rights should be respected in nigeria 
is becoming increasingly hazy.
the Case for universal Citizenship
in this section, i argue for citizenship rights based on respect for in-
dividual rights. the recognition of citizenship rights based on ethnic 
identities in nigeria and many other African states is often criticized 
but without situating group rights in history and theory. if group rights 
demands are masks for individual privileges (as they are shown in the 
preceding section to have become in nigeria), then the subordination 
of the individual to the group in certain group rights advocacy, theory, 
and practice is in need of review. As Peter Jones has written, “[A] right 
is [a] group right only if it is borne by the group qua group. if the 
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individuals who form a group hold rights as separate individuals, their 
several individual rights do not add up to a group right.”36 thus, a group 
rights argument needs to be made for a particular type of human right 
if it is to be incontrovertible. the right to religion by a minority group 
is a good example of an incontrovertible argument to make.37 there is 
the need, then, to subject group rights demands and practice to case-by-
case evaluation. group rights that benefit individuals, not groups qua 
groups, and at the same time deny individuals the freedom to choose 
their group, including ethnic identity, are the focus of the criticism in 
this section.
 Liberal and communitarian perspectives through liberalism and na-
tionalism, respectively, “represent two opposing extremes in the relation-
ship between the individual and [the] group.”38 the liberal perspective 
treats the person as an identity sufficient for citizenship claims. it rec-
ognizes group rights if they serve the interests of individuals by insist-
ing that the importance of the group is “a derivative of the importance 
of individuals.”39 thus, it ascribes moral standing to the individual. it is 
criticized for being “too disembodied and atomistic to capture the actual 
needs and interests of human beings in the world.”40 individuals need the 
group to actualize certain personal interests such as worship.
 the communitarian perspective regards the identity of a group as 
primary for the enjoyment of citizenship by the individual. A variant of 
communitarian perspective, cultural pluralism, maintains that “mem-
bers of certain groups would be incorporated into the political com-
munity not only as individuals but also through the group, and their 
rights would depend, in part, on their group membership.”41 As such, 
it ascribes moral standing to the group. it suggests as the corporat-
ist approach to human rights that individuals and groups have mutual 
interests. Consequently, it undermines “the potential for harm arising 
from conflicts of interests within a group.”42 As Chandran Kukathas has 
noted, “[C]ultural communities are not undifferentiated wholes but as-
sociations of individuals with interests that differ to varying extents. 
So within such minorities are to be found other, smaller minorities. 
to regard the wider group as the bearer of cultural [group] rights, is to 
affirm the existing structures and therefore to favour existing majori-
ties.”43 groups, by whatever identification, are divided in terms of both 
interests and structure. this can be seen from the application of the 
federal character principle in nigeria. indeed, it is “affirming the exist-
ing structures in favour of existing majorities.”44
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 A group rights argument has two major thrusts: inequality and past 
discrimination. they are said to be necessary for ensuring equality for 
weak groups in a multicultural state.45 “Special status and rights should 
be extended to some groups to enable them to survive.”46 Vernon Van 
dyke is opposed to a one-tracked individualism and majority rule be-
cause they allow the major group to oppress minor groups.47 As iris 
young puts it, group rights are necessary for counteracting the effects of 
“differences in capacities, culture, values, and behavioural styles among 
groups.”48 in respect of past discrimination, Kim forde-mazrui asserts 
that affirmative action finds justification in the two moral principles 
that were used to argue against it, that is, “racial discrimination is un-
just” and “corrective justice.”49
 in terms of access to power and economic benefits, the current group 
rights practice in nigeria cannot be justified by inequality between 
groups and has never been justifiable by past discrimination against a 
group. those who need recognition as citizens are not necessarily his-
torically excluded people. in today’s nigeria, discrimination knows no 
limit, since it depends on the context and the “broader ethno-territorial 
concept of indigene.” this concept is what has made “it possible for 
yoruba individuals from other yoruba states and not igbo immigrants 
to enjoy full citizenship in Lagos State.”50
 People seen by outsiders and by themselves as the same ethnic 
group are discriminating against themselves. What is the justification 
for such discrimination? if the justification for discriminating against 
an advantaged group is its past or existing advantage, what is the jus-
tification, as can be observed in nigeria, for members of one group 
discriminating against members of another group of exactly the same 
historical circumstances—such as political and economic conditions? 
the communitarian perspective on group rights shows no awareness 
of groups between which there are no past and present differences. 
this layer of group relationship needs to be recognized for progres-
sive theorizing on group rights. the silence of ethnic group rights 
theory on the violation of the rights of individuals even within the 
group it theorizes is entitled to collective rights is its other limitation. 
African political leaders frequently use denial of citizenship to oth-
ers on the basis of ethnic identity because they can get it to stick, to 
direct attention from their poor performance, and because “unless the 
situation reaches a level of significant upheaval, as in Cote d’ivoire, 
there is unlikely to be widespread reaction.”51 President Paul Biya 
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has successfully used the politics of ethnic belonging as a patrimonial 
channel to retain state power.52
 Liberalism’s rejection of “the idea of group claims as the basis of 
moral and political settlements primarily because groups are not fixed 
and unchanging entities in the moral and political universe” cannot be 
ignored.53 But the argument for group rights in many parts of Africa 
presumes that the question of subgroup or major group membership 
is settled: every ethnic group’s membership is frozen. this immutable 
view of the individual’s ethnic group identity is certainly untrue of many 
contexts. Have individuals been observed to opt out or desire to opt out 
of the ethnic identity presumed by naturalists or primordial theorists of 
ethnic group formation to be theirs? it is not enough to argue for group 
rights. it is equally important to deal with the question of group mem-
bership and whether the process of group definition derogates from 
individual right of participation in it when (especially) group rights are 
intended to benefit individual members of the group. By treating the 
group, which is nevertheless undefined, as frozen, it is unbothered by 
the derogation of the rights of individuals in the course of enforcing 
the rights that supposedly belong to their group. thus, proponents of 
group rights have no proper theory of human rights. for a proper theory 
of human rights, the group theory of rights must defrost the group and 
allow for changing membership as a fact.
 the process of group identity making should include entry and exit 
even in an ethnic group and, in so doing, violates no rights, whether of 
the individual or of the group. for it allows the individual to choose to 
become or cease to be a member of the group within its basic member-
ship principles. As michael freeman has observed, “[S]ince the moral 
basis of groups claiming group rights is the freedom of association, these 
groups have moral rights only if membership in them is voluntary.”54 
the link in that process is group nationality or citizenship. the proces-
sual approach to membership of the group or group nationality postu-
lated here serves as an important bridge between the liberal idea of an 
already made individual or citizen for whom there are duties and rights 
in a situation of only individual-state relationship and group theory’s 
idea of an already made group without regard for the individual’s right 
to association or dissociation. the possibility of the individual’s desire 
for a new ethnic identity and the consequent rejection of the presumed 
ethnic identity of that individual have not featured in the thinking of 
group rights proponents about ethnic groups. they cannot contemplate 
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this, because they do not regard the freedom of association with and 
disassociation from the ethnic group by the individual in their thinking 
about groups.
 Kukathas has observed that cultural associations, including ethnic 
groups, are regarded as involuntary associations.55 As he puts it, “[m]em-
bership is usually determined by birth rather than by deliberate choice, 
and in many cases, there is no option of entry for those outside.” 
However, limitations on admission into a new ethnic group apply to 
first-generation migrants of a different ethnic group. if it is considered 
impossible for first-generation migrants to change their ethnic group 
because they are thought to be rooted in the ethnic culture of their place 
of emigration, the same cannot be said for their children born in the new 
ethnic culture and territory. Which other qualifications are required of 
children born in and who speak the language of the new ethnic culture 
and territory? Consider igbo parents—or a case in which the father is 
igbo and the mother is yoruba—who gave birth and raised their chil-
dren in a yoruba cultural community in nigeria. if the children, by 
their parents’ choice, grow up with yoruba or english names and with 
the yoruba language, the greatest identity marker of the yoruba ethnic 
group, as their mother tongue, such children should not have problems 
adopting the yoruba ethnic identity where the freedom of association 
and disassociation is respected. Whereas the ethnic group can change 
in nature or composition, the nature of the individual—the need for 
welfare—does not. thus, the additional possibility of changing ethnic 
group identity represented by the individual’s freedom of choice of eth-
nic association or dissociation lends further credence to foregrounding 
the individual in the thinking about human rights.
 While advocates of ethnic (group) rights acknowledge the negative 
consequences of the implementation of group rights for out-group 
members, they have not realized that the implementation of group 
rights also negatively affects members of the in-group. if at all, they 
would consider such consequences as inconsequential or still in the in-
terest of the individuals affected. if the current group rights practice is 
jeopardizing the well-being of even the in-group members for whom it 
is supposedly being undertaken, then there is the need to rethink it. the 
resolution of this contradiction cannot be achieved within the group 
rights theoretical framework but outside of it. in this regard, liberal 
theory’s emphasis on “the fundamental importance of individual liberty 
or individual rights” recommends itself:56 “So groups or communities 
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have no special moral primacy in virtue of some natural priority. they 
are mutable historical formations—associations of individuals—whose 
claims are open to ethical evaluation. And any ethical evaluation must, 
ultimately, consider how actual individuals have been or might be af-
fected, rather than the interests of the group in the abstract.”57
 Any maltreatment on account of group identity is borne invariably 
by individuals, not by the group at that given point in time. the feel-
ing that one’s group is suffering is a display of compassion, which is 
not unique to group members. Although a divide-and-rule tactic is a 
common instrument of oppressors for privileging some members of 
the oppressed group over their fellow citizens, not all members of the 
oppressed group suffer at the same time or to the same degree. it is 
individuals who still bear the brunt of mistreatment. Some privileged 
members of the oppressed group who are not compassionate may not 
even experience the trauma from the oppression of their group.
 if individual welfare is the goal of group rights advocacy, one cannot 
agree more with Brian Walker:
in most societies some ethnic groups do better than others, and 
thus the ethnic group that one belongs to will often determine 
one’s statistical chances of ending up poor and culturally deprived. 
yet even so, if one’s goal is to address the moral difficulties in-
volved with cultural deprivation, then the focus of analysis should 
be placed on issues of class. . . . under policies which would, for 
example, guarantee a basic income to those worst off in society, 
vulnerable ethnic groups would draw a greater (that is, differenti-
ated) benefit. if one gives all poor people access to the same basic 
goods, the ethnic groups who are worst treated will benefit most 
from the policy.58
 Apart from this alternative approach to material inequality between 
ethnic groups, a rigid view of cultural boundaries amounts to denying 
freedom of propagation of ideas or the need to allow cultures embodied 
by them to compete for superiority. those who argue for ethnic group 
rights and support rigid boundaries are denying the right of ethnic 
groups to interact and mesh. new religion and language are cultural ele-
ments that such scholars would not deny people the freedom to adopt.
 taking citizenship rights on the basis of ethnic group identities to its 
logical conclusion in nigeria is producing at least three effects. first, it 
is becoming a barrier to the development of a larger fraternity, nigerian 
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political community, specifically, nigerian nationality or citizenship in 
the various autonomous political and administrative areas. Second, it 
is encouraging a politics of difference in which leaders focus on the 
perception of disadvantage to become local heroes and perhaps win 
concessions rather than work hard to overcome the self-inflicted dis-
advantage by their group. third, it is discouraging vigorous political 
and economic participation of those labeled nonindigenes in the local 
political community, thereby slowing the pace of economic develop-
ment and political integration.
 Besides, defending a communal approach to human rights in Af-
rica is difficult, writes rhoda Howard, because of the breakdown of 
the “ethic of communalism” in the face of industrialization and urban-
ization.59 the exclusivist language of rights, which finds expression in 
particularistic claims, undermines the evolution of political community 
in Africa given its abuses of the rights of new minorities inherent in 
the pro-ethno-territorial approaches to ethnic minority grievances. the 
framing of demands in exclusivist terms by (especially) ethnic groups as 
a result of insecurity or past experience invariably becomes an ideology. 
And no matter the historical rootedness of an ideology, it is a choice. 
this means that the problem of exclusive citizenship lies beyond the 
group’s position in relation to other groups in terms of political or eco-
nomic power. it is a problem of the group language of rights. either 
the group in control of state power or the one kept out of state power 
will prefer and, if in the position to do so, pursue politics of exclusion 
with such a language of rights if it chooses to do so. Past experience 
of discrimination does not point to exclusivist citizenship as a natural 
choice. for example, nelson mandela is revered worldwide for leading 
black South Africans to choose inclusive citizenship despite their past 
experience of brutal exploitative segregation at the hands of minority 
rule for white South Africans.
 if historically there are both advantaged and disadvantaged groups 
that have practiced discrimination against groups with which they 
coexist, then discrimination must be a cultural choice rather than a de-
fense of economic advantage. the white minority South African regime, 
which was economically well-off and advantaged, practiced discrimina-
tion against the economically marginal black population for decades. 
Similarly, in the united States of America, the white segment of the 
population, which was and still is economically advantaged, practiced 
discrimination for centuries against the economically disadvantaged 
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African Americans. indeed, parochialism is often a major or dominant 
group syndrome because of its belief that it has enough space to pursue 
its interests. the dominant group tends to defend space against the le-
gitimate quest for access by a minor group.
Concluding remarks
the implicit preference for divided citizenship in political orientation 
and practice finds anchor in scholarly discourse on citizenship in nige-
ria, as well as in Africa more broadly. this is the essentialist view of the 
group in the exposition of group rights. the changes that are taking place 
among individuals are being ignored by scholars of citizenship in Africa. 
Scholars often observe the political elite’s manipulation of ethnicity and 
ignore the changes occurring among the nonelites. they have stuck to 
the assumption of permanent homeliness of the primordial home, not 
paying attention to the repelling factors in this home, which encourage 
the nonelite to embrace the nonprimordial, current place of domicile 
as home. the current African citizenship discourse is being misled by 
the closed ethnic polities’ thinking to give accent to group claims at the 
expense of the individual’s demand for inclusion or citizenship. it essen-
tially blames underdevelopment and economic backwardness in Africa 
on ethnic and cultural diversity while venerating the ethnic language 
of rights, hence the endless demand for “self-government” by cultural 
groups.60 in contrast with the past intellectual approach to group rights 
in nigeria, this chapter shows that current group rights practice in ni-
geria is in need of rethinking by making a case for universal citizenship.
 the beneficiary of group rights practice is the political class of the 
major ethnic groups, not the ordinary people. An indigene-settler prob-
lem is therefore the problem of the political class. if the political class 
chooses to resolve the problem, the rest of the people, the nonpolitical 
class, will adjust to it. no protests have been heard or seen from the 
nonpolitical class over the appointment of those hitherto regarded as 
nonindigenes to positions of responsibility by some members of the 
political class in their states. if this class begins to see such ethnic dis-
crimination as retrogressive and demonstrates a resistance to it in ac-
tion, then the rest of its people will emulate the new attitude. the use of 
ethnic identity for the administration of rights for over five decades has 
not been very effective in addressing the issues of inequality and poverty 
in nigeria. it has only created an ethnic superclass of individuals made 
wealthy by ethnic group rights.
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 neither the demands for group rights that result in an unending pat-
tern of discrimination against individuals nor the intellectual discourse 
of such citizenship demands in Africa can find an anchor in the theoreti-
cal justifications for group rights. A consensus is in sight, if not already 
secured, about the pitfalls of giving liberalism (individualism) free rein. 
Similarly, “groupism” carried too far, that is, to its logical conclusion, is 
antithetical to “the idea of citizenship,” in which all have a stake and 
should acknowledge that all groups are embedded in a larger common 
culture.61 this is because extreme groupism leads to discrimination of 
all against all, whereas citizenship is needed for the existence of the 
political community or, more broadly speaking, nationhood.
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The State and the “Peoples”
Citizenship and the Future of Political Community in Ethiopia
S o L o m o n  m .  g o f i e
I n  m A y  1 9 9 1 ,  t H e  C O m B I n e d  f O r C e s  O f  t H e  t I g r A y A n  P e O P l e ’ s 
Liberation front (tPLf), the eritrean People’s Liberation front 
(ePLf), and the oromo Liberation front (oLf) overthrew the derg 
regime that had ruled the country since 1974. the ePLf took con-
trol of eritrea and turned it into an independent state. the tPLf, 
which had been instrumental in the formation of the ethiopian 
People’s revolutionary democratic front (ePrdf), took power in 
Addis Ababa. the ePrdf consists of the tPLf, the oromo People’s 
democratic organization (oPdo), the Southern ethiopian People’s 
democratic movement (SePdm), and the Amhara national demo-
cratic movement (Andm).
 each of these ePrdf organizations took charge of one of the four 
regional states—tigray; oromia; the Southern nations, nationalities 
and Peoples regional State (SnnPr); and the Amhara regional State, 
respectively. the other five regional states continue to be run by political 
groups that are separate from the ePrdf and regarded as its “partner 
organizations.” the oLf left the ethiopian political scene early in the 
1990s because of conflict with the ePrdf. the ePrdf has been in 
command of state power for more than two decades now, and it consid-
ers itself the dominant group destined to rule continuously and fulfil its 
objectives of “peace, development, and democracy” in ethiopia.
 Central to ethiopian political dynamics since the 1990s has been the 
ePrdf’s reconstruction of the ethiopian state in its own image. When 
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it took over the state, it introduced what many considered a radical re-
structuring of the country along the lines of major identity groupings. 
Some have termed such a formation “ethnic federalism.”1 the ePrdf 
and the proponents of the post-1991 order it presides over believe that 
the introduction of this form of federalism redresses long-standing 
grievances of ethiopia’s constituent populations, its “nations, nation-
alities, and peoples,” vis-à-vis successive ethiopian rulers since the late 
nineteenth century.2 they strongly assert that the derg regime and its 
predecessors’ approach to state building failed to address the problems 
of domination and inequality that came about in the process of the 
formation of the modern state in ethiopia, termed by some the “ethio-
pian empire State.”3 the “constitutive inequalities” that arose in the 
process prompted those who resented this phenomenon to articulate 
what was termed the national question.4 in short, this was a demand 
for the right to self-determination of the “nations, nationalities, 
and peoples.” this became the slogan of the tPLf and others that 
fought the derg, and in the post-1991 period the ePrdf has been 
working to put this into practice.5
 in the post-1991 period, for the ePrdf and its proponents, (sub)
national groups defined mainly on the basis of language criteria have 
been presented as the determinant category of belonging and the or-
ganizing principle of the ethiopian body politic. in line with this, the 
preamble of the 1995 constitution of ethiopia begins with the statement 
“we the nations, nationalities, and Peoples of ethiopia have adopted 
this Constitution.”6 the regional states Afar, tigray, Amhara, oromia, 
Somalia, Benishangul-gumuz, SnnPr, gambella, and Harari are 
recognized in the constitution as the constituent units of the federa-
tion. there are also two cities, Addis Ababa and diredawa, directly run 
from the center. the regional governments have the power to manage 
the day-to-day administrative functions of the regions. the regional 
states such as oromia, Somali, and tigray have been allowed to use the 
language of the majority national groups within their respective regions 
for educational and administrative purposes. the SnnPr, which is the 
most diverse of all the regional states, continues to use Amharic, al-
though some of its zonal administrations such as the Sidama zone have 
been using the Sidama language for the purposes of administration and 
primary education.7
 ethiopia thus presents us with a particularly interesting case in 
the context of this volume. the continued importance of subnational 
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(“ethnic”) identities in postcolonial Africa has often been understood as 
a legacy of colonialism, and one that presents a significant challenge to 
those seeking to explain the requisites of democratic polities in contem-
porary Africa.8 yet the importance of “ethnic” identities in contempo-
rary ethiopia lies not in a history of european colonial rule but rather in 
a long history of state formation. What does this mean for the current 
experience of federalism and the recognition of subnational identities as 
the primary category of belonging in post-1991 ethiopia?
 for the political scientist Lahra Smith, students of African politics 
in general and ethiopia in particular have much to learn from Western 
scholarship on multicultural citizenship, which, she argues, offers “a 
dynamic and optimistic view of the role of identity politics in support-
ing democratization.”9 federalism, in this reading, has the potential to 
create more space for ethiopian citizens to engage the state, as well as 
to engage in practices of what she terms meaningful citizenship. for 
Smith, then, the salience of “ethnic” identity in ethiopia, and in Africa 
more broadly, is not a symptom of state failure but rather offers the 
potential to promote democratization.
 this chapter raises the question of whether the introduction by the 
ePrdf of discourses of national self-determination for ethiopia’s con-
stituent “peoples” as an organizing principle of the state has resulted 
in qualitative changes toward the improvement of the conditions of 
groups and individuals in the country in their relationship with the state 
since the fall of the derg regime in 1991. Has it created and fostered a 
meaningful sense of citizenship beyond the reconfiguration of collec-
tive belonging along identity lines? i argue that while the language of 
self-determination as designed and employed by the ePrdf has at 
one level led to a modicum of cultural expression and recognition of 
language rights and has created a perception of local self-governance by 
the respective regional states, its reification as the predominant form of 
political belonging after 1991 went hand-in-hand with growing threats 
to the economic means of subsistence and the closing down of alterna-
tive spaces of association and expression, processes that seriously limited 
the ability of ethiopians to practice their citizenship.
 to understand contemporary political development in ethiopia as well 
as in Africa more generally, we need to go beyond the focus on “ethnic-
ity” characterizing many studies of state, society, and politics in Africa 
since the 1990s.10 Politically significant issues of state-society relations 
in ethiopia are not limited to “social cleavages based on identity.”11 it 
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is doubtful whether “primordial theories of ethnicity” capture politically 
significant societal groupings or categories and their concerns, since the 
concept tends to dismiss political antagonisms as manufactured “ethnic” 
conflicts that pop up when authoritarian control wanes.12 nor does rec-
ognizing “multicultural citizenship” necessarily serve to create a society in 
which citizens can exercise their rights more effectively.13
 Since 1991 ethiopia has been ruled by a regime that has embraced the 
challenge of recognizing multicultural citizenship through its recogni-
tion of the self-determination of “nations, nationalities, and peoples.” 
yet the ethiopian case suggests that the prospect of “meaningful citi-
zenship” rests not just on formal recognition of “ethnic” identities but 
also on understanding and explaining the essence of the relationship 
between the state and society.
the ePrdf and the discourse of “revolutionary democracy”
the apparent inconsistency between the proclaimed objectives and the 
actual practice of the ePrdf has a lot to do with the instrumental role 
it wanted to ascribe to “the peoples.” Augmented with its ideology of 
“revolutionary democracy,” during the ePrdf’s early years in power it 
argued for the curtailment of the rights of certain elements within society, 
even as it claimed partisanship with “the peoples.” this was a recurrent 
theme during the early 1990s in the ePrdf’s publications such as 
Revolutionary Democracy, its weekly magazine.14 As Jean-nicholas Bach 
has recently noted in regard to its 2010 election campaign, “the ePrdf 
owes its successes over the past decade in guiding the ethiopian people 
under its leadership to two key instruments that define its nature; these 
are its partisanship to the people and [the] ‘revolutionary democracy’ 
its [sic] advocates.”15 What is important here is that the very idea of 
curtailing rights embedded in the ePrdf’s discourse of “revolutionary 
democracy” has served to justify political actions taken against individuals 
and groups within society and has profoundly affected the extent to 
which individuals and groups in society can engage the state.
 the priority given to the implementation of state policies that 
alienate substantial parts of the population has generated a particular 
form of state-society relations in ethiopia. A relationship has developed 
in which the imperative of power has come to form the basis for a 
divergence between state interests and the interests of society, giving 
rise to antagonisms between the state and the society in the post-1991 
period. We can see this in practice if we look in more detail at state 
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policies in two key areas: land policy and policies relating to freedom 
of association and expression. While the sources of the antagonisms 
are varied and multiple, economic subsistence (most notably land 
ownership) and freedom of expression and association are among the 
major recurring topics and lie at the center of the tension between 
society and the state.
the Politics of Land and the right to Subsistence
Various economic policies and practices have been pitting the post-1991 
government against groups in rural as well as urban areas. As the pri-
mary means of economic subsistence for the overwhelming majority of 
the ethiopian population, land is central to discussion of state-society 
relationship and citizenship in ethiopia. the land question was one of 
the central political issues in ethiopia, and it drove the resistance to 
imperial rule that led to the assumption of power by the derg in 1974. 
the groups that led the revolution were able to mobilize the peasantry 
and other societal forces around the motto “Land to the tiller.” once 
in power, however, the derg nationalized the land and thus ensured its 
control over society for the next seventeen years.16
 the control of land remained the prerogative of the state in the af-
termath of the derg. While the 1995 constitution maintains that land is 
“owned” by “the peoples” and the government of ethiopia, in practice 
the ePrdf’s discourse of revolutionary democracy allowed it to pres-
ent itself and its partners as the embodiment of “the peoples” to at-
tain a monopoly of control over land.17 neither “the peoples” nor other 
categories of ethiopian societies have been allowed to participate in 
decisions about land as the basis of the economy.
 first of all, farmers, especially those living around Addis Ababa 
and major regional towns, have faced dislocations as state authorities 
opted to free highly valued plots of land for lease to investors. Such 
land transfers involve a process in which farmland is taken from farmers 
and given to investors, with or without compensation to the farming 
communities who had lived on it for generations. this in effect means 
forcing individuals and communities away from or depriving them of 
their means of subsistence. in such a situation, farmers have no right of 
appeal, and attempts to protest and resist eviction have led to threats of 
imprisonment.18
 over the years there has been widespread dislocation of the farming 
communities, mainly the oromo community, who live around Addis 
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Ababa. While the numbers vary, tens of thousands of families have been 
dislocated in recent times and their livelihood severely affected.
 While the process of freeing land for investment continues to unfold, 
as of late the government has disclosed what it calls the Addis Ababa 
integrated master Plan, which is condemned by various sections of the 
oromo population, who consider it an excuse for further land grabbing. 
officially, however, the smaller towns in predominantly oromo-inhabited 
areas surrounding the city need to be included in the controversial mas-
ter plan for the purpose of integrated development.19
 the plan was opposed by the oromo People’s democratic organiza-
tion (oPdo), one of the four groups constituting the ePrdf. it led to 
protests among oromo students in different universities and secondary 
education institutions. they vehemently opposed the plan, citing the 
“risk of evicting more than two million farmers from around the capi-
tal city.”20 many people including students in the town of Ambo were 
killed, and several were put in jail. Since this incident, the government 
has put on hold the implementation of the plan.
 Second, the leasing of large tracts of land in different parts of the 
country has become a source of conflict not only between individual 
farmers and the government but also between the latter and the “peo-
ples” in several regional states. the fact that huge tracts of land were 
being given out to investors, without the consent of the affected people, 
has become a bone of contention. this was the case in gambella, 
Benshingul-gumuz, Afar, and South omo and oromia. the people in 
these regions feel that they have not been consulted when large-scale 
land transfers have been made. government policy in this area seems to 
run directly counter to the ethos of a particular form of federal structure 
in ethiopia, organized around “nations, nationalities, and peoples.” this 
has generated tensions between the government and the populations of 
the regional states.
 one commentator, graham Peebles, has described the land appro-
priation processes as “a colonial phenomenon.” in an article published 
in 2012 he argued that the government was behaving as if land were 
simply “a chip to be thrown upon the international gambling table of 
commercialization.” He argued that this practice was due to the dis-
torted notions of development, wherein “people, traditional lifestyles 
and the environment come a distant second to roads, industrialisation 
and the leasing of land.”21
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 other researchers have corroborated this view. the oakland insti-
tute, which is at the forefront of documenting this phenomenon, states 
in one of its reports that at least 3,619,509 hectares of land (an area 
close to the size of Belgium) were reserved or transferred to investors 
in the previous ten years. While the government often claims that the 
land being leased is not occupied by the local communities, information 
from the oakland institute and other sources indicates that it is being 
cultivated by smallholders and subsistence farmers or used by pastoral-
ists for grazing. those using the land have been forcefully evicted.22 
Similar accounts have been put forward by human rights organizations 
such as Human rights Watch and by investigative journalists writ-
ing for international media outlets.23 in general, the transfer of huge 
tracts of land by the government in ethiopia to foreign and domestic 
investors for the purpose of growing food and allegedly biofuels for 
export has made observers skeptical about the ethiopian government’s 
objectives in encouraging land transfers. dessalegn rahmato, who has 
been writing on issues of land policy in ethiopia for decades, has clearly 
argued that this state of affairs, when viewed from the perspective of 
the communities affected, constitutes nothing more than the transfer of 
rights belonging to individuals and communities.24
 third, people in the towns and the cities have felt the full weight of 
the government’s land lease policy. Any plot of land to build a residential 
house or a business quarter can be obtained only by leasing it from the 
government. moreover, people who have more than 500 square meters 
of land have to either hand it over to the authorities or pay exorbitant 
lease values to retain it. nowadays, one can observe the phenomenon 
whereby neighborhoods are removed, the land is leased to “investors,” 
and multistory buildings are erected in a very short period of time. in 
Addis Ababa, large parts of the Lideta, Arat Kilo, Kazanchis, and tekel-
haimanot areas of the city have so far been cleared during the past few 
years. the drama usually unfolds in such a way that the Addis Ababa 
city administration urges city residents in the target area to vacate their 
residential quarters within a short period of time. recently the adminis-
tration planned to clear about 1,200 hectares of land for redevelopment, 
and it was mentioned that a good portion of this would be up for leas-
ing to investors immediately. While the government housing plans led 
to the building of low-cost houses, especially in the suburbs of Addis 
Ababa, furnishing relocated residents with condominium houses fitted 
with adequate facilities remained a major challenge.25
247
The State and the “Peoples”: Citizenship and Political Community in Ethiopia
 in general, these practices on the part of the state work against its 
own declaration that each farmer has an unrestricted right to land and 
claims of guarantees of land use and that the property rights of the urban 
population would not be threatened. Added to this is the recent urban 
land lease practice following the 2003 proclamation, which converted 
all urban land to leaseholds under the control of the state. this serves 
to strengthen doubts as to whether individuals and groups in ethiopian 
society today have any right of property ownership in relation to land.26
freedom of Association and expression
freedom of association proved to be another problematic area in the 
troubled relationship between the state and the society in ethiopia. the 
experience of the workers’ union in ethiopia in the post-1991 period 
serves as an example of the challenges in this respect. in the 1990s, 
the ePrdf embarked on a policy of liberalization and privatization 
of previously state-owned enterprises. in the process it created a new 
mechanism for administering previously publicly owned enterprises. 
the main feature of the approach was the appointment of a “board of 
managers” of the enterprises in the process of transfer of ownership. 
the chairmanship positions of such a board overseeing the enterprises 
were invariably given to high-ranking members of the tPLf/ePrdf. 
the positions held not only were used to help manage the enterprises 
and facilitate the transfer of their ownership but also served to con-
trol trade unions so that they would not effectively resist the decisions 
about the future of the enterprises. Consequently, in the 1990s, the fate 
of thousands of workers in the manufacturing industries was decided 
without consulting the workers.27
 there were widespread direct interventions in the dissolution of for-
mer trade union associations, as well as the formation of progovernment 
union leaderships. one of the state institutions accused by the former 
Confederation of ethiopian trade unions (Cetu) in the mid-1990s 
of undermining the activities of trade unions was the ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs (moLSA). this was mainly because the ministry was 
responsible for the implementation of Labor Proclamation no. 42/1993. 
According to Article 170(2) of the proclamation, “the ministry shall 
organize, coordinate, follow up and execute the labor administration 
system, by establishing an employment service, labor inspection ser-
vices, and also a permanent advisory board.” in accordance with Article 
145 of the proclamation, among several of its roles, it is responsible for 
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establishing the labor relations board. the ministry has also the power 
to issue certificates of registration for workers’ associations (Article 
118). it can also cancel the certificate of registration it issues. Cancel-
lation of the certificate of registration would lead to dissolution of an 
association, in this case, workers’ associations (Article 120).28 moLSA 
played a significant role on behalf of the state in cancelling the regis-
tration of many workers’ unions in conflict with the management of 
the enterprises the state wanted to privatize. moLSA was accused of 
playing a role in the formation of progovernment workers’ associations 
at lower levels such as the workers’ federations. the ethiopian Human 
rights Council (eHrCo, now HrC) through its periodic reports has 
requested the government to stop illegal practices against workers and 
their associations and has appealed to human rights organizations and 
religious groups in ethiopia and abroad “who support the rule of law 
and human rights to use their influence to make the ethiopian govern-
ment . . . respect the human rights” of workers.29
 the former labor union, the Confederation of ethiopian trade 
unions (Cetu), attempted to resist the move toward privatizing 
the enterprises without ensuring the participation and consultation 
of workers. in the face of heightened state interference, especially in 
1994, Cetu attempted to express its concerns regarding targeted and 
widespread dismissals of workers. one of the persistent concerns aired 
by a proworkers’ trade union leadership before its forceful dissolution 
revolved around the issue of job security of employees and the lack of 
transparency in the process of transferring the ownership of enterprises.30 
the struggle for workers’ rights failed with the ban and dismember-
ment of Cetu in 1994 and its replacement by a new organization, 
generally considered docile in representing the interests of workers. the 
consequence has been the relegation to a secondary consideration of the 
right of workers to form free and independent associations and of work-
ers’ rights in general.31 in the absence of a strong workers’ organization, 
the vast majority of workers in ethiopia are left to the mercy of state 
control and to the whim and will of so-called “developmental investors” 
and owners of companies.32
 more generally, freedom of association has been a key area of an-
tagonism between the state, on one hand, and individuals and group 
members of the society, on the other, over the past two decades. Besides 
the challenges faced by workers, other groups such as political parties 
continue to complain that their leaders, members, and supporters have 
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been subjected to harassment, intimidation, and arrest. this is the case 
when such independent organizations are seen as mobilizing support 
from among society and working to organize the population around 
political agendas. At any rate, the hostile attitude of the state toward 
freedom of association and assembly has negatively affected the emer-
gence of independent institutions and organizations.
 these problems are further exacerbated by the lack of space for free 
expression. in the post-1991 period, the effects of curtailment of free-
dom of expression have not been limited to the private media and civil 
society organizations. restrictions on expression have permeated the 
practices of state institutions, affecting individuals and groups in the 
society. the challenge faced by the youth in educational institutions is 
instructive of this situation.
 in ethiopia, students have historically been at the forefront of re-
sistance against state policies and practices. Students were recognized 
as one of the primary social forces that brought to an end the imperial 
regime in the 1960s and 1970s. But since 1991 there has been grow-
ing state distrust of this group. State authorities see students’ attempts 
to express themselves in higher education institutions as the works 
of antidemocracy and antipeace and antidevelopment forces working 
against the post-1991 order.33 Student protests have met with a severe 
response from state authorities.34 this has made a mockery of the idea 
of higher-education institutions as a space for free expression of ideas. 
instead, some have talked of a pervasive sense of being controlled and 
monitored in public institutions and beyond, limiting the emergence of 
alternative forms of expression and association.35
 thus, since 1991, while the state has sought to address the “national 
question” through a discourse of “the peoples,” it has clamped down on 
the ability of key social groups such as farmers, workers, and youths to 
form free associations and to express themselves politically. this has 
served the ePrdf’s aim of consolidating their hold on power. A dis-
course of “the peoples” has gone hand in hand with a state policy of 
retaining control of land and other key resources. this has enabled the 
state to undertake land appropriation in rural areas and policies that have 
led to the dislocation of many in towns and urban areas. this situation 
clearly attests to the subordination of the economic means of subsistence 
for the many to state-driven accumulation in the interests of the few.
 Similarly, while state laws, the constitution, and official pronounce-
ments have emphasized the right to organize, the practice has been 
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one of pervasive suppression of free association. the story of Cetu, 
discussed above, and other associations such as the former ethiopian 
teachers Association (etA) attest to this. the lack of trust in free 
and independent organizations on the part of state authorities has 
contributed to the weakening of existing organizations and limited the 
possibility of the emergence of strong autonomous organizations or 
institutions. today there is a widely felt view within ethiopian society 
that organizations are allowed to exist insofar as they further the inter-
est of the state or as long as they are not perceived as threats. in regard 
to freedom of expression, the practice on the part of state authorities 
has followed a similar logic. the persistent actions of the state in using 
different mechanisms of undermining freedom of expression have re-
sulted in self-censorship of speeches, as well as experiences of fear and 
mistrust within the society. Besides the challenges faced by the younger 
population in educational institutions, as already discussed, the suppres-
sion of private media and the use of state media as an instrument of 
propagating the advantages and the benefits that the post-1991 order 
brought about for “the peoples” conform to the state’s understanding of 
free expression as a threat to its aims and objectives. 
State-Society Antagonisms
the political leadership of the state in the post-1991 period has con-
sistently ridiculed concerns and attempts to resist government policies 
threatening the economic means of subsistence of the population as the 
works of “anti-peace, anti-development and anti-democracy forces” 
working to derail its peace, development and democracy agendas,36 
and this is indicative of how the ePrdf understands its perceived 
adversaries. in general, the consequence of the state-society antago-
nisms described above has been the fragmentation of the ethiopian 
political community and the virtual absence of social solidarity. the 
experiences of farming communities and workers in manufacturing 
industries are indicative of a pervasive sense of fear, insecurity, frag-
mentation, and disunity.
 experiences over the past two decades show no meaningful develop-
ment of a sense of solidarity whereby the affected members of the soci-
ety come together to form collective movements. Land appropriation in 
rural as well as urban areas does not seem to galvanize support for the 
affected communities. not only were workers unable to salvage them-
selves, but also their suffering did not earn them support from other 
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sections of the society. the proworkers’ Confederation of the ethiopian 
Labour union (CeLu), led by dawi ibrahim (who went into exile in 
1994 because of pressures from state functionaries), protested against 
the dismissal of workers and curtailment of freedom of association and 
made repeated calls for the people to express their support to workers, 
to prevent the dissolution of the workers’ association. it did not gain 
any tangible support from students, government employees, and the 
public at large, however, underscoring the significance of solidarity as a 
precondition for collective action.
 this underlines the importance of having space for expression. 
Solidarity in itself is difficult to conceive without a space of expres-
sion necessary to form associations and build trust and confidence. 
the antagonistic state-society relationship described above has made 
the task difficult, for the legal and institutional space for discussion of 
political issues has been monopolized by the state, while fear, insecurity, 
and self-censorship of expression characterize conditions at the societal 
level. Attempts to create an alternative space for expression through the 
politics of opposition, through elections, and through the works of non-
governmental organizations (ngos) have been repeatedly rebuffed. 
Little has been achieved in terms of changing the way state authorities 
deal with individuals and groups within the society, since actors such 
as ngos continue to operate within the parameters defined by the 
state. Similar attempts were made through the independent media that 
emerged in 1991, but this was more or less shut down following the may 
2005 elections.
ePrdf’s project of reconstruction of the state in ethiopia presents the 
rights of self-determination of nations, nationalities, and peoples as an 
organizing principle of the ethiopian body politic. While the recog-
nition of “peoples” and their rights to self-determination in ethiopia 
appears to go some way toward recognizing diversity or difference, its 
reification by the state in post-derg ethiopia has served as an instru-
ment of the political forces in command of state power since the early 
1990s. Consequently, while ordinary ethiopians of various political 
persuasions continue to strongly identify themselves with the country 
(the land and its peoples), their religion or beliefs, the region, and their 
identities, the unresolved issues with regard to the right to economic 
means of subsistence (notably, the land issue), as well as freedom of 
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association and expression, have negatively affected the ability of ethio-
pians to practice “meaningful citizenship” in the post-1991 period.
 the ePrdf government over the past two decades has been empha-
sizing the importance of peace, democracy, and development. the state 
has sought to use a discourse of respect for the rights of “the peoples” 
but at the same time has limited the space available for solidarity, asso-
ciation, and expression. therefore conceiving of citizenship in its fullest 
sense is difficult and the task of building a viable political community in 
ethiopia remains uncertain.
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l O n g  A g O ,  r e I n H A r d  B e n d I x  d I s t I n g u I s H e d  B e t w e e n  t w O  O P P O s I n g 
principles of citizenship: the plebiscitarian principle, which holds citi-
zens as individuals who relate directly to the state, and the functional 
representation principle, in which relations between individuals and 
the state are mediated by the primary group(s) to which the individual 
belongs.1 At the core of liberal democracy is the plebiscitarian principle, 
which promotes universal citizenship, whereby citizens, irrespective of 
ethnic origin, race, sex, or religion, are formally equal in terms of rights, 
duties, and opportunities.2 the functional principle, in contrast, defines 
citizens and the rights they enjoy on the basis of the hierarchical groups 
they belong to and tends to promote unequal, exclusionary, and con-
tested citizenship.
 the coexistence of both forms of citizenship and the contradictory 
forces they provoke are central to the problems of citizenship in multi-
ethnic states. in Africa, the prevalence of the functional principle and 
associated problems underlies the conundrum of John Ayoade’s “states 
without citizens,” an apt description of the fact that some so-called citi-
zens are precluded from the rights and benefits of citizenship because 
of the subordinated, excluded or marginalized groups they belong to.3 
this is explained by three underlying factors. first, and the historically 
most fundamental, are the anomalies and structural disabilities be-
queathed by colonialism and the colonial state. these mostly had to 
do with the artificial origins and violent character of the colonial state, 
which involved the forced incorporation of diverse and hostile groups 
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and suppression of people’s rights; the instrumentalities of indirect rule 
and ethnic inequalities, which kept groups divided and subjected some 
of them to domination; and the fact that the colonial state pursued the 
interests of the colonizer rather than those of the colonized.4 By its very 
nature, the colonial regime precipitated the crises of state legitimacy 
and ownership, which are fundamental to the problems of citizenship 
today. in particular, as mahmood mamdani has pointed out, the co-
lonial state had subjects and not citizens, and by restricting so-called 
natives to membership in tribal groups rather than the state, colonialism 
sowed the seeds of contested citizenship.5
 the second underlying factor for the prevalence of the functionalist 
principle is the predominance of precapitalist social formations in which 
rights (and corresponding duties) are conceived of in organic, commu-
nitarian, collectivistic, and exclusivist terms.6 According to okwudiba 
nnoli, “individuals do not have any claims which may override those of 
the collectivity. Harmony and cooperation rather than divergence of in-
terest, competition and conflict characterize social life. People are more 
inclined to think of their obligations to other members of the group 
than their rights. . . . even in the urban areas a feeling of belongingness 
to a community is an important part of individual existence.”7
 the ethnic group and its derivatives—ethnicity and ethnic identity— 
are central to this conception. Citizenship is then constructed on an 
ethnic basis. Perhaps the best illustration of this is the indigeneity clause 
in the nigerian 1999 constitution, section 25(1)a, which makes belonging 
to an ethnic group indigenous to the country a condition for citizenship 
by birth. indigeneity makes the individual an ethnic citizen whose rights 
are tied to those of the ethnic group.8 indigene-based citizenship has 
serious implications, which are not only disenabling of equal citizenship 
but also promote conflicts. first, it makes citizenship a mutually exclu-
sive category of “insiders” and “outsiders.” According to a submission by 
the Plateau State government to the constitutional amendment com-
mittee in nigeria, “everyone comes from somewhere and therefore one 
can only be an indigene of one place. . . . it is culturally impossible to 
have dual and multiple indigeneship.”9 in effect, indigeneship separates 
insider-citizens (indigenes) from outsider-citizens (nonindigenes) and 
makes rights and privileges in the indigenous group, locality, or state the 
exclusive preserve of indigenes.
 Although the Plateau government submission clarifies that the exclu-
sive rights and privileges are restricted to “indigenous” or “traditional” 
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rights mostly having to do with rights and access to land and that all 
citizens, irrespective of indigeneity, are entitled to the fundamental and 
so-called residency rights provided for in the constitution, the reality is 
that nonindigenes suffer discrimination and exclusion on most matters 
and are treated as noncitizens within the domains of the indigenous 
groups.10 this has been the source of protracted indigene/nonindigene, 
indigene/settler conflicts in several parts of the country, especially in 
the middle Belt state of Plateau and other ethnic minority domains 
of the north where long years of religious conflicts between powerful 
muslim groups and non-muslims have created deeply divided societies. 
the Plateau State submission argues that indigene-based conflicts can 
be resolved only if traditional and indigene rights can be abolished, but 
this is unlikely as long as indigenous groups exist and constitute the 
basis for the constitutional definition of citizenship.
 there is also a problem with the determination of indigeneity: who 
is truly an indigene, and who does the defining and determination? 
Because of the arbitrary manner in which boundaries of African states 
were demarcated by colonizers and the long history of migrations and 
displacements across ethnic boundaries, the question of which groups 
are truly indigenous, settler, and migrant remains fiercely contested 
and unresolved.11 the opening of previously closed political spaces 
beginning in the late 1990s rekindled contestations over the status of 
descendants of individual migrants and migrant groups, particularly in 
countries like malawi, Zambia, and Côte d’ivoire, where the (original) 
origins of incumbent presidents, former presidents, and presidential 
aspirants became major electoral issues. A case in point is the constitu-
tional amendment to prevent former president Kenneth Kaunda from 
contesting the presidential election in Zambia conducted by the Chi-
luba government on the ground that Kaunda was not a Zambian citizen 
(it was discovered late in the day that his parents were originally from 
malawi, but even frederick Chiluba’s own status as a citizen of Zam-
bia was also contested by the opposition!). the new forms of contested 
citizenship resonated in some other countries as well, notably, Côte 
d’ivoire, malawi, Liberia, and Congo. the problem of the mandingos 
(who are regarded by supposedly indigenous Liberians as migrants from 
guinea) in Liberia and the migrant Bayanmulenges in the democratic 
republic of Congo was a major factor in the civil war that erupted in 
each of the two countries, with members of both groups struggling to 
assert their belongingness and citizenship.
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 the third underlying factor for the prevalence of the functional 
principle in Africa is the state-centered, authoritarian, and nonac-
countable manner in which citizenship has been constructed within 
the broader framework of nation and legitimacy building. in the name 
of preventing fragmented states inherited from the colonial era from 
falling apart, power holders suppress so-called nation-threatening 
rival claims by members of dissatisfied (but so-called opposition) 
groups and pursue hegemonic and exclusionary projects that seek to 
reproduce the state in the image of the dominant ethnic or religious 
group. one-party and military regimes, which proliferated on the 
African political landscape in the 1960s and 1970s, provided the po-
litical hinges for authoritarian constructions of citizenship on terms 
that were discriminatory, unequal, exclusionary, and unjust. of course, 
the policies pursued by the regimes intensified intergroup conflicts 
and citizenship contestations that have hallmarked national identity 
formation in postcolonial Africa.
 the wave of democracy and democratization that swept through the 
continent in the closing years of the twentieth century, however, en-
gendered new approaches to citizenship construction that have increas-
ingly seen a movement away from the privileging of states as the sole 
determinants of citizenship to a more robust engagement of citizens 
with states. the opening up and expansion of political spaces, revital-
ization of civil society, and rights-based demands for inclusive, partici-
patory, and accountable governance broadened the arena of citizenship 
construction. through social movements, ethno-nationalist groups 
and prodemocracy organizations, minorities, and other previously ex-
cluded, dominated, and oppressed groups have challenged authoritarian 
structures and engaged the state in a manner that makes exclusionary 
citizenship now less likely—indeed, in places like Sudan and Central 
African republic, where redress-seeking demands continued to be sup-
pressed, protracted conflicts and civil war appeared to be a last resort for 
inclusive nation-state building, leading, in the case of Sudan, to a split 
into two countries: Sudan and South Sudan. to the extent that group 
interests and rights (and therefore the functional principle) remain cru-
cial in the renewed citizenship struggles, it may be too early to talk of 
paradigm shifts in citizenship contestations and constructions in Africa, 
but the struggles for voice, rights, equity, and justice for members of 
various groups represent an important development in the search for 
universal citizenship.
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Citizenship as a Contested terrain
the construction of citizenship is an integral part of state and nation 
building. the problems of citizenship may therefore be approached 
from the perspective that, like the emergence of an integrated nation-
state that is the end product of nation building, citizenship is not 
natural or given but something to be claimed and constructed. the 
process of constructing citizenship is two-pronged. on the one hand, 
it involves the construction of national identity (and allegiance as well) 
as the primary identity of members of a polity. the aim of national 
identity construction is to establish an overarching identity to which 
all other competing identities and allegiances—ethnic, racial, religious, 
regional—are supposed to be secondary. on the other hand, citizenship 
construction involves the granting or extension of civil, political, social, 
and economic rights to members of the state in return for the duties 
they render to it (allegiance, patriotism, payment of taxes, national 
service, and so forth). the two aspects of citizenship are theoretically 
linked by the fact that belongingness in the state and national identity 
are the basis upon which citizens lay claim to the rights and privileges 
provided by the state.
 in reality, however, the terrain of citizenship is not as settled as the 
foregoing might suggest. indeed, it is essentially contested, more so in 
the postcolonial states of Africa where the fatal legacies of colonialism 
and postcolonial authoritarian regimes have fostered citizenship hierar-
chies and deprived segments of populations of rights of full citizenship. 
in effect, contested citizenship involves the struggles by various groups, 
especially marginalized, excluded, minority and disadvantaged groups, 
to enjoy rights and benefits equal to those accorded privileged citizens 
by the state and to thus become full members of the state. A helpful 
way to understand the nature of contested citizenship is to distinguish 
analytically between two coexisting but opposing forces of identity 
formation.12
 first is state-generated or manipulated collective identity, which typi-
cally involves the creation of a hegemonic order. Although this process 
of identity formation tends to be integrationist and state power holders 
“find it politically wiser to recognize and tolerate some forms of cultural 
diversity rather than impose a total uniformity by forcible means,”13 it 
is often asserted through repressive means—persecution, dispossession, 
discrimination, exclusion, conquest, assimilation, and in extreme cases, 
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genocide. to the extent that state power holders tend to enforce so-
called common identities (as well as their component languages, cul-
tures, and religions) as the legitimate identities, Peter Beilharz is right 
to argue that “[c]itizenship has often been used politically or systemati-
cally to integrate or modulate rather than diversify.”14 Citizens belong-
ing to groups outside the dominant paradigm are generally treated as, or 
perceive themselves to be, excluded or marginalized. thus, the struggles 
and claims by members of the latter groups for equity and justice are 
what lie at the core of citizenship contests.
 Second, and in contradistinction to state-directed identity, there is 
nonstate or civil society–generated identity formation (civil society as 
used here refers to the nonstate segment of the public realm whose main 
institutional manifestation is the broad range of voluntary, nongovern-
mental, and community-based associations that play important roles 
in the process of state building). this tends to be more discerning of 
diversity and pluralism and offers spaces for the expression of various 
competing identities and rights. Civil society–led identity formation 
also aims at collective and integrated identity, but unlike that dictated 
by the state, it proceeds on the basis of inclusion, mutual exchanges, and 
accommodation (rather than assimilation, exclusion, or conquest), such 
that when a collective identity emerges, it is quite often negotiated.15
 the identities negotiated by civil society may not have the same legal 
authority as those of the state, but they nevertheless present a more 
assured pedestal for members of disadvantaged groups to locate them-
selves as rights-bearing groups and engage the state, more so if civil 
society is regarded as the site of counterhegemonic mobilization.16 in 
general, and as borne out by the experiences of several African countries, 
citizenship tends to be less fiercely contested where counterhegemonic 
claims from civil society are not suppressed and/or where civil society 
is able to influence or control the structuration of the state. in short, 
citizenship would be less contested where state-directed identity forma-
tion is informed by demands from civil society and is therefore inclusive 
and pluralist—as in the adoption of more than one official language, 
protection of cultures and religions, power-sharing arrangements that 
guarantee equitable access to state power and resources, the granting of 
political autonomy to territorial groups in a federal system, and so on, 
rather than where these are suppressed.
 the problem mainly arises from the fact that citizenship construc-
tion is, in the final analysis, a state project because it is central to the 
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state’s legitimacy, and few states would allow a free-wheeling process of 
identity formation outside their control.17 even if civil society constitu-
ents are assumed to successfully contest, negotiate, and even mitigate 
grievances, the ultimate responsibility for citizenship—for granting 
rights and effectuating them—still lies with the state and how its power 
holders structure the authoritative allocation of values.18 But even so, 
the location of civil society as the state of the stateless and site of coun-
terhegemony and cogovernance makes it a key partner in the manage-
ment of citizenship contestations.19
 When we turn to the underlying reasons for contested citizenship, it 
becomes clear that citizenship means much more than the assumption 
of national identity.20 underlying the contestations are the competitions 
for scarce resources and social goods and the struggle to control political 
power, which is crucial to the authoritative allocation of resources and 
goods. in relation to citizenship, these competitions take the form of 
struggles to claim and assert civil, political, social, and economic rights 
that embody the public goods and access to them. issa Shivji’s charac-
terization of rights as “a means of struggle . . . not a standard granted as 
charity from above but a standard around which people rally for struggle 
from below” underscores the point very well.21
 in capitalist, liberal democratic formations, the struggle involves 
autonomous individuals who, under free-market conditions, compete 
and bargain with others to maximize benefits. the logic of this process 
requires that the individual be granted rights (to life, private property, 
free speech, association with others, nondiscrimination, and so forth) 
that put him or her at par with others in access and opportunities and 
enable them to compete equitably. Where precapitalist formations co-
exist with those of capitalism, as they do in most parts of Africa, the 
(ethnic) group by which the individual is socially and legally defined 
tends to be the main actor—or intermediary—in the struggle for social, 
economic, and political rights and relations with the state. demands 
for individual and group rights are made in the context of structured 
inequalities, relative deprivation, discrimination, and distributive 
injustice in which members of aggrieved groups are disadvantaged, 
marginalized, or excluded from the rights and privileges available to 
members of other groups.
 thus, individual rights mostly demanded by groups on behalf 
of their members are those that promote affirmative action and 
social mobility—redress of imbalances in education, public sector 
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employment, entry into the military, and so on.22 this is because the 
theory of individual rights assumes equality of access and opportuni-
ties, which is possible only when action is taken to redress and re-
duce structural inequalities among groups.23 in acknowledgment of 
this, section 8(3)a of the 1994 interim constitution of South Africa, 
a country where the apartheid regime had created racial hierarchies 
and deprived the black majority of citizenship, provided that the 
enforcement of fundamental human rights “shall not preclude mea-
sures designed to achieve the adequate protection and advancement 
of persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of all 
rights and freedoms” (emphasis added).
 group rights are also demanded to protect the corporate identity and 
survival of the group because, it is argued, the purposes for which they 
are demanded (such as preservation of language, culture, religion, power 
sharing, local political autonomy, and assertion of the rights to self-
determination and development) cannot be met by individual rights, 
which is why the granting of fundamental (individual) human rights has 
not lessened demands for group rights, especially by minority groups.24 
the case of the powerful Afrikaner minority in the period immediately 
following the transition from apartheid in South Africa is instructive. 
Although the bill of rights in the 1996 constitution is sufficiently liberal 
and inclusive, this did not lessen the momentum of Afrikaner demands 
for the right to self-determination and possibly an independent volkstaat 
and protection of Afrikaner language and culture.25 in general, although 
state power holders are reluctant to grant group rights, especially those 
that demand political autonomy or national self-determination, because 
of their perceived dangers to the political order, expediency has often 
necessitated policies that address or lessen tensions associated with 
group demands and grievances.
ethnicity and Citizenship in Africa
the basis of contested citizenship in most African states is ethnicity, 
which may be defined as the mobilization of ethnic identity and in-
terests to make political demands on the state and pursue constitutive 
interests in competition with members of other groups. the levers 
of mobilization are the objective markers (language, culture, religion, 
myth of common origin, territory) that differentiate members of one 
group from others and provide the basis for forging group solidarity 
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and collective destiny, in the process of transforming the ethnic group-
in-itself into the ethnic group-for-itself. three crucial attributes of 
ethnicity that are germane to its relation with citizenship need to be 
emphasized. the first is that ethnic identity is a collective or shared 
identity that merges the individual’s identity with that of the group. in 
behavioral terms, the implication of this is that the individual as a bearer 
of the collective identity is representative of the group and is subject to 
the security/insecurity or advantages/disadvantages that that identity 
confers. this does not contradict the acknowledged fact that ethnicity 
is situational; it only means that when adopting the ethnic identity (or 
resource) is found to be expedient, the individual ties his or her chances 
in the competitive setting to the status of the group. this is in addition 
to the fact that in societies where the individual is defined or ranked in 
terms of her or his ethnic origin, as has been the case in most parts of 
Africa since colonial times, she or he has little or no choice.
 the second attribute is that ethnicity is an interest-begotten ideol-
ogy that is constructed and mobilized in pursuit of individual or group 
interests, and the form it takes varies from routine competition to vio-
lent conflicts. When not mobilized or politicized, ethnicity is dormant, 
or its existence is not troubling. But when mobilized and conflicts are 
provoked, ethnicity tends to become a pervasive strategy for making 
political demands, partly because ethnic mobilization provokes coun-
termobilization by other ethnic groups and partly because state power 
holders recognize the destructive potential of ethnic conflicts and tend 
to take ethnic demands seriously. in general, perceived threats to the 
collective well-being or survival of the group (such as relative depri-
vation, threat of extinction of language, culture, or religion, exclusion, 
discrimination, persecution, and genocide) provide the most opportune 
setting for ethnic mobilization. thus, although ethnic solidarity is often 
mobilized in pursuit of individual interests, these are disguised as con-
stitutive interests tied to the grievances (or privileges) of the group. this 
is mostly done by the elites who are in the front line of the competition 
for socioeconomic goods and political power, but nonelites also rationally 
exploit the ethnic resource.26 for ethnic mobilization to succeed, how-
ever, the mass of the people (whether rural peasants or urban prole-
tariat) and the various subgroups have to be reasonably dissatisfied with 
their place in the existing system or be committed to preserving extant 
privileges. Where this is not the case, subethnic constituents have been 
known to engage in countermobilization.
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 third, then, ethnic competition occurs at the intergroup as well as 
intragroup levels. At the latter level, subterritorial demarcations, varia-
tions in language (dialects) as well as cultural and religious practices, 
uneven development, and elite factionalism constitute the basis of 
contestations. the example of Somalia, where conflicts among clans of 
the same ethnic group exploded into a protracted civil war, shows that 
intragroup conflicts can be as serious as intergroup conflicts. the point 
here is that competing ethnicities are more complex than analyses that 
focus on only intergroup conflicts suggest. With regard to citizenship, 
the implication of inter- and intragroup competition and conflict is that 
focus should not be merely on engagements between groups and the 
state but also on the whole complex of horizontal engagements that 
involve groups not only discriminating against each other but also mo-
bilizing to deny adversaries (outsiders, nonindigenes) citizenship rights.
Why is ethnicity a Basis for Contested Citizenship?
given these attributes, especially the fact that ethnicity is constructed 
and involves the mobilization of collective identity/security in making 
political demands, we should not be surprised that it is a major basis of 
contested citizenship. it is by no means the only basis for contestation 
(race, gender, religion, class, and so on are other important bases), but 
it is arguably the most potent challenge to national or universal citizen-
ship in Africa.27 the reasons for this are well articulated in the literature 
on ethnicity in Africa, and they can be summarized as follows.28
 the first reason is that ethnicity hinges on and is sustained by territory-
based exclusivist and discriminatory claims. As such, it is antithetical to 
citizenship, which is a more egalitarian concept that assumes the formal 
equality of citizens across territorial boundaries within the state. the 
territoriality of ethnic claims makes it possible for people from outside 
groups to be denied citizenship rights within the same country. Perhaps 
the best example of this is to be found in nigeria, where regionalism 
and statism have historically involved the preclusion of so-called nonin-
digenes (also called migrants or settlers) from citizenship rights in their 
places of domicile.29 the stratification (or ranking) and inequality of 
ethnic groups, coupled with the fact that ethnicity thrives on competi-
tion, make politicized ethnicity dangerous for citizenship.30
 Second, ethno-nationalism, which involves the construction of ethnic 
identity and solidarity for political claims, is often a counterideology to 
the nationalism of the (multiethnic) state, with some disaffected groups 
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demanding separate statehood. the history of the first decade of in-
dependence of many African states is replete with separatist agitations 
and attempted secession. Attempts by Katanga in Congo and Biafra 
in nigeria to secede are most notable in this regard. the situation has 
improved considerably since those heady days, with secession becoming 
less fashionable and separatists now demanding greater autonomy and 
access to power and resources within extant states. the examples of 
the minorities of the oil-producing areas in nigeria, tuaregs in niger, 
Baganda in uganda, and the inkatha-led Zulu in South Africa readily 
come to mind. there are nonetheless pockets of secessionist threats, 
such as right-wing Afrikaner demands for a volkstaat in South Africa, 
resurgent talks of ethno-regional secession (especially by elites of the 
disaffected yoruba–South West in nigeria following the annulment of 
the June 12, 1993, presidential election), and the long, drawn-out battles 
of separatists of Casamance in Senegal and Southern Cameroon in 
Cameroon.
 third, the highly emotive character of ethnicity makes it a powerful 
ideology for mobilization, especially in cases where there is discrimina-
tion against members of the group by the state, or a genocidal threat to 
the collective security or survival of the group is perceived. its intricate 
linkages to, and reinforcement by, other emotive constructs like reli-
gion and territoriality make it even more powerful. donald Horowitz 
explains the strong appeal of ethnicity in terms of the fact that “group 
worth” is a focal point of both individual and group identity because 
self-worth or self-esteem tends to be calculated in terms of the esteem 
accorded the individual’s group. Although Horowitz’s conclusion that 
“the sources of ethnic conflict reside, above all, in the struggle for rela-
tive group worth”31 is somewhat exaggerated, it nevertheless helps to 
explain why a threat to the group is invariably seen as a threat to the self, 
which is, more often than not, the basis of the mobilization of ethnic 
movements and transformation of ethnic identity into political identity. 
under the circumstances, the suppression of ethnic movements only 
serves to justify further countermobilization.
 fourth, ethnic demands tend to enjoy a measure of legitimacy. the 
right to self-determination, which is enshrined in most human rights 
covenants and upheld by international law, legitimizes ethno-nationalism 
and claims for ethnic equality and pluralism, especially where there 
is open discrimination, persecution, or genocide against members of 
a group. in the case of the latter, favorable international opinion and 
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support by international organizations and foreign powers reinforce the 
legitimacy of ethnic mobilization and further encourage the agitators. 
the case of the ogoni minority group in nigeria—whose struggle was 
placed within the larger global framework of climate change, environ-
mental justice, and human rights and whose leader, the late Ken Saro-
Wiwa, enjoyed international acclaim as a minorities’ rights activist—is a 
good example.32 the importance attached to other group rights like cul-
tural, language, and religion rights and the rights of so-called indigenous 
peoples, as well as welfarist or distributive social and economic rights, by 
the united nations and international human rights organizations has 
also had the same effects.
 the fifth reason consists of the gross inequalities among ethnic groups 
in terms of population, resource endowment, political and socioeconomic 
advancement, and access to and actual control of political power and 
the public sector, which over time create ethnic hierarchies. Some of 
the problems in this regard are part of the fatal legacy of colonial rule 
in Africa. Colonial authorities’ established systems of ethnic ranking 
elevated favored groups to superior and dominant political and eco-
nomic positions, which disproportionately composed the public service, 
army, and police, making the latter the monopoly of so-called warrior 
tribes, fostered uneven socioeconomic development especially in the 
educational sector, and generally created a system of unequal access and 
opportunities among the different ethnic groups. these inequalities 
were maintained or even extended by exclusivist postcolonial regimes, 
thereby extending the terrain of competitive ethnicity and contested 
citizenship.
 finally, ethnic mobilization involves some form of formal or infor-
mal organization—ethnic union, hometown, cultural or linguistic asso-
ciation, social movement, communal self-help development union, and 
so forth. these not only function as interest groups, making demands 
in the “political arena for alteration in their status, in their economic 
well-being, in their civil rights, or in their educational opportunities,” 
but they also perform shadow-state functions for members of the group, 
functions that entail providing social goods and services (community 
schools, scholarships, credit facilities, roads, and cottage industries) that 
the state since colonial times has failed to provide for citizens.33 the 
importance of the latter functions (which propelled the emergence of 
what Peter ekeh calls the primordial public, comprising ethnic welfare 
and development organizations)34 lies in the fact that they encourage 
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competition with the state. According to Claude Ake, primordial pub-
lics “became centres of resistance, means of self-affirmation against the 
colonizers’ aggressive deculturing of the ‘natives,’ and also networks of 
survival strategies. By being all this, they became polities and essentially 
displaced the state, depriving it not only of legitimacy but also of a 
civic public. instead of a civic public, political society was parcellized 
into a plurality of primordial publics framing primordial polities which 
are competitive with the state.”35 the failure of postindependence 
governments to perform better than colonial authorities in this regard, 
a situation that became worse with the economic decline suffered by 
most governments in Africa in the period beginning in the mid-1980s, 
ensured the survival and importance of competitive primordial publics.
the dynamics of ethnicity and Contested Citizenship in Africa
the contestation of citizenship along ethnic lines is both a manifesta-
tion and an aggravating factor of the festering legitimacy crisis that has 
rendered the nation-state fragile at best in postcolonial Africa. it shows 
that the processes of state and nation building are still uncompleted 
after many years of independence, with such fundamental issues as citi-
zenship and ownership of the state still largely unresolved.36 members 
of several groups continue to be excluded from and denied full and 
equal citizenship in their states of belonging, while others who belong 
are subordinate and subject citizens. the aim of this section is to search 
for these explanations and examine how changing political, economic, 
and social formations and orientations since the 1960s have affected the 
processes.
 the major explanations for protracted ethnicity-based contestations 
over citizenship in postcolonial Africa have to do with the authoritarian, 
discriminatory, and exclusivist strategies of citizenship construction that 
have been adopted by state power holders since the period of colonial 
rule. for the postindependence power holders, authoritarian strategies 
were ostensibly justified by the imperative of keeping together the artifi-
cial and fragile states they inherited. this approach received the support 
of the dominant intellectual perspectives on state and nation building at 
the time, which theorized nationalism as an exclusively statist ideology.37 
Strong (actually authoritarian) and charismatic father-of-the nation 
leaders, including military “modernizing” rulers, and limited expansion 
of political participation spaces were advanced as prerequisites for po-
litical stability, national integration, and economic development, which 
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were regarded as urgent tasks of independence. in the assimilationist-
centrist conception of the nation, notions of power sharing and pluralism 
were relatively unpopular, and rival claims to the state were perceived as 
threats to be suppressed or eradicated. even countries like nigeria (and 
for shorter periods Kenya, uganda, Cameroon, Sudan, and ethiopia) 
that adopted the federal solution, in which power sharing and pluralism 
were emphasized, approached the formula as a pragmatic means for al-
lowing diversities to coexist peacefully “until such a time as the process 
of modernization resulted in a sufficient degree of national integration 
that would render federal structures redundant.”38
 it is against this background that the prevalence of the one-party 
system (and later military regimes) as instruments of nation-state (and 
citizenship) construction should be analyzed. the forging of national 
consensus through suppression of competing ethnic claims was the 
spearhead of this offensive. Leaders like Julius nyerere, modibo Keita, 
Jomo Kenyatta, and Kwame nkrumah sought justification for their 
schemes on the basis of so-called traditional African social formations 
and political thought whose paradigms not only claimed the absence of 
class divisions and institutionalized opposition but also, more impor-
tantly, emphasized the organic solidarity of that society, the primacy 
of the community over the individual, and the role of the ruler as the 
symbol and embodiment of the unity of the “nation.”
 this was the context within which the totalizing tendencies of 
the state took root.39 At the heart of these were the attempts to do-
mesticate civil society and place the entire political space under state 
control. nothing, including the private sector, was exempt from state 
intervention, and very little space was left for autonomous action. the 
state assumed exclusive control of national economies through nation-
alization, centralized planning, and unbridled expansion of the public 
sector. restrictions were placed on labor unions and other civil society 
constituents whose demands and advocacy for human rights and good 
governance and close ties with opposition groups made them targets 
of state repression. Press freedom was in short supply, as only state-
owned media that were closed to opposition elements were allowed to 
operate. Although many constitutions contained bills of rights, human 
rights were observed more in the breach. in fact, rather than rights, the 
obligations or duties of the citizen to the state were emphasized, as was 
said to be consistent with African communalism.40 But even duties were 
also problematic, because of the failure of the state to reciprocate with 
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corresponding rights. group rights, especially the right to local self-
determination, were denied. even a federal state like nigeria denied 
minority groups in the regions the right to internal political autonomy. 
even ordinary and day-to-day things like popular music, personal 
names, clothing, and food, as well as culture and national languages, 
which ought to belong to the private realm, attracted government in-
tervention, as was amply demonstrated by mobutu’s authenticité project 
in Zaire.
 it is in the political sphere, however, where the full force and impact 
of state totalization can be more clearly seen. opposition parties that 
were mostly ethnic and sectional (this was largely a response to the 
perceived ethnicization of the state) and their leaders were repressed 
or outlawed. in many cases, there was a one-party system de jure, and 
all public structures and organizations from the local to the national 
level were linked to the party—and in some countries (for example, 
Liberia), membership in the ruling party was compulsory for public 
servants. Where so-called opposition parties were allowed to function, 
as was the case in Botswana, gambia, mauritius, and Senegal, ruling 
parties deployed corporatist and patrimonialist strategies to co-opt the 
leaders and render them ineffective or physically eliminate them. Later, 
military regimes outlawed political associations, which they accused of 
being agents of division.
 in all this, so-called nation-destroying ethnicity (or tribalism) was 
considered the chief enemy. this could not have been surprising, con-
sidering that it was perhaps the only counterstate (nationalist) ideology 
that escaped the totalizing process, in part because state power holders 
were themselves ardent players of the ethnic game—indeed, Horowitz 
points out that one-party regimes were “a mask for ethnic domina-
tion.”41 for members of dominated and minority groups, ethnic move-
ments and organizations provided the vehicles of resistance to state 
repression. State power holders, however, tried all they could to suppress 
or eliminate ethnicity (opposition ethnicity, in effect), without much 
success. Some, like Sekou toure of guinea, abolished the institution of 
chieftaincy to arrest the growth of ethnicity, while others, like nkrumah 
of ghana and general ironsi of nigeria, banned ethnic associations and 
political organizations and discouraged ethnic political participation.42
 Because abolition of ethnicity was impossible, some leaders were forced 
(by reasons of political expediency, mostly) to embrace ethnic arithmetic 
formulas to redress ethnic and social inequalities in the public sector and 
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balance competing ethnicities in the composition of central government 
and its agencies, especially the civil service, the military, and universities. 
But by and large, as was consistent with the overall totalizing strategies, 
the emphasis continued to be placed on the deployment of the coercive 
apparatus of the state to deal with ethnicity and ethnic mobilization.
 the foregoing summarizes the fatal foundations of nation-state and 
citizenship construction in postindependence Africa. By emasculating 
civil society’s roles of cogovernance, the earlier postindependence re-
gimes made unresolved issues of coexistence inherited from colonial 
rule difficult to address. the coercive and authoritarian approach to the 
construction of the nation-state therefore had the effect of heightening 
ethnic tensions and conflicts. moreover, the inability of governments to 
meet the high expectations of independence, which led to the strength-
ening of shadow and alternative state functions performed by the pri-
mordial publics, ensured that the ethnic hold on citizenship was kept 
strong. the sectional and hegemonic uses to which state power was 
put, however, accentuated the contestation of citizenship along ethnic 
lines. By preserving and in some cases extending the ethnic inequalities 
inherited from the colonial era, by making the public sector the virtual 
monopoly of the president’s ethnic group and precluding other groups 
from state power, by promoting the culture, language, and religion of 
that group as national symbols, and, worst of all, by making it impos-
sible for displaced and marginalized groups to legitimately seek redress, 
power holders excluded large sections of the country from effective 
citizenship. the result was the spate of fierce contestations, separat-
ist agitations, civil wars, and state fragility that marked the first five 
decades of independence.
 Africa has since gone through tremendous change and transition. 
the period beginning in the 1990s, in particular, consisted of years 
of profound economic and political transformation and reforms. de-
mocratization occasioned by constitutional and governance reforms 
brought with it new emphasis on the rights of individuals and groups, 
the dismantling of authoritarian structures and regimes, and pluralism 
(the opening of political space, the emergence of virile civil society, 
and multiparty politics). the opening up of previously closed political 
spaces and the growing legitimation of ethnic demands in the ferment 
of a global democratic revolution reinvented issues of state owner-
ship and citizenship in a manner that called for remarkably different 
approaches to nation-state construction. in place of the old wisdom 
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of authoritarian, centrist, and assimilationist strategies came the new 
wisdom of pluralism, power sharing, human rights, and inclusion—in 
short, an open and democratic approach to addressing the national 
question. this development has been greatly aided by new intellectual 
paradigms that emphasize a shift away from state-directed integration 
and citizenship construction to shared civil society and state-driven 
integration and governance.43 A major premise of the new paradigm is 
the claim that “democratization is a process not of suppressing but of 
institutionalizing conflict.”44
 the emergence of a virile civil society emboldened previously sup-
pressed counterhegemonic identity groups and movements to engage 
the state to demand inclusive citizenship. Some of the more conspicuous 
manifestations of this emboldening include independent mass media; 
rights-asserting activities of civil liberties, prodemocracy, and minor-
ity rights organizations; the reinvigoration of labor, student, women’s, 
and professional associations seeking governance reform; and a flood of 
strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of protest to back political and 
economic demands. given the primacy of ethnicity in the structuration 
of state-citizen relations, it was only to be expected that ethnic mobiliza-
tion for emancipation, inclusion, equity, and justice would be a major 
part of the new politics of citizen movements that arose to renegotiate 
solidarity or belongingness. A large part of this involved the construction 
of spaces that empowered citizens to make self-determined choices in 
terms of Albert o. Hirschman’s analytic categories of exit, voice, and loy-
alty.45 While exit has always provided alternative sites beyond the reach 
of the state and has remained a redress-seeking strategy of last resort, the 
new politics have hinged more on the reciprocity of voice and loyalty.
 the dynamics of the changing scenario of citizenship engagements 
are well illustrated by the experience of minority groups in nigeria 
whose nationalist—in effect, citizenship—politics has moved from 
seeking accommodation to demanding self-determination.46 in the 
northern parts of the country, where religion has been the dominant 
mode of domination and exclusion, minorities sought to assert their 
rights as non-muslim indigenes. this pitched them against the Hausa/
fulani, who have been at the top of the ethnic ladder since colonial 
times on the one hand, and on the other hand the state and federal 
governments from whom the minority leaders demand protection and 
justice. in Kaduna, taraba, nasarawa, and Plateau States, autonomous 
chiefdoms have been created to safeguard the minorities, while federal 
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authorities have become more sensitive to reflecting the ethnic, religious, 
and cultural diversity of the north in the sharing of political offices and 
economic resources. the case of the minorities of the oil-rich niger 
delta is even more interesting. there, the ijaw, ogoni, urhobo, and oth-
ers have exploited their location as the source of the country’s oil wealth 
to the fullest by not only exacting a greater share of the federation’s 
pooled revenues and increased political autonomy but also raising their 
levels of group worth to the point of producing the country’s president 
(goodluck Jonathan). two things are particularly remarkable about the 
new forms of struggle from below: first, they are rights-based and aim 
at respecting diversity and inclusion; and second, the engagements are 
located within larger frameworks of governance, economic, political, 
and constitutional reforms involving local and global civil society and 
other nonstate coalitions, which makes it relatively more difficult for 
ethnic demands to be demonized or treated in isolation.
 the new citizenship politics has been driven by (new) social move-
ments whose demands for rights and justice dwell more on first-line 
participation in decision making and making the state more accountable 
than the old fight for formal rights. the integrated solidarity roles of 
the social movements have also seen the emergence of civil society and 
(autonomous) communities as (alternative) sites of identity and loyalty. 
So the notion that the state is the natural or (only) legitimate repository 
of integral loyalty seems to be no longer as valid as it used to be. in 
fact, in rethinking the state of the global South, whose chronic and en-
demic pathologies have stood in the way of full citizenship for all, there 
are those who argue that the time has come to de-privilege the state, 
de-construct its colonial fixation, and consider possible alternatives.47 
Cumulatively, these developments and these robust engagements have 
brought renewed hopes for marginalized, dominated, and excluded 
groups, although the continued emphasis on indigeneity remains the 
greatest obstacle to equal citizenship. in this regard, a lot of work still 
needs to be done by the state and civil society, especially in the area of 
reducing the gross inequalities in resources, access, and opportunities 
among competing groups.
 one point that bears emphasizing is that the wind of change and 
transformation across Africa has not rendered ethnicity and therefore 
the functional principle less salient in the new patterns of the politics of 
belonging. A major explanation for this is that the structural inequali-
ties that have historically separated the various groups and subgroups 
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remain, a matter that the economic decline of the state has not helped. 
economic decline is only one part of the state fragility variables (which 
include poor governance, accountability deficits, and intractable conflicts 
and insurrection) that have seen most governments in Africa unable 
to discharge the functions of effective statehood. Another explanation 
lies in the continued manipulations of ethnicity by incumbent political 
parties and governments to retain power. these manipulations, it goes 
without saying, ensure the retention of new ethnic hierarchies and the 
creation of new ones.
Concluding notes
the emergence of a virile civil society from the throes of economic re-
forms and political transition as a relatively autonomous co-actor in state 
building, however, was a major advance in the process of resolving the 
national question of which citizenship is an integral part. thus, although 
the structural inequalities that encourage competing ethnicities remain, 
and contestation of citizenship has tended to intensify in the aftermath 
of political and economic reforms, the chances of constructing equal or 
universal citizenship are now arguably brighter than they were previously.
 this is not because the functional representational principle of citi-
zenship is no longer prevalent (this will remain the case for as long as 
indigeneity remains the condition for citizenship) but because the new 
forms of citizenship engagement aim at appropriating the state, mak-
ing decision making more participatory, and making the state more 
accountable. Within this framework, questions of group inequality and 
relations of domination, which need to be resolved before individuals 
can meaningfully become universal citizens, now stand a chance of being 
democratically posed and better managed, if not resolved. the increased 
involvement of civil society in citizenship construction makes the pro-
cess more discerning of diversity and the imperatives of equitable rights 
and accountability, and therefore more likely to endure as a negotiated 
rather than a received paradigm. But this would depend to a great extent 
on the ability of civil society to assert itself as an autonomous co-actor in 
nation-state reconstruction. As John Keane puts it, “Civil society and the 
state must become the condition of each other’s democratization.”48
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f r e d e r i C K  C o o P e r
C I t I z e n s H I P  I s  A  P O w e r f u l  C O n C e P t ,  A n d  A  P r O t e A n  O n e .  I t  I s 
above all a claim-making construct, juxtaposing people’s assertion of 
rights against a state’s assertion of obligations. Citizenship both pre-
sumes and fosters a sense of belonging, of membership in a collectivity, 
and therefore it simultaneously includes and excludes. Citizenship is a 
focus of claims and counterclaims in today’s Africa, as it has been in the 
past—within African colonies and independent countries, across colo-
nial empires, in reference to a variety of diasporically and territorially 
defined collectivities. one of the virtues of this volume is that it gives as 
much attention to the variety of meanings of citizenship as to the impor-
tance of the category. it is all to the good that some of the contributors 
to this volume disagree with others over how the concept should be used. 
And it is also to the good that several of them write about the future of 
citizenship claims with passion, not just analytic precision.
 much of the controversy lies in how one is to conceive of the relation-
ship between citizenship and colonialism and how to assess the impact 
of colonial patterns on contemporary Africa in the long run. Coloniza-
tion, one argument goes, produced subjects, not citizens.1 But does this 
conception give too much weight to colonizers’ perceptions of their own 
power to define categories, when the realities were more ambiguous than 
that? As emma Hunter points out in her introduction to this volume, so-
called subjects engaged with colonial legal structures in different ways.2 
And they had their own conceptions of what political belonging might 
mean. the question is how much we want to consider colonial empires 
to be contested spheres, in which—for all the extremes of inequality—
struggle mattered. in chapter 2 of this volume, nicole ulrich points to 
the complexities of struggle as long ago as the eighteenth-century Cape. 
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Khoesan, slaves of Southeast Asian origin, and lower-level dutch in vary-
ing ways sought either to distance themselves—literally or figuratively— 
from the dutch east india Company administration or to use the 
state’s own legal mechanisms to claim at least a slightly better situation 
within it. After the British takeover from the dutch, the status of subject 
of the king became itself a basis for making claims. As ulrich shows, 
“the incorporation of Khoesan . . . into the category of ‘British subject’” 
allowed workers to claim basic legal protections. there is no need to 
exaggerate the effectiveness of such claim making across much of the 
history of european colonization in Africa, but we can avoid the trap of 
having to choose between conceptions of absolute subjectification and a 
view of power relations as “negotiated.”
 even the idea of an imperial “subject” presumes some form of incor-
poration into a polity, and empires deployed a range of mechanisms to 
make sure that subjects understood both their subordination and their 
incorporation. they at times needed loyalty—even military service—
from their subjects, and command and exemplary violence were not 
necessarily sufficient to enforce loyalty on a daily basis, let alone in cir-
cumstances when imperial power could be very much in question. that 
is why the category of “subject” could hardly be a stable one. Colonial 
regimes went to considerable effort to police their boundaries precisely 
because of the ambiguity of imperial power. People in the categories 
of subject and citizen knew—or at least some of them knew—about 
the other and moved between social fields characterized by each. As 
Cherry Leonardi and Chris Vaughan (chapter 3, this volume) put it, 
“multiple registers of political language were being spoken simultane-
ously or alternately” and the “rhetoric of rights and citizenship was 
intertwined with older discourses of genealogy, personalized and pater-
nalist rule, and patrimonial obligation.” Citizenship, for many Africans 
in the colonial period, was something they knew about but could not 
have. it was therefore the focus of demands, complaints, petitions, and 
mobilizations.
 Colonial governments were confronted both with the fragility of 
their own mechanisms of control and with the ambivalence of elites in 
and out of government about the simultaneous imperatives of imperial 
inclusion and the maintenance of boundaries. even in the paradigmatic 
case of french Algeria—where the juridical basis of the subject-citizen 
distinction was worked out and the separate system of “justice” for non-
citizens was enshrined—influential members of the french political 
284
Frederick cooper
establishment repeatedly questioned the legitimacy and practicality of 
such distinctions until they were formally repudiated in the Constitu-
tion of 1946.3
 if the association of subjecthood with colonization turns out to be 
complex, the association of citizenship with the “nation” is problematic 
as well. Citizenship has a long history—much longer than notions of 
“the nation-state” or “popular sovereignty.” At times—such as rome 
in the era of the republic (509–27 BC)—it implied that the people of 
rome had a political voice, and its selective extension became a tool of 
roman elites for incorporating a portion of conquered people. in Ad 
212 the emperor Caracalla declared all nonenslaved male inhabitants of 
the roman empire to be citizens, with the right, among other things, 
to have any legal cases involving them to be heard in a roman court. 
Here was the model for imperial citizenship: defining membership in 
a vast, culturally diverse system whose unity was created by the power 
of a state. When the possibility of extending citizenship to the subjects 
of the french empire was being debated in 1946, proponents and op-
ponents alike referred to the proposal as a new “edict of Caracalla.” the 
arguments—in political mobilizations in Africa as much as in the legis-
lature in Paris—were vigorous and uncertain in outcome or significance, 
because both government leaders and African activists wanted to give 
juridical weight to concepts of belonging: one to insist on loyalty and 
obligations, the other to claim rights and resources.4
 in historical terms—in 1946 as much as 212—the location of citi-
zenship was not predetermined. empire could be a meaningful unit of 
political belonging, a claim on the patronage of the king or the parlia-
ment, an assertion of rights within a large, diverse, resource-rich politi-
cal entity. or monarchs could insist that they were the source of rights, 
which they could allocate differentially to groups within their realms. 
Such a ruler was not entirely free to not grant rights, however, without 
risk to his legitimacy and authority.5
 When the idea that rights originated in “the people” entered political 
discourse, the stakes of deciding who constituted the people became 
higher. no sooner had the declaration of the rights of man and of the 
citizen emerged in the Paris assemblies in 1789 than the question of 
whether they applied in the colonies as well as in metropolitan france 
came to the fore. the revolutionary assemblies at first temporized, but 
after the revolution in Saint-domingue broke out in 1791 they decided 
for pragmatic as much as principled reasons to include free people of 
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color within the realm of citizenship, then to free and make citizens of 
the slaves. But the restrictive vision came back when napoleon tried to 
reinstate slavery, succeeding in most of france’s colonies but provoking 
the exit of Saint-domingue from the empire.6 the question of imperial 
citizenship would be debated periodically from then on. the exclusion 
of colonized people from citizenship was not a notion that could be 
taken for granted.
 imperial citizenship was a focus of demands in the British as well as 
the french empire in most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
About the same time as france passed its new edict of Caracalla, the 
British Parliament (1948) passed its nationality Act, which granted a 
superposed British citizenship to citizens of Canada, Australia, and 
the other dominions—and the colonies as well.7 But if the domain 
of citizenship could be wider than the territorially defined nation, it 
could also be smaller. in early modern Spain, citizenship had much 
more to do with cities than with kingdoms; the institutions of urban 
society defined what membership in a political entity signified.8 the 
ambiguous locality of citizenship—which is neither new nor specific 
to Africa—is quite relevant to the problems that are central to the 
chapters in this volume. is the existence of sentiments of belonging at 
the level of a linguistically or culturally defined community—a moral 
community, to use John Lonsdale’s term—compatible with citizen-
ship in a state-centered conception?9
 Hunter argues in the introduction to this volume that notions of 
belonging can exist simultaneously at different levels and that one func-
tion of the state can be to foster and protect the diversity of its popula-
tion. in principle, she is right, but things do not always work out that 
way. As Jean marie Allman showed in regard to British West Africa in 
the 1950s, the form and rhetoric of “Asante” nationalism could be quite 
similar to that of “ghanaian” nationalism. And the two engaged in bit-
ter conflict, precisely because they saw that locating the nation at one 
level diminished power at the other.10
 indeed, the very conception that one sort of citizenship can be 
considered “national” while another is “ethnic” flattens the historical 
process that defines units of political action and subjective belonging. 
Asante was itself an empire that forcibly incorporated people into its 
institutions, assimilating them to varying degrees and maintaining dis-
tinctions to varying extents. John Lonsdale (chapter 1) warns against 
treating the forms of incorporation or belonging in different African 
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societies (centralized or otherwise) as a specifically African form of citi-
zenship that could be used as a model today. What might today appear 
as fundamental units of belonging have been shaped at various times by 
migration, the flexibility of kinship structures, adaptation to new envi-
ronments, cultural interaction, religious conversion and invention, and 
the power of elites to forcibly incorporate some people and violently 
exclude others. Colonial regimes—pace mahmood mamdani—fostered 
both a theory that reified ethnic boundaries and practices that blurred 
them. As V. Adefemi isumonah argues for nigeria in chapter 8 of this 
volume, the argument for ethnically defined group rights “presumes 
that the question of subgroup or major group membership is settled. 
every ethnic group membership is frozen.”
 one has, nevertheless, to be careful about going too far in emphasiz-
ing the variability and changeability of the citizenship construct. the 
power of the citizenship construct does not lie in its fluidity. States take 
claims seriously when they have a social and political basis. People’s 
sense of belonging is not fixed in time, but it is not transitory either. 
Affinity may or may not crystallize in group membership, that is, in 
the notion of belonging to a bounded collectivity, to which one either 
belongs or does not.11 And group membership may or may not translate 
into the capacity to allocate resources with authority. to talk about citi-
zenship is to talk about the relationship of units of belonging to units of 
power. that means, as several of the authors in this volume make clear, 
that discussion of citizenship entails analysis of how states resist claims 
as much as how they respond to them.
 demands for cultural recognition or defense of local or regional in-
terests are one form of claim making but not the only alternative to a 
nation-state-centered view of power. People can organize on the basis 
of class, gender, and generation. they demand many different things 
of states. the question is not so much whether states should recognize 
cultural particularity as whether they respond to a wide variety of collec-
tive mobilizations and what categories of people and what categories of 
political actions states can exclude from the political arena. Several con-
tributors to this volume point to the dangers of privileging the principle 
of “indigeneity.”12 isumonah, for example, sees ethnic representation 
as privileging certain power brokers over others. eghosa e. osaghae 
(chapter 10) sees such a politics as not only promoting conflict but also 
“disenabling” claims to equality among all citizens. Solomon m. gofie 
(chapter 9) shows that even a state—post-1991 ethiopia—willing to 
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vest a degree of power in regions and to promote an “ethnic federalism” 
put in place a “formal recognition of multiple identities” while avoiding 
crucial issues of human rights. Henri-michel yéré (chapter 5) reports 
that even as powerful a figure as félix Houphouët-Boigny could not 
get elite ivorians to accept flexible concepts of nationality, setting off 
the escalation of claims for a true ivoirité that excluded people with a 
historic pattern of cross-border connections that had contributed to the 
prosperity of ivory Coast. the very fact of privileging “ethnic citizen-
ship” allows state officials the possibility of playing off ethnic groups 
against each other and against other demands for social and economic 
justice. osaghae powerfully criticizes the “state-centered, authoritarian, 
and nonaccountable manner in which citizenship has been constructed 
within the broader framework of nation and legitimacy building.” And 
Aidan russell (chapter 4) describes an especially insidious instance of a 
state that promoted a sharp line between the included and the excluded, 
while denying even the included “space to express the slightest hint of 
independent political thought.” the ethnicization of politics is as much 
the consequence of such state politics as ethnic differentiation is the 
cause of political conflict.
 in both colonial and postcolonial times, the assertion of rights im-
plied more than one kind of demand at a given time. the quest for 
citizenship was not just a demand for recognition as a “nation” or for 
a political voice in running that nation: it was part of a quest for a 
chance for a better life in a world in which states are essential actors. 
it was a quest for dignity. different movements put the accent on dif-
ferent places, and the tensions between different levels—between local 
or regional collectivities and the state, between demands for equality 
with a privileged group and autonomy from that group—are tellingly 
described in the chapters of this book.
 is the citizenship construct a “Western” import, a particular form of 
relationship to the state that excludes others? yes and no.13 Africa is rich 
in the variety of forms of belonging, of affinity, of a relationship of po-
litical authority to people. Citizenship can be defined to include all such 
methods (incorporation into “networks of authority,” as Hunter puts it), 
but then one will have to invent a new term to focus on a particular—
and particularly powerful—form. Citizenship is so important as a form 
of claim making because it posits a collective body of equivalent citizens 
who have a common relationship to the state. that Africans need to 
come to grips with the state—and specific forms, territorially defined, 
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of the state—is a product of history, in which the place of colonization 
looms large. But it is not a history of a simple imposition. Citizenship 
enables people to push on the form, as well as the actions, of the state.
 one can distinguish the horizontal nature of the citizenry from the 
vertical relationship characteristic of patrimonial systems, including 
African kingdoms and european empires—which discourage relation-
ships among equivalents and foster relationships of patron to client, of 
king to subject, of emperor to subordinate rulers. in such terms, citizen-
ship presumes a certain kind of state, one that recognizes a “population” 
that is both the object of state power and—in democratic theory—the 
ultimate source of state power. Critics of liberal governance postulate 
that such a state form reduces complex social and political relationships 
to a one-to-one relationship of individual to state.
 the actual politics of citizenship is not so simple—in france, great 
Britain, or the united States as much as in any African country. People 
bring their various connections among themselves to their connection 
to the state. Citizens are not, in practice, equivalent in resources and 
influence. Some are more “in” than others. But the citizenship ideal 
is an important claim-making tool, an assertion of equivalence that, if 
effectively made, limits the vertical structures of power. in the aftermath 
of the constitutional innovations that made his constituents into french 
citizens, Léopold Sédar Senghor developed a theory of political action 
that was quite explicit on this point. He called for two forms of solidar-
ity: “horizontal solidarity,” among African citizens of france; and “ver-
tical solidarity,” between european and African france. His metaphor 
of vertical solidarity acknowledged the reality of inequality—in wealth, 
education, access to media—that colonization had produced, while 
turning the vertical connection into an African claim on the superior 
resources of european france.14
 Senghor’s generation of political leaders was building movements 
out of potential citizens as they actually were—with their kinship net-
works, cultural practices, patronage relations, and village or urban com-
munities. recognizing that the generalization of citizenship brought 
to the voting booth largely rural Senegalese, Senghor sought to build a 
constituency by working through regional elites—the marabouts asso-
ciated with the major islamic brotherhoods. the political movement he 
fashioned thus linked the particular social organization of rural Senegal 
to the institution of voting, organized in the 1950s on a french model. 
Here and elsewhere, the politics of citizenship was relational, drawing 
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on complex and dynamic affinities in rural and urban Africa. Such poli-
tics is typical of much of the world where citizens vote.15
 that last point is a critical one, for the social dynamics of citizen-
ship can degenerate into a divisive form of patron-client relations if not 
subjected to the discipline of elections. the horizontal solidarity that 
an open and fair election embodies can turn into an entirely vertical 
relationship, in which the population as a whole has no check on the 
activities of elites and patrons mobilize rival sets of clients, leading to a 
political arena that is not only undemocratic but also divided. As Lon-
sdale points out, population growth shifts the power in patron-client 
relations toward the patrons. even where elections continue to be held, 
the extremes of vertical authority can undermine the making of claims 
in the name of the equivalence of citizens. But, as such events as the 
popular mobilizations that drove Blaise Compaoré out of Burkina faso 
in 2014 demonstrate, citizens acting together, outside of elections, can 
challenge a person who holds the power of patronage, state authority, 
and armed henchmen.
 now, the framework for such conflicts is the territorial state. in for-
mer french Africa, this situation results from the fact that Senghor 
lost one of his most important battles: over the location of citizenship. 
He fought for, and for a time seemed to be getting his way, in creating 
a multilayered conception of citizenship, recognizing people as both 
french and African. His starting point was citizenship in an empire—
french citizenship—but he wanted to inflect it to acknowledge the 
diversity of the peoples that made up the french empire. the Constitu-
tion of 1946, written by an assembly of which Senghor was a member, 
made french subjects into citizens without forcing them to give up 
their personal status under islamic or “customary” law. in important 
ways, the citizenship they won was diluted. ultimate power rested in a 
national assembly in which Africans were underrepresented. But citi-
zenship was also a basis for claiming rights at the level of the individual 
territory, in french Africa as a whole, and in the entire french union 
(as the empire was renamed). Senghor wanted basic rights—freedom 
of speech and assembly, for example—to be guaranteed at the broad-
est level, for he feared that local political interests would tempt leaders 
to undermine the rights of citizens. He wanted Africans to be able to 
take their rights with them, whether at home, in another African terri-
tory, or in european france. And he wanted french Africans to unite 
among themselves in a federation of African territories, an expression 
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of “horizontal” solidarity that was distinctly African. As yéré explains in 
this volume, a broad conception of citizenship was shared in other parts 
of french Africa, but some, like Houphouët-Boigny, rejected the idea 
of an African federation and sought a direct relationship of each french 
African territory to a french federation in which all would be citizens.
 these disagreements, as well as france’s reluctance to face the so-
cial and economic costs that demands for the equivalence of citizens 
would have produced, led to a separation of citizenships instead of one 
of the various forms of federalism that most West African politicians 
had sought. france’s West African territories ended up in 1960 as eight 
nation-states, most small, most poor, most with limited resources to 
promote education and health services. the most important asset their 
leaders had was sovereignty, and they guarded it jealously. Senghor him-
self ended up in the trap he had predicted would ensue from what he 
called the “balkanization” of Africa: regarding power within the territo-
rially bounded state as a zero-sum game, he proved willing to trample 
on the political rights of Senegalese citizens to retain it.
 the “unit” question was thus a critical dimension of the history of 
citizenship in the time of decolonization. Basil davidson has referred 
to the nation-state as a “curse”—not because the state is an evil thing or 
because nation is not a genuine focus of sentiment, but because seeing 
the two as inexorably linked draws stark boundaries around a territori-
ally defined space and presumes homogeneity and singularity within it, 
making political control into an all-or-nothing affair.16
 Perhaps the layered notion of citizenship that seemed a real possibility 
in the 1950s might have proven less brittle than the resolutely national 
citizenship with which African states ended up—making leaders reluc-
tant to cede some of their power to a more inclusive (federal or con-
federal) African entity or to smaller (regional, ethnic) units within the 
territorial state. Perhaps not. But citizenship politics did not end there. 
there was still the question of—to use Lahra Smith’s expression—how 
“meaningful” citizenship within newly independent states could be?17
 more useful than the dualism of subject-citizen or western-nonwestern 
citizenships is another notion mentioned in some of the chapters of this 
book and in some of the scholarly literature on citizenship: between 
“thick” and “thin” citizenship. is citizenship merely a formal expression 
of membership in a political unit, be it imperial, national, or otherwise? 
or does citizenship convey something more: voting rights, eligibility 
for office, protection against government abuses, the right to education, 
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to health services, to possibilities for collective action? is citizenship a 
matter of the relationships and associations that people construct for 
themselves, outside of but in relation to state institutions? rather than 
operating as a static dualism, this distinction enables us to focus on 
processes of “thickening” or “thinning.” might one conceptualize the 
politics of the late 1940s and 1950s in french Africa as a “thickening” of 
the formal status that was constitutionally granted, after much contesta-
tion, in 1946, as trade unions demanded equality of wages and as African 
politicians operating at territorial, Africa-wide, and empire-wide levels 
kept pushing for political, social, and economic reforms?
 And did the first generation of African rulers, well aware of the 
volatility of citizenship claims from their own experience of the 1950s 
and equally aware of the limited capacity of their governments to meet 
the demands of citizens for social and economic justice, try to thin out 
citizenship? might the demands coming from citizens close to the seat 
of power for a thicker citizenship for themselves have something to do 
with the tendencies in such countries as ivory Coast to take an increas-
ingly exclusionary view of citizenship, to define categories of people out 
of it, and hence out of the possibility of making claims?
 thinking about the varying levels at which citizenship discourse 
and practices exist helps us understand the changing spatial and juridi-
cal world that Africans have had to navigate since the middle of the 
twentieth century—and the bitterness brought about by some of these 
changes. for a time after World War ii, British and french Africans 
had the legal right to travel to and settle in parts of their respective 
empires, including the British isles and metropolitan france, and they 
could do so as rights-bearing citizens. Such possibilities—however 
harsh the conditions of life that intraempire migrants experienced—
shaped an African presence in european cities and movements of peo-
ple, money, and cultural practices between Africa and other parts of the 
world. independence entailed the separation of citizenships, softened 
by treaties and other arrangements that for a time made it easier for 
people from the ex-colonies to move to Britain or france and in some 
cases to establish or have recognized their British or french nationality. 
But in france, where french citizens in Africa had once had a political 
voice, the power to decide the rules of access to citizenship was trans-
ferred to metropolitan hands. When the french government decided in 
1974 to restrict immigration, including that of its pre-1960 citizens, it 
was within its power to impose its rules. Britain likewise tightened its 
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restrictions on the movement of people from its former dependencies 
in Asia and Africa to the British isles in the 1960s, drastically so in the 
1970s. So if an ambiguous imperial citizenship was pushed into national 
containers in independent African countries, Britain and france also 
adapted more national, more exclusionary, definitions of citizenship, 
vis-à-vis the descendants of people whom they had once tried to keep 
within their imperial embrace.
 But citizenship is more complicated—and more controversial—than 
a neat line between those who have it and those who don’t. Citizenship 
has not been an indivisible construct. Postwar social policy in european 
states linked certain rights to work status and residence, not nationality, 
at a time when migration within and beyond europe was extensive: 
these rights included wage and benefits legislation, access of children 
to schools, medical care, participation in trade unions, and access to 
courts administering labor law. in some cases, people could vote in local 
elections in their country of residence, even if they were not citizens. 
Some scholars, such as yasemin nuhoǧlu Soysal, who have studied 
this phenomenon perceptively, refer to this situation as “post-national 
citizenship.” But the “post” presumes a chronological priority to “na-
tional” citizenship. in fact, the postnational citizenship Soysal describes 
resembles the imperial citizenship of the french union after World 
War ii.18 more recently, the advent of the european union has set out 
a supranational, european citizenship, which is inscribed on people’s 
passports, while the Schengen process has bumped to a european level 
the control of movement and identification that is often regarded as 
intrinsically national.19
 But this inclusivity is specifically european (and its future, at this 
point, cannot be taken for granted). to many Africans, europe as a 
whole is surrounded by a barrier, and people risk their lives in cross-
ing in leaky boats between Africa and the Canary islands or Sicily in 
an attempt to cross it. the politics of the “sans papiers” has become a 
political issue in france, in which memories of a previous citizenship 
regime—and the contributions of African subjects and citizens to the 
defense and prosperity of france—are invoked against the exclusionary 
nature of the current regime.
 Can African governments devise their own equivalent of the Schen-
gen system? there were waves of expulsions of nonnationals from a 
number of African countries in the 1960s, and in this volume, rus-
sell, yéré, and Samantha Balaton-Chrimes (chapter 6) all describe 
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exclusionary practices of African states vis-à-vis each other.20 yet the 
founding treaty of the economic Community of West African States 
(1975) and subsequent protocols look toward a “community citizenship” 
derivative of citizenship in the member states and “the abolition of 
obstacles to free movement of persons, services and capital.”21 But the 
restrictions on movement remain tighter than those of Schengen. two 
nigerian law professors describe these provisions as “a greek gift, giv-
ing rights with the right hand and taking them back with the left,” as 
national governments stick to their own forms of regulation.22 African 
leaders and scholars are aware of alternative models of citizenship, of 
the possibilities for their citizens and the dangers to their power, of 
more flexible and inclusive citizenship regimes.
 Looking within and beyond the state-citizenship nexus in Africa, 
we are left with multiple questions. Can African states move toward 
notions of citizenship that are thick and inclusive rather than thin and 
exclusive? Can states be responsive to the multiple forms of affinity 
among their populations and the multiple forms of mobilization of their 
citizens, not just affinity and mobilization based on putative linguistic 
or cultural commonality? Can wealthy countries that depend on cross-
border movements of workers recognize how much the welfare of the 
entire population depends on people with different relations to the state 
and to each other?
 Citizenship claims shook up colonial regimes just when they thought 
their top-down programs of economic development and gradual and 
controlled extension of political participation would give colonial rule 
a new lease on life. they threatened the leaders of independent states 
enough to thin out or even suppress recently won citizenship rights 
and at times led African rulers to dismiss the very notion of rights as a 
neocolonialist idea. But in different African countries at different times, 
citizens have reasserted their right to claim rights, to equal treatment 
before the law, to a determining voice in public affairs, to respect for 
human dignity and welfare. one period when such tendencies are evi-
dent in numerous African countries is the present. osaghae, for exam-
ple, points to “rights-asserting activities of civil liberties, prodemocracy, 
and minority rights organizations; the reinvigoration of labor, student, 
women’s, and professional associations seeking governance reform; and 
a flood of strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of protest.” the poli-
tics of citizenship, as this volume makes clear, has a present and a future 
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